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A.

IV .

Appointed to the United States Supreme Court by President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt in 1939, William 0. Douglas (1898-1980) was one of the
foremost judicial activists in the field of individual rights and constitutional
liberties in U.S. history.' Perhaps it is not surprising that among the
1. For a consensus among legal historians on Douglas's individual rights and
civil rights jurisprudence, see MICHAEL R. BELKNAP, THE VINSON COURT:
JUSTICES, RULINGS AND LEGACY 63 (2004); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM
CROW TO CIvIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL
EQUALITY 194 (2004); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT

239-40 (1993); see also Abe Fortas, William 0. Douglas: An Appreciation, 51 IND.
L.J. 3 (1975); Laura Krugman Ray, JudicialPersonality: Rhetoric and Emotion in
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twentieth-century justices, Douglas was also the Court's most outspoken
critic of the military's legal construct.2 Throughout his judicial tenure,
which spanned from 1939 to 1975, Douglas was both a principal advocate
for reforming the military's legal construct-in particular the military's
justice system-and, at the same time, a staunch and often unyielding critic
of it.3 Indeed, over time, his criticism of the military's legal construct
increased rather than abated, even as many of the judicially imposed
reforms he advocated for were enacted into law.
Douglas's anti-military ideology was not only a companion to his
individual-rights and civil-rights ideology, but it was also predicated on a
belief in the necessity of limiting what he perceived as an unhealthy
expansion of the Executive Branch's power. He believed that a nexus
existed between the Executive Branch's assertion of almost exclusive
control over the military and its willingness to forgo constitutional checks
and ignore popular opinion against policy decisions, such as when or how
to commit the Nation into an armed conflict. To Douglas, even in a
constitutional democracy, Executive Branch control over the military was a
dangerous power requiring judicially imposed limitations. Thus, he sought
a constitutional realignment that would, if successfully achieved, expand
Supreme Court Opinions, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 193 (2002); Melvin I. Urofsky,
William 0. Douglas as a Common Law Judge, 41 DUKE L.J. 133 (1991). Ray

helpfully summarizes this consensus in her own words:
If Frankfurter wrote for the specialists and Black for the general
public, then Douglas in one sense wrote for himself. The Court's
premier individualist, Douglas saw himself as the champion of
society's outsiders, and his constitutional jurisprudence consistently
upholds the rights of minorities, workers, and assorted
nonconformists in the face of restrictive statutes and doctrines.

Ray, supraat 205.
2. For the purposes of this Article, the term "military's legal construct" refers
not only to the disciplinary rules of the military rooted in the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ), but is more expansive to include the presidential authority
over the military, constraints enumerated under the law of war as well as customary
international law, and the constitutional checks and balances inherent in the
legislative and judicial branches. Although this definition might appear new, as this
Article is its first use, its antecedents are deeply rooted in U.S. jurisprudence. See,
e.g., GEORGE B. DAVIS, A TREATISE ON THE MILITARY LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
1 (2d rev. ed. 1898); WILLIAM CHETWOOD DE HART, OBSERVATIONS ON MILITARY
LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION AND PRACTICE OF COURTS MARTIAL; WITH A
SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE AS APPLICABLE TO MILITARY TRIALS 16
(1863); JOSEPH STORY, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED

STATES §§ 1196-97 (5th ed. 1891); see also Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296,
300-01 (1983).
3. See, e.g., Noyd v. Bond, 395 U.S. 683, 689-700 (1969).

THOMAS M COOLEYLA WREVIEW

[Vol. 26:2

judicial influence over military affairs, particularly in executive decisionmaking as to when and how armed conflict would be waged by the
Nation's military forces. The Nation's reaction to post-World War II
political currents, in particular its political and social response to the rise of
Communism as both an internal and external enemy, drove Douglas to an
anti-military ideology. Douglas never supported Communism; he believed
it had to be defeated by due process and the expansion of constitutional
liberties, rather than through a force of military might.
Although Douglas served on the Court through the tenures of four chief
justices and was often joined in his anti-military law decisions by his allies,
Justice Hugo Black and Chief Justice Earl Warren, his ideology was unique
in two respects. With the exception of Warren, the justices who decided to
limit military jurisdiction primarily did so on the basis of civil and
individual rights, which they believed were lacking in courts-martial, rather
than on limiting executive authority. Douglas was unique in that he sought
not only to expand, to the maximum extent practicable, individual and civil
rights into the military's legal construct and limit military jurisdiction over
its service members, but in that he was also determined to undermine the
establishment of a unitary executive branch.4 In this latter respect he was
4. Douglas was by no means alone in fearing an empowered Executive Branch.
However, the term unitary executive did not exist in the Nation's mainstream
lexicon. It was referred to as an imperial presidency. For instance, in 1973,
political scientist Arthur Schlesinger warned of an imperial presidency, which
disregarded the constitutional checks and balances traditional to U.S. politics. See
ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 216-18 (1973); see also
ANDREW RUDALEVIGE, THE NEW IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY: RENEWING PRESIDENTIAL

POWER AFTER WATERGATE 211-60 (2005).

For a definition of the unitary

Executive Branch, see Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural
Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1153
(1992). Calabresi and Rhodes state that "[u]nitary executive theorists claim that all
federal officers exercising executive power must be subject to the direct control of
the President." Id.at 1158; see also Lawrence Lessig & Cass Sunstein, The
President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1994). Lessig and
Sunstein believe that the unitary executive theory is new:
It is a creation of the twentieth century, not the eighteenth. It derives
from twentieth century categories applied unreflectively to an
eighteenth century document. It ignores strong evidence that the
framers imagined not a clear executive hierarchy with the President
at the summit, but a large degree of congressional power to structure

the administration as it thought proper.
Id.at 2. However, Lessig and Sunstein do not argue that all notions of a unitary
executive are constitutionally wrong or unworkable. Id.
However, Professor John Yoo, perhaps the leading advocate of the unitary
executive theory, argues that "[a] war may be constitutional, even if no declaration
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joined by Warren, who also expressed a fear of expansive executive power
exuding from its control over the military.5 But Douglas alone sought to
limit the Nation's involvement 6in an unpopular overseas conflict in
Vietnam through judicial activism.
This Article is not a biography of Douglas. Nor is this Article an
analysis of courts-martial procedures during the evolution of the military
justice system from the pre-World War II Articles of War through the
of war has issued or if the President acted unilaterally, so long as one branch has
not usurped the textually enumerated power of another." The Continuation of
Politics by Other Means: The OriginalUnderstandingof War Powers, 84 CAL. L.
REV. 167, 174 (1996). For a criticism of Yoo's thesis, see JACK GOLDSMITH, THE
TERROR PRESIDENCY:

LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION

(2007). According to Goldsmith, a contemporary of Yoo's while serving President
George W. Bush, "Yoo believed that when the Constitution vested the 'executive
power' in the President, it gave him all of the military powers possessed by the
King of England save those expressly given to Congress." Id. at 97.
It is this author's contention that Douglas presciently feared the
establishment of a unitary executive as advocated for by Yoo and others, but that
his judicial activism to diminish the President's command over the military was an
unworkable constitutional realignment as much at odds with the founders' intents as
is Yoo's thesis.
5. See, e.g., Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L.

REV. 181 (1962). Despite significant ideological differences with some of his
fellow justices, after his death, Douglas was not remembered by all as socially
antagonistic. See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Remembrances of William 0. Douglas
on the 50th Anniversary of his Appointment to the Supreme Court, 1 Sup. CT. HIST.
SOC. YEARBOOK 1 (1990); see also HOWARD BALL, HUGO L. BLACK: COLD STEEL
WARRIOR 130-32 (1996). But this was not always the case, and Douglas's mutual

animosity to Frankfurter characterized the Court's conference deliberations. See
Melvin I. Urofsky, Conflict Among the Bretheren: Felix Frankfurter,William 0.
Douglas, and the Clash of Personalities and Philosophies on the United States
Supreme Court, 1988 DUKE L. J. 71 (1988); see also JOHN C. JEFFRIES JR., JUSTICE
LEWIS F. POWELL, JR., AND THE ERA OF JUDICIAL BALANCE 255 (1994). John C.

Jeffries, a biographer of Justice Louis Powell, observed that Douglas feuded with
Frankfurter and openly derided both Warren Burger and Thurgood Marshall, a
justice who was his ideological ally. Douglas was far more friendly with Rehnquist
than these men despite their differences in judicial ideology. Id. at 256. A recent
biography of Justice Wiley Rutledge noted that Douglas had particularly warm
relations with Rutledge and Frank Murphy, but Robert Jackson and Felix

Frankfurter denigrated Douglas, and Douglas came to dislike these two men. See
JOHN

M.

JUSTICE

FERREN, SALT OF THE EARTH, CONSCIENCE OF THE COURT: THE STORY OF

WILEY RUTLEDGE 278 (2004). To the extent that personalities on the Court

matter in deliberations, these relationships are instructive as to the processes of
publishing majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions.
6. See, e.g., Noyd, 395 U.S. 683.
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enactment of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the establishment of
Article II judicial review. The intention underlying this Article is to
analyze the sources and effects of Douglas's antipathy for the military's
legal construct, especially the practice of trial by courts-martial. Douglas
did have an effect on the evolution of the military's legal construct, and he
almost succeeded in narrowing the military's jurisdiction over its
servicemen to a narrow fraction of what its jurisdictional reach is today.
Along with Justices Hugo Black, Earl Warren, Felix Frankfurter, William
Brennan, and shorter-tenured justices, he succeeded in judicially mandating
due-process rights for servicemen accused of offenses.8 However, in his
ultimate goal, the extent to which he succeeded in lessening executive
authority in direct matters of military law is questionable. Yet, to date,
little analysis exists regarding the relationship between Douglas and the
military's legal construct.
There is an important point to demarcate on the nature of military law.
From the origins of the Nation through the 1950s military law was
considered an area of jurisprudence almost under the exclusive control of
the Executive Branch. 9 The U.S. Congress enacted the rules of disciplining
soldiers and sailors and legislated appropriations necessary to maintain a
military, but the governance of the military under its legal construct was an
Executive-Branch zone of exclusivity without comparison to any other
domestic legal arena.' ° In 1857, the Court, in Dynes v. Hoover,"1
sanctioned the Executive Branch's exclusive dominion over the
adjudication of courts-martial and, without so stating, other military trials.12
Even before Dynes, through Douglas's tenure on the Court, justices
frequently turned to legal treatises for guidance. In his final years on the
Court, Douglas sought to overturn Dynes and lessen the federal judiciary's
7. For an overview of the evolution of military justice, see Walter T. Cox III,
The Army, the Courts, and the Constitution: The Evolution of Military Justice, 118
MIL. L. REV. 1 (1987).
8. See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
9. See, e.g., WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTs 49 (reprint
1920). However, it should be noted that Winthrop also argued that courts-martial
were judicial in nature and served as courts of justice. To Winthrop, as a result,
courts-martial were bound to adhere to rules of law, including decisions of federal
courts. Id. at 54.
10. See, e.g., Joshua E. Kastenberg, A Sesquicentennial Historic Analysis of

Dynes v. Hoover, and the Supreme Court's Bow to Military Necessity: From its
Relationship to Dred Scott v. Sanford to its Contemporary Influence, 39 U. MEM.
L. REv. 595 (2009).
11. 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1857).
12. Kastenberg, supra note 10, at 596. Dynes v. Hoover was a basis for Ex
parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. 243, 254 (1863).
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reliance on older military-law texts, as well as to reduce the reach of
courts-martial jurisdiction to cases arising in wartime to only offenses
unique to the military, such as desertion and crimes committed in overseas
installations. 3 Douglas was a keen scholar of legal history, and his
decisions on military law were shaped by his interpretations of history. For
instance, in a book entitled An Almanac of Liberty, he parsed through what
he considered the more compelling legal acts and cases in U.S. history.'4
These included the Civil War cases Ex parte Milligan15 and Ex parte
McCardle.16 Douglas believed that Milligan was "an outstanding
declaration of the rights of man" and that McCardle was a product of the
"military['s] claim[] [to a] right to try him under the odious Reconstruction
Acts."' 7 In essence, Douglas likely believed that because little separation
existed between the Executive Branch's symbolic exclusivity over military
law and its actual exclusivity over it, the separation was easily crossed in
the name of necessity. Douglas did not degrade the importance of the
Nation possessing a military. In 1946, he argued that military service was
essential to protecting democratic ideals, particularly when those ideals
were challenged by foreign enemies. 18 But he also clarified this statement
in writing:
13. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 766 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
14. WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, AN ALMANAC OF LIBERTY (1954). Although
Douglas criticized the expansion of military authority during the Civil War, he did
not do so unequivocally. For instance, Douglas believed that President Abraham
Lincoln treated the free press generally within the Constitution's First Amendment
guarantees: "But on the whole, the Civil War period was marked by a degree of
tolerance for the press somewhat surprising in view of the fact that the enemy was at
the gates and secret societies were operating from within." Id.
at 163.
15. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). In Ex parte Milligan, the Court upheld
Lincoln's suspension of habeas corpus but held that U.S. citizens were not
amenable to military jurisdiction in areas where domestic civil courts functioned.
For a recent analysis of Milligan, see BRIAN MCGnTY, LINCOLN AND THE COURT
255-61 (2008).

16. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868). Ex parte McCardle originated with a
Mississippi newspaper editor who published inflammatory articles against the Army
and Reconstruction. A local Army commander arrested McCardle. After McCardle
appealed his arrest, Congress withdrew the Court's appellate jurisdiction over the
case. It must have troubled Douglas that Chief Justice Samuel Chase upheld
Congress's authority to withdraw jurisdiction, particularly the statement, "We are
not at liberty to inquire into the motives of the legislature. We can only examine
into its power under the Constitution; and the power to make exceptions to the
appellate jurisdiction of this [C]ourt is given by express words." Id.
at 514.
17. DOUGLAS, ALMANAC OF LIBERTY, supra note 14, at 176, 280.
18. Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946). The petitioner in this case,
Girouard, was a Canadian-bom immigrant seeking U.S. citizenship who was a
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The bearing of arms, important as it is, is not the only way
in which our institutions may be supported and defended,
even in times of great peril. Total war in its modem form
dramatizes as never before the great cooperative effort
necessary for victory.
The nuclear physicists who
developed the atomic bomb, the worker at his lathe, the
seaman on cargo vessels, construction battalions, nurses,
engineers, litter bearers, doctors, chaplains-these, too,
made essential contributions. 19
Part I of this Article traces the evolution of Douglas's anti-military
ideology from his youth through the end of the Truman Administration. In
World War II, he often supported Roosevelt's expansion of executive
authority through the Commander-in-Chief role, but this changed when the
war ended. Douglas's anti-military ideology cannot be dissected without
understanding its relationship to another political force that existed
between the end of World War II and the mid 1960s. In what became
known as "McCarthyism," an anti-Communist movement swept through all
aspects of U.S. politics. 20 While Douglas did not support Communism, he
believed that the nature of the anti-Communist movement both caused and
empowered the Executive Branch to not only ignore due-process rights of
individual citizens, but it also enabled the Executive Branch to embark on
legally questionable military policies.21
Part II analyzes Douglas's continued alliance building to reduce the
reach of the military's legal construct during the era of civil rights that
characterized the Warren Court. It distinguishes Douglas as not only
seeking a reduction in executive authority over the military as a matter of
individual rights, but also as waging a judicial campaign to reduce the
Executive Branch. Part HI dissects Douglas's influence and intent in
O'Callahanv. Parker.22 This case was the high watermark of Douglas's
efforts to curb the Executive Branch. While the unpopular Vietnam War
provided a forum for Douglas's ideology, the war, for him, was simply
proof of the need to curb the Executive Branch's control over the military
because that control undergirded a far greater danger: an Executive Branch
practicing Seventh Day Adventist. Based on his faith, he declared his refusal to
"take up arms in the defense of [the U.S.]." Id. at 62. As a result of this answer, the
government denied his citizenship application, and he challenged the decision. Id.
The Court held for Girouard. Id. at 70.
19. Id. at 64.
20. See, e.g., RICHARD M. FRIED, NIGHTMARE IN RED: THE MCCARTHY ERA IN
PERSPECTIVE 120-70 (1990).
21. See infra Part I.
22. 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
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willing to push against its constitutional constraints. Of importance,
O'Callahanhas historically been viewed as a briefly lived case limiting
military jurisdiction over service members.23 But O'Callahanrepresented
23. Even before the Court overruled O'Callahan, in Solorio v. United States,
483 U.S. 435 (1987), a legal scholar within the military legal community, in failing
to see the broader intent underlying O'Callahan, wrote that the decision was
"intended to restrict courts-martial jurisdiction to the greatest extent possible over
crimes committed within the territorial limits of the United States during
peacetime."
See, James B. Thwing, Trial Counsel Forum: Trial Counsel
Assistance Program: Service Connection: A Bridge Over Troubled Waters, 1986
ARMY LAW. 19, 21 (May 1986); see also Frederick Bemays Weiner, American
Military Law in the Light of the FirstMutiny Act's Tricentennial, 126 MiL. L. REV.
1, 57-58 (1989). Weiner was a retired judge advocate and well known scholar of
military law. He argued a number of cases cited in this Article before the Court,
which are noted on a case-by-case basis. In his article referenced here, he only
nominally connected the Vietnam Conflict to the majority's intent in O'Callahan,
arguing that the decision represented a flawed notion on the part of the majority that
courts-martial were grossly lacking in due process.
For another, more contemporary analysis of O'Callahan,see also Steven B.
Lichtman, The Justices and the Generals: A Critical Examination of the U.S.
Supreme Court's Tradition of Deference to the Military, 1918-2004, 65 MD. L.
REV. 907, 919-20 (2006). Lichtman's analysis is simply that the Court has
traditionally deferred to the military and O'Callahan was a significant departure
from this deference, but the Court's purpose was to secure due-process rights of
servicemen. Id. The author of this Article does not agree with Lichtman's
argument:
[T]he Court has a long history of deferring to military judgment.
While other litigants are often required to submit proof of whatever
assertions they are making before the Court, the Justices invariably
accept arguments put forth by the military without subjecting them to
constitutional scrutiny.
Id.at 910. The author's disagreement with Lichtman's article is that it failed to
research or analyze the Court's deliberations in the period 1939-1975, and even
beyond. It did not make use of the abundant original research, such as personal
correspondences, drafts of opinions, and judicial memorandum available at the
Library of Congress and other repositories. For further conventional views of
O'Callahan,see also Cox, supra note 7, at 21; John A. Cohan, Legal War: When
Does it Exist, and When Does it End?, 27 HASTINGs INT'L & COMP. L. REV 221,
290-91 (2004). However, one author correctly argued that O'Callahanwas an
attempt at judicial oversight over the conduct of military operations. See Diane H.
Mazur, Rehnquist's Vietnam: ConstitutionalSeparatism and the Stealth Advance
of Martial Law, 77 IND. L. J. 701, 705-06 (2002). Mazur correctly noted that
O'Callahan"represents the height ofjudicial willingness to test the constitutionality
of decisions made in the exercise of military discretion. O'Callahanalso illustrated
the careful line the Court once attempted to draw in defining the scope of military
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far more than a jurisdictional decision. It was the culmination of Douglas's
efforts to restrict presidential authority to enter the Nation into armed
conflict.
I. FROM YOUTH THROUGH WORLD WAR II: A SYNOPSIS OF
DOUGLAS'S MILITARY RULINGS
There is little in Douglas's youth, college experience, or legal career
that indicated an anti-military propensity. Douglas enlisted in the Army
after the U.S. entered into World War I, but during the war he remained in
the U.S. 24 Unlike his colleague, Justice Harold H. Burton, Douglas did not
experience first-hand the horrors of trench warfare. 25 Nor did he receive a
commission like Warren, Black, Frankfurter, and Murphy. 26 Nonetheless,
Douglas's military service was laudable in his commanding officer's
opinion. On Douglas's discharge papers, Captain Chris Jensen, U.S.
Infantry, noted that Douglas possessed "excellent character" and labeled
him "a trustworthy soldier in every respect., 27 Moreover, the discharge
certificate indicated that the Army intended for Douglas to attend officers'
training camp, and only the November 11, 1918 armistice precluded this
advancement.28
Douglas was born in Minnesota in 1898, but, at the age of three, his
family migrated to Yakima, Washington. 9 In 1904, his father died, leaving
the family in poverty.30 Despite the poverty of his youth, he excelled
academically, graduated as valedictorian from his high school, and received
powers granted to Congress and to the Commander-in-Chief under the
Constitution." Id.
24. EDWIN P. HOYT, WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS: A BIOGRAPHY 19 (1979).
25. Burton saw extensive fighting on the western front during World War I. In
the six months between May and November 1918, the U.S. Army, numbering some
1.5 million men in France, suffered 120,000 soldiers killed. For Burton's wartime
experiences, see HAROLD H. BURTON, 600 DAYS' SERVICE: A HISTORY OF THE
361 ST INFANTRY REGIMENT OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY (1921).
26. For Justice Murphy's military service, see SIDNEY FINE, FRANK MURPHY IN
WORLD WAR I (1954). For Justice Black's military service, which included a
commission in the artillery, see ROGER K. NEWMAN, HuGo BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY

47-49 (1994).
27. For Douglas's military experience, see Military Discharge Certificate,
William 0. Douglas (Dec. 20, 1918) (located in Papers of William 0. Douglas, Box
1771, Library of Congress) [hereinafter WOD, Box__J.
28. Id.
29. See PHILnP J. COOPER, William 0. Douglas: Conscience of the Court, in
THE BURGER COURT: POLITICAL AND JUDICIAL PROFILES 163 (Charles M. Lamb &
Stephen C. Halpern eds., 1991).

30. Id. at 163-64.
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a scholarship to attend Whitman College.3 ' In 1922, he enrolled in
Columbia Law School. 32 Following graduation, he briefly worked at the
Cravath firm in New York and then returned to Washington State.33
Shortly thereafter, he accepted faculty positions at Columbia Law School
and then at Yale Law School.34 After a stint as a member of the Securities
and Exchange Commission, he caught President Roosevelt's attention and
was appointed as its chair in 1937. 35 In 1939, Roosevelt nominated him to
the U.S. Supreme Court.36
In his autobiography, written after his retirement from the Court,
Douglas expressed that the origins of his dislike of the military dated back
to his military service; despite possessing a passionate love of the Nation,
Douglas noted:
[M]y own experience in the Army taught me that it was
largely the "doughboys" who made the supreme sacrifice.
For many of the regular officers, the war had been a way to
get promoted. It was the peace that was anathema to the
officer corps. I also began to have grave doubts about top
generals such as "Black Jack" Pershing, who headed our
forces in World War I. I was not sorry to leave the Army.37
It is impossible to know whether Douglas's autobiography, written over
fifty years after his military service, accurately reflected his beliefs at the
times in his life that he referenced. He later equated his distrust of the
military with his empathy for striking laborers and the Industrial Workers
of the World who were suppressed at times through armed force.3 s
Douglas did not leave any correspondences objecting to military service,
31. Id. at 164.

32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.

35. Id.
36. Id.
37. WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, Go EAST, YOUNG MAN: THE EARLY YEARS, THE
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 95 (1974). Douglas also recalled:
At the college ROTC we had a colonel obsessed with two ideas.
First, we must become "leaping jaguars," ready with bayonet in hand
to run any German through. Second, we must be in the right mood
for our role and learn to hate the Germans. How was this to be
achieved? By bayoneting dead horses, pretending they were
Germans. I had more disgust for the colonel than I had hate for the
Germans.
Id. at 93.
38. See id. at 80-82.
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but his expression of distrust towards the military after 1952 accords with
sentiments articulated in his autobiography.
A. Deference to Roosevelt as Commander-in-Chief. Executive
Authority, Internment of Citizens, and Selective Service
During World War II, and in its immediate aftermath, Douglas seldom
opposed the Executive Branch's wartime policies on military jurisdiction.
In addition to Douglas's recognition of the exigent circumstances of World
War II, this may have also resulted from his admiration for Franklin
Roosevelt, the President who appointed him first as the Securities and
39
Exchange Commission Director and then to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Douglas regularly corresponded with President Roosevelt, even after his
Court appointment.40 In one notable instance, Douglas implored Roosevelt
to seek a third term and defeat the likely Republican nominee, Wendell
Wilkie, in 1940 because he felt that Roosevelt was the only person who
could legitimately threaten Hitler with the Nation's military forces.4'
39. See COOPER, supra note 29, at 164. Douglas penned, "[O]f the Presidents
with whom I served, FDR was the most principled and had the greatest integrity in
the political and constitutional sense, for never would he cross the bridge from
peace to war by any connivance such as was used in Vietnam some twenty years
later."
WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS:
1939-1975, THE
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 288 (1980). In a brief paragraph
entitled, "What I Miss Most About Franklin D. Roosevelt," which was published in
Look Magazine in 1952, Douglas penned:
FDR was a master of human relations who made the world his field.
That is why there were heavy hearts in Asia's rice fields when he
died. Since that time, we have been sadly out of touch with the
forces that make revolutions. Being out of touch, we do not
understand them, and out of that misunderstanding grow the
mounting tensions in the world.
William 0. Douglas, What I Miss Most About Franklin D. Roosevelt, LOOK
MAGAZINE, Feb. 1, 1952 [WOD, Box 855]. Douglas was not alone in his reverence
for Roosevelt. A biographer of Justice Wiley Rutledge noted that Rutledge did not
dissent in the contentious Japanese internment cases out of loyalty for the President.
See FERREN, supranote 5, at 255-57. Ferren wrote that Rutledge revered FDR and,
at some level of consciousness, "was not going to turn his back on his president."
Id. at 257.
40. In Box 368 of Douglas's papers there are over one hundred personal letters
between Roosevelt and Douglas. [WOD, Box 368].
41. Letter from Justice William 0. Douglas to President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt, July 2, 1940 [WOD, Box 368]. An abbreviated text of the letter
evidences Douglas's admiration for Roosevelt and may explain Douglas's
reluctance to oppose the President:
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Douglas's loyalty to Roosevelt-a loyalty that continued after
Roosevelt's death-is evidenced by the fact that he did not dissent in Yakus
v. United States,42 a case in which the Court determined that the Congress,
as an emergency wartime measure, could delegate to the Executive Branch
certain authorities to regulate price controls and prosecute violations as
crimes in federal court.4 3 In Cramer v. United States, Douglas dissented
from the Court's reversal of a treason conviction. 44 The Court held that for
criminal treason to occur, an overt act beyond meeting with agents loyal to
an enemy had to be proven.4 5 Likewise, in Hartzel v. United States,

I view it this way. If Hitler licks England (and certainly his chances
are at least fair), he will offer "peace to this country".... He will
make every possible appeal to American business, to greed for
profits, etc. Many in this country already are saying that we could
"do business with Hitler" if we only had a chance to do so .... To

have a "business minded" President in the White House during these
critical times would be fatal .... Once we started on that course, we
would be at Hitler's mercy in world markets and tortured by him on
the domestic scene. As a republic, we would face the gravest peril in
our history. The Nazi dream of having us by 1944 might well come
true. [Wendell] Wilkie would walk into the arms of Hitler as did the
Cliveden set. Not only could you prevent that grave disaster. You
see the issues clearly and have the public confidence and are the only
one who could prevent it.
Id. In this same letter, Douglas argued to Roosevelt that New York Mayor, Fiorello
LaGuardia, should be Roosevelt's vice presidential candidate, but not Postmaster
General James Farley. Id.
42. 321 U.S. 414 (1944). The case arose under the Emergency Price Control
Act, an anti-inflationary measure that vested an executive agency with the authority
to create price controls. Id. at 419. The Act conferred jurisdiction to the U.S.
District Courts to prosecute individuals who violated price control regulations. Id.
at 418. The regulations were created by the Executive Branch rather than legislated
through Congress. Id. at 419. Violations of the regulations, in some instances,
were prosecuted criminally rather than civilly. Id. at 418.
43. Id. at 422-23.
44. 325 U.S. 1, 48 (1945) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 29 (majority opinion). The Court noted:
A citizen intellectually or emotionally may favor the enemy and
harbor sympathies or convictions disloyal to this country's policy or
interest, but so long as he commits no act of aid and comfort to the
enemy, there is no treason. On the other hand, a citizen may take
actions which do aid and comfort the enemy-making a speech
critical of the government or opposing its measures, profiteering,
striking in defense plants or essential work, and the hundred other
things which impair our cohesion and diminish our strength-but if
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Douglas sided with Justices Frankfurter, Robert Jackson, and Stanley Reed
in dissenting from the Court's reversal of an espionage conviction. 47 The
there is no adherence to the enemy in this, if there is no intent to
betray, there is no treason.
Id. Douglas opposed this view and argued that ample evidence existed to prove
treasonous intent. See id.at 53-54 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Douglas closed his
dissent with a caustic comment: "Such a result makes the way easy for the traitor,
does violence to the Constitution and makes justice truly blind." Id. at 67. In his
1954 book, An Almanac of Liberty, Douglas wrote:
The first treason case ever to be decided by the Supreme Court
reached there in 1944 in the midst of World War II. It involved an
American citizen charged with having given aid and comfort to
Germany in time of war. His conviction was reversed by a divided
Court.... The accused must have more than an intent to betray; he
must translate the intent into action. Each act must have two
witnesses. And the act of adherence must confer some actual,
tangible benefit on the enemy. So ruled the Court in 1944. The
construction given was so restrictive that some thought that no
prosecutor would thereafter chance an indictment under the head of
treason.
DOUGLAS, ALMANAC OF LIBERTY, supra note 14, at 347. Douglas did not note that
he was a dissenting justice in the case. See id.Ironically, it was arguably the
restrictive holding in Cramerthat prevented a large volume of treason trials during
the anti-Communist movement's heyday in the 1950s.
46. 322 U.S. 680 (1944).
47. Id. at 690 (Reed, J., dissenting). The Court, in reversing the conviction,
noted that Hartzel, a World War I veteran, honorably discharged from the Army,
and a native-born American, had never been a member of a subversive organization
prior to World War II. Id.at 682-83. Hartzel mailed his pamphlets to the U.S.
Army Air Force Chief-of-Staff, as well as a number of other military organizations.
Id.at 683-84. The majority recognized the total-war nature of World War II:
We are not unmindful of the fact that the United States is now
engaged in a total war for national survival and that total war of the
modem variety cannot be won by a doubtful, disunited nation in
which any appreciable sector is disloyal. For that reason our
enemies have developed psychological warfare to a high degree in
an effort to cause unrest and disloyalty ....But the mere fact that
such ideas are enunciated by a citizen is not enough by itself to
warrant a finding of a criminal intent to violate Section 3 of the
Espionage Act. Unless there is sufficient evidence from which a jury
could infer beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to bring
about the specific consequences prohibited by the Act, an American
citizen has the right to discuss these matters either by temperate
reasoning or by immoderate and vicious invective without running
afoul of the Espionage Act of 1917.
Id.at 689.
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two individuals convicted of espionage under the 1917 Espionage Act had,
shortly after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, distributed pamphlets
designed to undermine the government's efforts in recruiting for the armed
forces.4a
Douglas sided with the majority in Hirabayashiv. United States.4 9 In
that case, the Court upheld a military commander's curfew order directed at
citizens and legal residents of Japanese, German, and Italian extraction.50
48. See United States v. Hartzel, 138 F.2d 169, 170 (7th Cir. 1943), rev'd, 322
U.S. 680 (1944). As characterized by the appellate court, the pamphlets were antiRoosevelt, anti-Semitic, and anti-British. Id. at 173. Hartzel admitted to the trial
court that he authored and distributed hundreds of the pamphlets through the U.S.
mail. Id.
at 172-73. One such pamphlet contained a statement which read:
Wilson died an invalid; Roosevelt became president one. What is
the social significance of his condition?
A clue is given in the statement that syphilis is "the result of an
illness of moral, social and racial instincts" of which prostitution is
an integral part. Similarly the breakdown of Wilson after the
"peace" was probably connected with reactions from the emotional
debauchery of preceding years. It is, therefore, suggested that the
epidemic of paralysis in New York State at a later time had a source
in the weakening of nervous systems, brought about by the emotional
self-masturbation of stories of the "bad" Germans.
Our leader--safe in Washington--escaped the actual horrors of
war, but he could not escape the virus of a child's disease. As with
syphilis his paralysis is indicative of severe maladjustments within
the nation. He reproduces within his body our internal breakdown;
he is in fact a degenerate who now seeks ways of having us cure him
of his ailment.
Hidden within the present program to save humanity are germs of
infantilism, paralysis and death. For we now follow, not a little
child, but a man with a child's disease.
Id.at 171. Given Douglas's stated affinity for Roosevelt, it is difficult not to
conclude that Hartzel's attack on the President did not offend Douglas.
49. 320 U.S. 81, 105 (1943) (Douglas, J., concurring).
50. Id.
at 92 (majority opinion). The order read,
[A]II alien Japanese, all alien Germans, all alien Italians, and all
persons of Japanese ancestry residing or being within the
geographical limits of Military Area No. 1 . ..shall be within their
place of residence between the hours of 8:00 P.M. and 6:00 A.M.,
which period is hereinafter referred to as the hours of curfew."
Id.
at 88. Of importance, the Court also held:
The war power of the national government is "the power to wage
war successfully." It extends to every matter and activity so related
to war as substantially to affect its conduct and progress. The power
is not restricted to the winning of victories in the field and the
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Although Douglas agreed with the Court's view that in order to wage war
successfully the national government could vest in a local military
commander the authority to issue orders with criminal sanctions for
violators, he wrote a concurring opinion detailing his reasons for the
agreement.5 1 Unlike the majority opinion, Douglas concentrated on the
rights of an individual to challenge a military order based on civil rights
rather than on the military's legal position over civilians in wartime.5 2
Notably, Douglas did not publish a dissent in Korematsu v. United
States," a case for which he later expressed regret.54 Nor did he join in

repulse of enemy forces. It embraces every phase of the national
defense, including the protection of war materials and the members
of the armed forces from injury and from the dangers which attend

the rise, prosecution and progress of war. Since the Constitution
commits to the Executive and to Congress the exercise of the war

power in all the vicissitudes and conditions of warfare, it has
necessarily given them wide scope for the exercise of judgment and
discretion in determining the nature and extent of the threatened
injury or danger and in the selection of the means for resisting it.
Where, as they did here, the conditions call for the exercise of
judgment and discretion and for the choice of means by those
branches of the Government on which the Constitution has placed
the responsibility of war-making, it is not for any court to sit in
review of the wisdom of their action or substitute its judgment for
theirs.
Id. at 93 (citations omitted). Within two decades, Douglas significantly departed
from the argument that the judiciary could not substitute its judgment for the
Executive Branch's ability to wage war.
51. Id. at 105 (Douglas, J., concurring). Initially, Rutledge joined with Douglas

in the concurrence but then withdrew and authored his own.
(Rutledge, J., concurring); FERREN, supranote 5, at 244.

See id at 114

52. See Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 105-09 (Douglas, J., concurring). Douglas
argued that the government, at some point, had to create a means for loyal citizens
to challenge their detention, since the reasons for the detention were based on the
idea that a population sector contained disloyal persons. Id. at 108. To Justice
Murphy, a number of factors, including Hirabayashi's non-violent Quaker faith,
militated against any allegation of danger to national security. See SIDNEY FiNE,
FRANK MURPHY: THE WASHINGTON YEARs 437 (1984). Murphy originally drafted
a dissent, but Frankfurter convinced him to write a concurrence. See id. at 443.
Douglas did not find this argument compelling in 1943, but based on his later
jurisprudence, it is likely that had Hirabayashi been decided after Roosevelt's
death, he would have sided with Murphy.
53. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Chief Justice Harlan Stone assigned Black to write
the majority opinion for the reason that Black had, by 1944, become considered as a
guardian of civil liberties. See FINE, supra note 52, at 445. Black was angry with
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Murphy's dissent even though Murphy's dissent embodied two themes that
Douglas later incorporated into his military-law jurisprudence: civil rights
and judicially curbing excessive executive authority. 55 Murphy argued that
the majority's decision constituted a legalization of racism.5 6 He conceded
that in emergencies the decisions of military commanders had to be
accorded deference. 7 But, in a caveat, he argued, "At the same time,
however, it is essential that there be definite limits to military discretion,
especially where martial law has not been declared. 58 At the time of the
decision, Douglas was unmoved by Murphy's impassioned arguments, and
though he later considered his reluctance to be a great mistake, he placed
the blame for the relocation not on the President but on the military
command in the western U.S. 59 Douglas's blame on the military was
misplaced and, at best, reflected his regret for siding with General John
DeWitt, the military's commander for the Nation's western defenses, who
believed that the evacuation and relocation were both necessary.60 It is true
this assignment because the decision trammeled civil liberties, and he wanted his
reputation to remain as it had been. See NEWMAN, supranote 26, at 313-16.
54. See DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS, supra note 39, at 38-39, 280.
55. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 234-35 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 233 (arguing that "[s]uch exclusion goes over 'the very brink of
constitutional power' and falls into the ugly abyss of racism"). In conference,
Murphy argued that the U.S. treatment of its citizens of Japanese dissent was little
different than the Nazi government's treatment of its minorities. See FINE, supra
note 52, at 443.
57. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 233-34.
58. Id.at 234.
59. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS, supra note 39, at 280. Douglas recorded,
"Fine American citizens had been robbed of their properties by racists-crimes that
might not have happened if the Court had not followed the Pentagon so literally."
Id. He also argued, tellingly, that Korematsu had to be seen in light of Ex parte
Milligan, a Civil War case determining the extent of military jurisdiction over
civilians. Id. at 38. Ex parte Milligan narrowed the military's jurisdiction over
U.S. citizens to places of actual conflict where civil courts were not functioning. Ex
parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 123 (1866). Douglas penned:
Some think that the famous Milligan case-generally limiting the
power of military courts to try civilians-would never have been
written in the heat of the Civil War but mustered a majority of votes
only because it was decided late in 1866 [when the war was over]
It may be that [Korematsu] . . .would never have been sustained

except in the climate of war.
DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS, supra note 39, at 38 (citation omitted).
60. A concise treatment of the military's role in the internment of Japanese
Americans is found in Sidney Fine, Mr. Justice Murphy and the HirabayashiCase,
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that DeWitt grossly exaggerated the threat from Japanese persons to
Congress, and, as for the thousands of innocent persons, he concluded, "A
Jap's a Jap .... It makes no difference whether he's an American citizen
or not. There is no way to determine their loyalty." 61 But the Army Chief
of Staff, the Secretary of War, and President Roosevelt could have stopped
the internment of Japanese citizens and nationals residing in the U.S.
Douglas initially drafted a concurring opinion that allowed the
President the authority to remove citizens from one geographic area to
another in times of national emergency but not the authority to imprison
citizens in military encampments, which deprived them of basic liberties.62
He specifically argued, "While [Korematsu] could not lawfully refuse to be
evacuated, he could lawfully resist the indefinite detention which was in
store for him if he submitted., 63 Importantly, his circulated draft dissent
contained language acquiescing to the perceived needs of military security
on the West Coast:
And in any aspect of the matter, it was a military decision
which I do not believe we can disturb unless it had no
substantial report as an espionage or sabotage measure. I
think it plain that it had such support, unless we attribute to
the military the selfish reasons which certain groups had
as
for welcoming the evacuation. That we should not do,
64
faith.
good
of
earmark
every
had
decision
military
the
More accurately than his blame on the military for the internment,
Douglas later claimed that Black and Frankfurter bullied him from writing
the dissent. 65 There is an important point in Douglas's alliance with both
in THE MASS INTERNMENT OF JAPANESE AMERICANS AND THE QUEST FOR LEGAL

76-78 (1994). It is important to note that General DeWitt and Justice
Black were friends, dating back to Black's Senate tenure. NEWMAN, supra note 26,
at 314. Roger K. Newman, one of Black's biographers, noted, "Black's faith in
DeWitt added to his belief that the commander in the field had the right and the
power to make the decision who should remain in an area." Id.
61. NEWMAN, supra note 26, at 313. The Court did not know of this comment.
See FERREN, supra note 5, at 254. DeWitt had previously testified before Congress
on the military necessity of the internment and had claimed, falsely, that Japanese
Americans were detected signaling enemy ships from the coast and "conducting
other subversive activities." Id. at 255.
62. William 0. Douglas, draft dissent in Korematsu, circulated to the Court on
Dec. 1, 1944 [WOD, Box 114].
63. Id.
64. Id.
REDRESS

65. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS, supra note 39, at 280; see also BALL, supra

note 5, at 176-77. Roger Newman accurately wrote of Black:
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Black and Frankfurter. Douglas viewed Black as his closest ally on the
Court, though during the Vietnam conflict Black refused to join Douglas in
his attempts to judicially terminate the war, and during the height of the
Vietnam conflict the two men spent three years without socially speaking.66
Black's refusal placed him squarely in the individual-rights arena with
regard to the military's legal construct. Unlike Douglas, Black did not see
the judiciary's role as a means to check the executive's almost exclusive
authority over the armed services to terminate the Nation's involvement in
the Vietnam Conflict. 67 Whether Black ever harbored any regrets for
Korematsu is unknown because, 6long
after the war, he publicly argued that
8
the Court's decision was correct.
Douglas respected Frankfurter and considered him one of the Court's
brightest justices in its history. 69 However, although the two men
occasionally agreed on the outcome of cases, Douglas and Frankfurter
developed an antagonism for each other. 70 Douglas later penned, "Most of
Frankfurter's decisions at the constitutional level were eroded within a few
years after he retired, in 1962, only to be refurbished when the Nixon
appointees arrived.",71 Ironically, Douglas's description of Frankfurter's
short-lived influence is precisely what occurred with Douglas's efforts to
curb the military's legal construct in O'Callahan.
The same day that the Court decided Korematsu it also decided Ex
parte Endo.72 Douglas's role in Endo is as notable as it was in Korematsu,
as he authored the majority's opinion.7 3 He began the decision with a
recitation, similar to that in Hirabayashi,of the reasons for the relocation
Black wanted to immunize the military in wartime completely from
judicial review. He looked at the case as one of administrative
finality. General DeWitt's decision, he told his clerk, was the same
as if it had been made by a court or regulatory agency.
NEWMAN, supra note 26, at 316.
66. NEWMAN, supra note 26, at 599-600.
67. Seeid.at617.
68. JOHN R. VILE, GREAT AMERICAN JUDGES: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 75 (2003).
69. See DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS, supra note 39, at 22-23. Douglas also
noted that "[e]arly in his career [Frankfurter] was identified with leftist causes,
notably the Sacco-Vanzetti case. But Frankfurter was not a leftist; he was always
identified with the Establishment, though insistent that the Establishment proceed
with meticulous care when it moved against a miscreant, whether he be left or
right." Id. at 21.
70. BELKNAP, supra note 1,at 64.
71. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS, supra note 39, at 21.
72. 323 U.S. 283 (1944). See also Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944).
73. Id. at 284.
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of citizens of Japanese ancestry.74 Douglas, however, ensured that the
petitioner, Mitsuye Endo, was judicially noticed as a "loyal and lawabiding citizen" who had been forced into a relocation camp and, despite
efforts to prove her loyalty, was unable to secure release. 75 But Douglas
did not criticize the reasons for forced relocation or even reach a
constitutional question regarding the internment camps.76 Indeed, he did
not criticize the military's role in the internment." As in the case of
Korematsu, he later claimed that the lack of criticism of the military
78
occurred as a result of Frankfurter and Black putting pressure on him.
Yet, unlike the result in Korematsu, Douglas determined that the
government could not continue to intern citizens whose loyalty to the
Nation was proven. 79 Also, unlike in Korematsu, Douglas articulated
language that, while not condemning racism, made clear that loyalty to the
U.S. was not a matter of race. "Loyalty is a matter of the heart and mind,
not of race, creed, or color," he argued.80
To Murphy, Douglas's
determination did not go far enough, and he argued that any acceptance of
constitutional authority to detain individuals based on ancestry or race was
an "unconstitutional resort to racism. 8 1 What Murphy articulated in Endo
Douglas later adopted in his civil rights jurisprudence. But Douglas's
decision to refrain from criticizing Roosevelt's war policies resulted in
diminishing Murphy's abilities to influence the introduction of greater due
process into military law.

74. Id. at 285.
75. Id. at 293-95.
76. Id. at 297. Instead, Douglas wrote,
It should be noted at the outset that we do not have here a question
such as was presented in Ex parte Milligan, or in Ex parte Quirin,
where the jurisdiction of military tribunals to try persons according
to the law of war was challenged in habeas corpus proceedings.
Id.
(citations omitted).
77. Id. at 296-97.
78.

DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS,

supra note 39, at 280.

79. Endo, 323 U.S. at 302. Instead of criticizing the military's role, Douglas's
decision stated,
Mitsuye Endo is detained by a civilian agency, the War Relocation
Authority, not by the military. Moreover, the evacuation program
was not left exclusively to the military; the Authority was given a
large measure of responsibility for its execution and Congress made
its enforcement subject to civil penalties by the Act of March 21,
1942. Accordingly, no questions of military law are involved.
Id. at 298.
80. Id.
at 302.
81. Id.
at 307-08 (Murphy, J., concurring).
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B. Selective-Service Cases
In addition to Korematsu and Endo showing Douglas's support of
Roosevelt's war policies, Douglas's opinion in one prominent selectiveservice case that arose during the war evidenced his view that Roosevelt's
wartime conscription policies were largely conducted within constitutional
parameters. In Falbo v. United States,82 a case determining whether a
citizen who claimed conscientious-objector status was amenable to federal
criminal law for a failure to "report for assignment to national service,"
Douglas sided with the majority opinion, upholding the legality of the
selective-service process and, in effect, Falbo's conviction. 3
The petitioner in that case argued that because the classification
determinations of local selective-service boards were not subject to judicial
review, the Selective Service Act requiring his attendance was
unconstitutional.8 4 Relying on Martin v. Mott,s 5 a case arising from the
War of 1812 that Douglas later found antiquated, the majority found that
there was no constitutional requirement to enable individuals to challenge
their local selective-service board determinations, though any final
86
determination of amenability to military service was a different matter.

82. 320 U.S. 549 (1944), reh'g denied, 321 U.S. 802 (1944) (explaining that
Falbo was convicted of violations of the Selective Service and Training Act of 1940
and sentenced to one year in prison).
83. Id.at 550-51, 555.
84. Id. at 554.
85. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827).
86. Falbo, 320 U.S. at 554 (summarizing Mott's holding that "Congress
apparently regarded 'a prompt and unhesitating obedience to orders' issued in that
process 'indispensable to the complete attainment of the object' of national
defense"). However, Mott is worthy of note because it described the Executive
Branch's authority in national emergencies, an authority Douglas later took
exception to:
The power itself is to be exercised upon sudden emergencies, upon
great occasions of state, and under circumstances which may be vital
to the existence of the Union. A prompt and unhesitating obedience
to orders is indispensable to the complete attainment of the object.
The service is a military service, and the command of a military
nature; and in such cases, every delay, and every obstacle to an
efficient and immediate compliance, necessarily tend to jeopard[ize]
the public interests. While subordinate officers or soldiers are
pausing to consider whether they ought to obey, or are scrupulously
weighing the evidence of the facts upon which the commander in
chief exercises the right to demand their services, the hostile
enterprise may be accomplished without the means of resistance. If
"the power of regulating the militia, and of commanding its services
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The majority also noted, however, that the local board determination of
classification was only an intermediate step in an induction process into
armed service, non-combatant duty, or national service and that judicial
intervention was possible after a final determination of status.87
Falbo was decided on January 3, 1944.88 On March 27 of the same
year, the Court decided Billings v. Truesdell, a case authored by Douglas
that narrowed the military's jurisdictional reach to citizens lawfully
89 Inthat case,
conscripted but not fully inducted into it.
Arthur G. Billings,
a citizen, disagreed with his local board's determination of his amenability
to military service. 90 He considered himself a conscientious objector, but
not wanting to incur civil penalties, he protested administrative
determinations of his fitness while meeting all legal requirements of
mustering for duty.9' At Fort Leavenworth, Billings refused to undertake
an oath of military service or to be fingerprinted, and that is when Army
officials notified him that he was already inducted into the military.92
Billings disagreed with the local commander's view that he was already
within military jurisdiction and continued to refuse to take the induction
oath.93 The Army charged him under the Articles of War with refusing to

in times of insurrection and invasion, are (as it has been emphatically
said they are) natural incidents to the duties of superintending the
common defence, and of watching over the internal peace of the
confederacy."
Mott, 25 U.S. at 30 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 29 (Alexander Hamilton)).
87. Falbo, 320 U.S. at 553 ("[A] board order to report is no more than a
necessary intermediate step in a united and continuous process designed to raise an
army speedily and efficiently.").
88. Id.
at 549.
89. 321 U.S. 542 (1944). Billings's Socialist Party political affiliations, if
known at the time of his induction activities, would have likely kept him from
service. See, e.g., SUSAN R. RICHARDSON, Reds, Race, and Research: Homer P.
Rainey and the Grand Texas Tradition of PoliticalInterference, 1939-1944 in 24
PERSPECTIVES ON THE HISTORY OF HIGHER EDUCATION 125, 158 (Roger L. Geiger
ed., 2005). In 1944, he ran for the U.S. Senate as a Socialist Party candidate in
Kansas. Id.In his court hearing, he testified that he believed Japanese and German
atrocities were grossly exaggerated, if not fictitious. Id.After the war, he was
removed from his faculty position. Id.
90. Id.
at 543-44.
91. Id.at 544 (explaining that the local board found Billings unfit for service
because of poor eyesight; however, the board of appeals reassessed this decision
and found him amenable to military service); see also Billings v.Truesdell, 135
F.2d 505 (10th Cir. 1943).
92. Ex parteBillings, 46 F. Supp. 663, 664 (D. Kan. 1942).

93. Id.
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obey lawful orders. 94 After filing a habeas writ, both the district court and
appellate court determined that despite his refusal to undertake an oath,
Billings was lawfully within the military's jurisdiction. 95
Although both lower courts agreed that Billings had not taken the oath
and recognized that the oath was a legal requirement to be amenable to
military jurisdiction, they sided with the Army's argument that because the
refusal to take the oath took place on a military installation, the Army
possessed a limited jurisdiction over him.96 Douglas disagreed, although he
found a statutory and not a constitutional basis for Billings's status.9 7
Indeed, he conceded that originally the Articles of War would have
conferred jurisdiction to the Army over persons such as Billings.9 8 But
because Congress had vested "in the civil courts exclusive jurisdiction over
all violations of the Act prior to actual induction," Douglas determined that
the conviction required reversal. 99 Thus, in 1944, Douglas believed that the

94. Id.
95. Id. at 664, 669. See also Billings, where the appellate court held that:
When a selected man has reported for induction and been
transported to the induction station and found acceptable, induction
is not a matter of choice with him. Being subject to compulsory
training and service, having reported for induction, and having
passed the requisite examinations, it is the duty of the military
authorities immediately to induct him and he cannot avoid induction
by refusing to take the oath. The regulations, in effect, provide that
refusal to take the oath shall not alter in any respect the selected
man's obligation to the United States.
135 F.2d at 507.
96. Billings, 321 U.S. at 544-45; see also Billings, 135 F.2d. at 507.
97. Billings, 321 U.S. at 545-47.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 547. In a concurrence, Frankfurter articulated that the legal point of
actual induction was too vague and the case required reversal. Specifically, he
noted:
Under the Selective Service Act of 1940, unlike that of 1917, a
selectee is not subject to trial by a military court martial until he has
been "actually inducted" for training and service. But Congress did
not define when he was so "inducted." It thus left to judicial
construction when the civilian status ceased and the military status
began. In a matter of this sort, involving as it does the process of
compulsory recruiting of the nation's Army in the midst of war, it is
of vital importance that the line be drawn as definitely as the
legislation reasonably permits in order that ambiguity and
controversy be reduced to a minimum.
Id. at 559 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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Constitution granted wide authority to the Executive Branch, coupling
military jurisdiction and conscripted citizens.
Almost immediately after the war's conclusion, Douglas sought further
clarity to Falbo. He authored the majority opinion in Estep v. United
States,'°° a decision that placed limits on the government's authority to
prosecute individuals who refused to submit to military induction after the
individuals exhausted all administrative avenues for redress. Estep and one
other petitioner were Jehovah's Witnesses who claimed conscientiousobjector status in compliance with the Selective Service Act.' 0' However,
the local boards and all other administrative hearings ruled against the two
men.'0 2 Although both men reported on the date ordered for Navy duty,
each refused to be inducted into military service. 0 3 At trial, both
petitioners sought to defend on the ground that the local boards exceeded
their statutory authority in classifying them as eligible for duty. °4 The trial
courts refused these defenses, and both men were convicted.0 5
In a memorandum to his fellow Justices, prior to circulating a draft
opinion, Douglas argued first that religious rights were the central issue for
the Court to consider and second that the civil effects of convictions based
on arbitrary decisions by the selective-service boards were not warranted in
such instances as the case presented.1°6 Douglas did not want, for example,
Estep to lose the right to vote simply because,
as a Jehovah's Witness, he
07
sided with his faith against military service.1
Within his concern for religious rights, Douglas's decision rested on a
broad principle that individual rights in conflict with the Executive Branch
were proper matters for judicial review.' 0 8 He recognized that the Selective
Service Act did not expressly grant individuals access to the courts." 9 Yet
he refused to accept congressional silence as a blanket approval for the
boards to make determinations on individual cases without checks and

100. 327 U.S. 114, 115 (1946).
101. Seeid. at 116-17.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 117-18.
105. Id.
106. Memorandum from Douglas to the Court (undated) [WOD, Box 130].
107. Id. Douglas was troubled by the lack of legislative history on religious
exemptions for Jehovah's Witnesses within the Selective Service Act. He noted,
"[T]his particular question did not receive much attention in the debates, either in
the Senate or the House." Id.
108. Id.
109. See Estep, 327 U.S. at 121-22.
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balances, particularly because some determinations exceeded a board's
lawful authority." 0
Although Estep later provided Douglas a springboard to narrow the
Executive Branch's ability to wage war, it does not appear that he
contemporaneously considered the case as providing such a possibility. In
the twenty years after Falbo, Douglas's record in selective-service cases
was mixed. 1 In 1947, Douglas authored Sunal v. Large, 1 2 an opinion that
denied habeas to a petitioner who had been precluded from the same
defense raised in Estep. 1 3 Timeliness was the basis for Douglas's
denial. 1 4 Later, in Witmer v. United States,n 5 the Court found that the
board's denial of exemption from national service, based on conflicting
claims of ministerial status, did not give rise to a rights violation. 1 6 Along
with Black, Douglas dissented without comment. 17 In Sicurella v. United
States,"8 the Court determined that exemption from military service based
on conscientious-objector status did not require a person's faith to oppose
all wars." 9 Here, Douglas sided with the majority's determination. 20 And,

110. See id The Court held,
We cannot readily infer that Congress departed so far from the
traditional concepts of a fair trial when it made the actions of the
local boards "final" as to provide that a citizen of this country should
go to jail for not obeying an unlawful order of an administrative
agency.
Id. at 122.
111. See infra notes 112-22 and accompanying text.
112. 332 U.S. 174 (1947).
113. Id. at 175-76.
114. See id.
at 177-79, 181, 183-84.
115. 348 U.S. 375 (1955).
116. See id. at 382-83. The Court also took note that the petitioner attempted to
obtain an agricultural exemption based on a specious claim. Id. at 382.
117. Id. at 384 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
118. 348 U.S. 385 (1955).
119. See id. at 390.
120. Id. at 385. Instructively, the Court held:
The test is not whether the registrant is opposed to all war, but
whether he is opposed, on religious grounds, to participationin war.
As to theocratic war, petitioner's willingness to fight on the orders of
Jehovah is tempered by the fact that, so far as we know, their history

records no such command since Biblical times and their theology
does not appear to contemplate one in the future. And although the
Jehovah's Witnesses may fight in the Armageddon, we are not able
to stretch our imagination to the point of believing that the yardstick
of the Congress includes within its measure such spiritual wars
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in United States v. Seeger,12 1 Douglas concurred that conscientious
objection22 to military service could be validly based on non-conventional
1
beliefs.

C. Military Trials of Civilians, Saboteurs, and War Criminals
A number of other World War H-era decisions evidence that Douglas
almost uncritically supported Roosevelt as a wartime Commander-in-Chief
and was not yet hostile to the military's legal construct or the assertion of
executive authority in wartime.
In Ex parte Quirin,123 Douglas
wholeheartedly agreed with the majority's determination that the President
possessed the constitutional authority to prosecute German saboteurs
captured on U.S. soil in a military trial. 124 However, during the
deliberations, Frankfurter insisted that the captured saboteurs could be
summarily executed and that Chief Justice Stone, the author of the opinion,
should state this fact in the decision. 125 Douglas disagreed, writing to Stone
between the powers of good and evil where the Jehovah's Witnesses,
if they participate, will do so without carnal weapons.
Id. at 390-91. Finally, in Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Bd., 393 U.S. 233 (1968), a
case arising out of a board's denial of a conscientious-objector claim, Douglas
extended the judiciary's authority to review board determinations prior to the filing
of criminal charges for failure to report. Id. at 239.
121. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
122. Id. at 188-93 (Douglas, J., concurring). Douglas articulated an argument
that the requirement of a conventional belief in a higher being would result in
discrimination against religions older than Christianity. Id. at 188-89. But he did
not attack the Selective Service Act or conscription in general in this particular
case. Significantly, he argued, "In sum, I agree with the Court that any person
opposed to war on the basis of a sincere belief, which in his life fills the same place
as a belief in God fills in the life of an orthodox religionist, is entitled to exemption
under the statute." Id. at 192-93.
123. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
124. See id. at 26, 48.

125. Frankfurter's insistence on the Court's recognition that summary execution
was a legal and viable alternative to a military trial for unlawful combatants is
found in a memorandum drafted by Frankfurter to read as a play. Known as
"Frankfurter's Soliloquy," he used phrases towards the German saboteurs such as
"curs," who "should be hung." The "Soliloquy" can be found in WOD, Box 77.
Frankfurter's involvement in the case included extrajudicial advice to Secretary of
War Henry Stimson on the creation of the military tribunal to prosecute the
captured saboteurs. See MELVIN I. UROFSKY, DIVISION AND DISCORD: THE
SUPREME COURT UNDER STONE AND VINSON 60 (Univ. of S.C. Press 1997).
Frankfurter recommended to Stimson that the tribunal consist of military officers
only and be administered by the War Department as opposed to the Justice
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his insistence that no reference to summary execution be made in the
26
published decision and that the published decision stress the rule of law. 1
As a result of Douglas's insistence, the opinion contains the sentence:
"Unlawful combatants are likewise subject to capture and detention, but in
addition they are subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals for
acts which render their belligerency unlawful"; there is no reference to
summary execution. 27 In influencing the published decision, Douglas
upheld Roosevelt's policy toward captured unlawful combatants without
expanding the President's authority beyond what was challenged and
without creating an unnecessary controversy with the inclusion of language
on the right to summarily execute saboteurs.
Three years after Quirin, in In re Yamashita,128 Douglas joined the
majority in determining the military's jurisdiction to prosecute law-of-war
offenses continued after the Japanese surrender and with little judicial
oversight. 29 Like Nazi defendants tried at Nuremburg, Yamashita was
Department. See id. Frankfurter's arguments for summary execution were in the
minority.
Since the formation of the Constitution, few military officers, and never the
Judicial Branch, have advocated for summary execution or lengthy prison sentences
without trial. See David G. Glazier, The Laws of War: Past, Present,and Future:
Precedents Lost: The Neglected History of the Military Commission, 46 VA. J.
INT'L L. 5, 79-80 (2005).
126. Memorandum from Justice William 0. Douglas to Chief Justice Harlan F.
Stone, (October 17, 1942) [WOD, Box 77]. Douglas disagreed with Frankfurter's
arguments. Douglas's memorandum to Stone is as follows:
I would like to see the sentence which I have underlined on pg. 6
omitted. That sentence is susceptible of the interpretation that it
would have been lawful for the Executive to have disposed of the
petitioners summarily without a trial by a tribunal. That may be true,

although if I had to vote today, I would be inclined to vote the other
way. The proposition however, is not before us and I think that the
omission of that sentence would not detract from the force and
substance or the paragraph at the bottom of pg. 6.
Id.
127.
128.
129.
case,

See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 31.
327 U.S. 1 (1946).
See id at 8, 11-13. Homma v. Patterson, 327 U.S. 759 (1946), a similar
decided concurrently with In re Yamashita, did not generate a lengthy

opinion. In that case, the Court denied certiorari for the same reasons as in
Yamashita. See id. at 759. However, Justices Murphy and Rutledge dissented in
that case as well. Id. Douglas penned a memorandum to the other justices detailing
his agreement with the majority in Homma. See Memorandum from Justice
William 0. Douglas on Homma, (1946) [WOD, Box 128]. Homma's argument
involved the fact that he commanded an army, which humiliatingly defeated
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accused of war crimes that had not been expressly enumerated under any
treaties 30 but were arguably common-law offenses in international law by
1939.131 However, little jurisprudence existed on the issue of command
responsibility to prevent atrocities, and Yamashita's failure to stop his
forces 2from committing atrocities was one gravamen of the charges against
13
him.

Unlike the Nazis prosecuted in international tribunals, Yamashita was
prosecuted in a wholly U.S. military commission for law-of-war offenses,
which were drafted by U.S. Citizens with no allied oversight. 133 It was a
tribunal similar to the Civil War military trials of Captain Henry Wirz, the
superintendant of the Andersonville Prison, and individuals accused in the

MacArthur's forces in the Philippines in 1941-1942. Id. As a result of this,
MacArthur sought revenge, rather than a fair trial. Douglas dismissed this argument
and responded:
Petitioner contends that he has been denied a fair trial because
General MacArthur, whom he defeated, has appointed the
commission, ordered the trial, and will be the reviewing authority.
The substance of this seems to be that because of personal animosity,
MacArthur will deprive him of the right to be tried fairly. There is
no merit in this contention. If it were to apply here, I suppose that
the same rationale would be greatly applicable to any trial of a
former belligerent.
Id. Rutledge compared Homma to the Nazi and Russian purge trials. See FINE,
supra note 52, at 459-60.

130. See Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 13-14. Yamashita was charged with failing to

"control the operations of the members of his command, permitting them to commit

brutal atrocities and other high crimes against people of the United States and of its
allies and dependencies." Id. Yamashita's army massacred a large part of the
civilian population, killed prisoners of war, and destroyed religious movements. Id.
at 14.
131. See ROBERT K. WOETZEL, THE NUREMBERG TRIALS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW, WITH A POSTLUDE ON THE EIcHMANN CASE 230-32, 235, 239, 245 (1962);
William H. Parks, Command Responsibility For War Crimes, 62 MIL. L. REV. 1,
19-20 (1973); see also Report of Robert H. Jackson to the President, Atrocities and
War Crimes (June 7, 1945), reprintedin 12 Dep't St. Bull. 1071 (1945).
132. See Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 13-14; see also Elizabeth Borgwardt, Reexamining Nuremberg as a New Deal Institution: Politics, Culture and the Limits
of Law in Generating Human Rights Norms, 23 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 401, 448
(2008) (noting that Yamashita was controversially convicted and hanged for failing
to control those under his command and permitting them to commit brutal
atrocities).
133. See Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 5.
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conspiracy to assassinate President Abraham Lincoln. 34 In his defense
before the Court, Yamashita asserted that the Executive Branch lacked
jurisdiction to prosecute him in a military trial because the war had already
concluded. 135 He also argued that the military commission lacked the dueprocess guarantees found in the Fifth Amendment, namely that he was
charged with ex post facto offenses, and that the trial was contrary to the
long-standing axiom of nullum crimen sine lege.'36

The majority

determined that because the charges and evidence were outside of the
Court's jurisdiction, it would not rule on that particular issue.' 3 7 In siding
with the majority, Douglas did not believe that the military tribunal's lack
of due-process safeguards
commonly found in civil trials were a matter of
38

judicial concern.1

134. See LOuIs FISHER, MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER:
AMERICAN REVOLUTION TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 62-63, 65-66 (2005)
(explaining that Wertz was tried by a "nine-member military tribunal" and that the
persons accused of assassinating Lincoln were also tried by a military commission
composed of nine officers). For a recent expansive treatise on the military trial of
the persons accused as conspirators in Lincoln's assassination, see ELIZABETH D.
LEONARD, LINCOLN'S AVENGERS:

JUSTICE, REVENGE, AND REUNION AFTER THE

CwL WAR (2004).
Douglas believed that the Lincoln assassination conspirators were
unconstitutionally prosecuted and sentenced in a military commission. See

0. DOUGLAS,
32 (1963).

WILLIAM

FORCE

THE ANATOMY OF LIBERTY: THE RIGHTS OF MAN WITHOUT

135. See Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 6.
136. Id. The majority disagreed and held that the offenses were properly
constituted. See id. at 14-17. "Nullum crimen sine lege" translates to no crime
without a law. See Theodore Meron, Revival of Customary HumanitarianLaw, 99
AM. J. INT'L L., 817 (2005).
137. Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 22. The Court held:
For reasons already stated we hold that the commission's rulings on
evidence and on the mode of conducting these proceedings against
petitioner are not reviewable by the courts, but only by the reviewing
military authorities. From this viewpoint it is unnecessary to
consider what, in other situations, the Fifth Amendment might
require, and as to that no intimation one way or the other is to be
implied.
Id.
138. FINE, supra note 52, at 453-56. Of importance to Douglas's evolution to
antipathy against the military's legal construct, Hugo Black threatened to depart
from the majority when Chief Justice Stone initially wrote that military commission
comported with due-process requirements in the Fifth Amendment. Black
vehemently opposed this and argued that if the issue rested on due process, the
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Justices Frank Murphy and Wiley Rutledge separately dissented from
the majority's opinion, and, as in the case of their dissents in Korematsu,
both justices used due-process language that Douglas later incorporated
into his anti-military jurisprudence. Notably, Douglas did not consider
Rutledge's criticism of due-process defects within Yamashita's tribunal a
matter for judicial concern. 139 In light of his later positions, Douglas's
commission was deficient, and that he would join Murphy's dissent. In an
unpublished concurrence, Black argued,
I am wholly unable to agree with the Court's evaluation of our
system of trial by jury. If the Due Process Clause applied to the
proceedings here challenged, I could not justify them on the ground
that "army officers are better trained," to disregard unreliable and to
weigh conflicting evidence than are "untrained jurors." For it so
happens that those liberty loving, and I think wise people, who were
responsible for the Bill of Rights did not provide that officer, but did
provide that jurors should resolve disputed testimony in cases
involving life and liberty tried in our courts.
Unpublished Concurrence of Hugo Black on In re Yamashita (undated) (Located in
Hugo Lafayette Black Papers, Box 283, Library of Congress [hereinafter Black,
Box j). Black also argued that the excessive reliance on hearsay in Yamashita's
trial violated the Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause. Id. He believed that
absent a treaty or law, because Yamashita's trial was inherently part of war, the
President had the authority to conduct the trial without judicial review. Id. While
this argument may appear tangential to the subject of this Article, Douglas later
insisted that Black reiterate his commentary on jurors in the Reid v. Covert and Ex
rel. Toth v. Quarles cases explained infra.

Because of a desire to show unity, the Court determined that questions over
the fairness of the tribunal were beyond its jurisdiction. Id. at 156. See also
FERREN, supra note 5, at 317. That Douglas remained aloof to this argument might
suggest that he initially sided with Stone and believed the commission entirely fair.
This belief, however, did not last into the 1950s. In his ALMANAC OF LIBERTY,
Douglas wrote of the war crimes trials:
By our standards, no one can be tried for violating an ex postfacto
law .... [T]he crimes for which the Nazis were tried had never been
formalized as a crime with the definitiveness required by our legal
standards. . . ,nor outlawed with a death penalty by the international
community. By our standards that crime arose under ex postfacto
law. Goering et al deserved severe punishment. But their guilt did
not justify us in substituting power for principle.
DOUGLAS, ALMANAC OF LIBERTY, supra note 14, at 96.
139. See [WOD, Box 127]. Rutledge argued,
These two basic elements in the proof, namely, proof of knowledge
of the crimes and proof of the specifications in the bills, that is, of
the atrocities themselves, constitute the most important instances
perhaps, if not the most flagrant, of departure not only from the
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acceptance of the Court's dicta that military commissions' evidentiary
rulings, and the actual conduct of the procedure, were beyond the Court's
authority to review is surprising.1 40 Less surprising is that Douglas did not
join Murphy's dissent. Murphy criticized the Court's majority opinion as
violating due process for what he believed to be a fictitious military
necessity.14 ' Had Yamashita been tried in a military commission in 1969,
Douglas would certainly have sided with Rutledge in Hiatt. In 1946,
Douglas sided with the majority in overturning the military trials of
142
civilians in Hawaii.

express command of Congress against receiving such proof but from
the whole British-American tradition of the common law and the
Constitution.
Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 54-55 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). In a memorandum to
Professor John Frank at Indiana University's law school and shared with Douglas,
Rutledge penned, "[A] dissenter is apt to exaggerate in his view of what the
majority do. Maybe I do so here. Nevertheless, in my honest and I hope sober
judgment, this case will outrank Dred Scott in the annals of the Court."
Memorandum from Justice Rutledge to John Frank (1946) (Located in the Wiley
Rutledge Papers, Box 137, Library of Congress [hereinafter Rutledge, Box--]).
For a short period, Rutledge's fears that In re Yamashita would be used against
American servicemen were well founded. In Hiatt v. Brown, the Court cited In re
Yamashita for the proposition that its jurisdiction over courts-martial was limited.
See Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103, 111 (1950).
140. See HOWARD BALL & PHILLIP COOPER, OF POWER AND RIGHT: HuGo
BLACK, WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, AND AMERICA'S CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 124
(1992). In light of his later positions, it is odd that Douglas agreed with the Court's
statement:
[T]he commission's rulings on evidence and on the mode of
conducting these proceedings against petitioner are not reviewable
by the courts, but only by the reviewing military authorities. From
this viewpoint it is unnecessary to consider what, in other situations,
the Fifth Amendment might require, and as to that no intimation one
way or the other is to be implied.
Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 23.
141. Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 28 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
In my opinion, such a procedure is unworthy of the traditions of our
people or of the immense sacrifices that they have made to advance
the common ideals of mankind. The high feelings of the moment
doubtless will be satisfied. But in the sober afterglow will come the
realization of the boundless and dangerous implications of the
procedure sanctioned today.
Id.

142. Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946). Justice Black authored the
majority opinion in Duncan. Douglas joined the majority and did not leave in
personal correspondences any reasoning for doing so. Moreover, the Court's
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Perhaps most surprising is that Douglas opposed the Court granting
Yamashita's case review at all. In a memorandum to Chief Justice Stone,
forwarded to Rutledge, Douglas dissented from the Court's grant of
arguments to Yamashita's defense counsel. 143 It is not apparent that
Douglas ever mentioned this point in his autobiographies or other
biographical materials on Douglas cited throughout this Article, and they
make no mention of Douglas's opposition either. However, mention of
Douglas's opposition to granting arguments in Yamashita appears in
Professor Sidney A. Fine's biography of Justice Frank Murphy. 144
Shortly after Yamashita, Douglas began to argue for the Court to
possess jurisdiction to review the jurisdictional reach of international-warcrimes tribunals, although his efforts resulted in no formal decisions. 45
Two years after Yamashita, Douglas took cognizance of Rutledge's
concerns regarding the expansion of military jurisdiction in his concurring

conclusion in overturning the military trials, which read, "Our system of
government clearly is the antithesis of total military rule and the founders of this
country are not likely to have contemplated complete military dominance within the
limits of a territory made part of this country and not recently taken from an
enemy," must have satisfied Douglas at the time Yamashita was decided that the
case posed little threat. Id. at 322.
143. Memorandum from Justice William 0. Douglas to Chief Justice Stone (Dec.
20, 1945) [Rutledge, Box 137]. Douglas's memorandum to the judicial conference
reads, "I am asking that the following be added to the order in the Yamashita Cases:
Mr. Justice Douglas Dissents from the order of the Court setting these applications
for oral argument." Id.
144. FINE, supra note 52, at 453. Fine does not cite to the actual memorandum to
Stone, but instead wrote:
[Douglas] requested that the order calling for oral argument state
that he dissented from the decision. The chief justice Reed,
Frankfurter, [and] Burton... met with Douglas to explain that since
the order had already been forwarded to Manila, it would be "silly"
for him to dissent and would only "emphasize the dissension" on the
Court.
Id.

145. See, e.g., Milch v. United States, 332 U.S. 789 (1947); Everett v. Truman,
334 U.S. 824 (1948); In re Ehlen, 334 U.S. 836 (1948); In re Stattman, 335 U.S.
805 (1948). In these cases, the Court denied certiorari. Chief Justice Vinson, and
Justices Frankfurter, Burton, and Reed argued that it did not possess jurisdiction to
review cases decided by international tribunals. Justices Douglas, Black, Murphy,
and Rutledge argued that the Court had to at least rule on the expanse of the
jurisdiction. Justice Jackson recused himself from these cases because of his
participation on the Intemational Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. As a result of the
split in voting, no decision was published.
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opinion in Hirota v. MacArthur. 46 In Hirota,the majority held that former

Japanese Army officers and government officials prosecuted in military
47
commissions for war crimes could not seek relief in U.S. courts.
Douglas concurred in this opinion but cautioned that a broad denial of
habeas to individuals prosecuted in international military tribunals overseas
posed dangers to due process. 48 Douglas argued that, while U.S. courts did
not have the jurisdiction to rule on the decisions of international tribunals,
the courts possessed jurisdiction to inquire into how an alien prisoner came
into the control of the Executive Branch, as well as the lawfulness of the
49
imprisonment.

In a memorandum to his fellow justices, Douglas also expressed
5" a decision
concern with Eisentrager v. Forrestal,'
of the U.S. District
5
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.' ' The appellate court
146. 338 U.S. 197 (1948). Hirota v. MacArthur might have never been reviewed

by the Court save for the intervention of Justice Robert Jackson who had absented
himself from considering jurisdictional questions on the trials of German war
criminals. See Hirota v. MacArthur, 335 U.S. 876 (1948).
147. Hirota, 338 U.S. at 198.
148. Id. at 201-02 (Douglas, J., concurring). Douglas cautioned,
Such a holding would have grave and alarming consequences.
Today Japanese war lords appeal to the Court for application of
American standards of justice. Tomorrow or next year an American
citizen may stand condemned in Germany or Japan by a military

court or commission. If no United States court can inquire into the
lawfulness of his detention, the military have acquired, contrary to

our traditions, a new and alarming hold on us.
Id. (citations omitted).
149. Id. at 204. Douglas specifically argued,
I assume that we have no authority to review the judgment of an

international tribunal. But if as a result of unlawful action, one of our
Generals holds a prisoner in his custody, the writ of habeas corpus
can effect a release from that custody. It is the historic function of

the writ to examine into the cause of restraint of liberty. We should
not allow that inquiry to be thwarted merely because the jailer acts
not only for the United States but for other nations as well.
Id.
150. 174 F.2d 961 (D.C. Cir. 1949). In this case, the appellate court determined
that German citizens captured in China and convicted as unlawful combatants in a
U.S. military commission were entitled to sue for release under a writ of habeas.
The German nationals were accused of aiding Japan after the German surrender.
See id. at 962-63.
151. Justice William 0. Douglas, Draft Memorandum (May 17, 1949) [WOD,
Box 186]. Douglas wrote, "Eisentragerv. Forrestalpresents grave Constitutional
questions," and agreed with the appellate court's decision. However, he did not

THOMAS M. COOLEYLA WREVIEW

[Vol. 26:2

determined that alien Germans tried in a military commission and held by
the U.S. in a foreign nation fell within the jurisdictional reach of the federal
courts. 15 2 In a circulated draft dissent, Douglas entertained quoting an
answer from one of President Harry Truman's recent press conferences, in
which Truman responded to a question on military trials by saying that "the
Constitution should follow the flag wherever it goes, and trials should be
conducted as we usually conduct them in this country. That is my theory
and I am trying to enforce it.' ' 153 Instead of the full quote, with an
attribution to Truman, Douglas's concurrence merely stated: "If an
American General holds a prisoner, our process can reach him4 wherever he
is. To that extent at least, the Constitution follows the flag."'5
Based on Douglas's concurring opinion alone, it might have been a
surprise that, in 1950, he joined in Black's dissent in Johnson v.
Eisentrager,155 a grant of review re-captioned from Eisentrager v.
Forrestal. Black dissented on the basis of the separation-of-powers
doctrine. 156 Although Black's dissent is brief, Eisentrager was the first
case in which Douglas showed an overt concern for the military legal
construct.
That, at the time of Yamashita, Douglas was not yet thought of as an
activist in military law is anecdotally evidenced by one of Yamashita's
defense counsel's memoirs of the case, entitled The Case of General
Yamashita.1 57 Its author, A. Frank Reel, concluded that the defense team
arguing Yamashita's case before the U.S. Supreme Court knew prior to
arguments that only Rutledge, Murphy, and Black would find that the
commission lacked due process.1 58 But based on his dissent in Eisentrager,
by 1950 Douglas might have been considered an ally.
elaborate on his opinion that Hirota and Eisentrager presented interrelated
concerns. Id.
152. Eisentrager,174 F.2d at 964 ("We think that any person who is deprived of
his liberty by officials of the United States, acting under purported authority of that
Government, and who can show that his confinement is in violation of a prohibition
of the Constitution, has a right to the writ.").
153. Letter from Justice Thomas Clark to Justice William 0. Douglas on
Douglas's circulated draft concurrence (May 5, 1949) [WOD, Box 186]. Clark
dissuaded Douglas from including Truman's quote, writing, "[M]y recollection is
that Brandt's [the reporter] question referred to a trial of a G.I.'s wife charged with
murder in Germany and not applicable here." Id.
154. Hirota,338 U.S. at 204.
155. 339 U.S. 763, 791 (1950).
156. Id.
157. A. FRANK REEL, THE CASE OF GENERAL YAMASHITA 215 (1949).
158. Id. See also BALL & COOPER, supra note 140, at 124. Ball and Cooper
wrote, "Douglas was strangely silent on this case; there were few notes in his file
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D. Early DecisionsIndicatingDouglas s JurisprudentialEvolution
While Douglas was not yet an activist against the military's legal
construct, there was a subtle change toward his deference to the Executive
Branch on military policy after Roosevelt's death on April 12, 1945.
Contextually, Douglas approved of Roosevelt's second Vice President,
Henry Wallace, but not Roosevelt's successor and third Vice President,
Harry S. Truman. 59 Douglas believed that Truman possessed integrity but
"had an abysmal ignorance of what actually went on in the world.' 160 It
was in Truman's military policy that Douglas found great fault. 161 "One
alarm that Hugo Black and I felt was the manner in which Truman
militarized the nation," Douglas recalled. 162
"Military men were
everywhere; the White House thought largely in military terms when
foreign affairs were up for discussion.... [Truman] greatly conditioned the
American mind to think in terms of military solutions to the problems of
communism.' ' 63 Douglas's criticism of Truman was not only relegated to
the President's military policy, he also decried the quality of justices
appointed to the Court. "Truman's appointees to the Court were Fred64
Vinson, Tom Clark, Sherman Minton, and Harold Burton," he noted.
"Under Truman the Court
sank to its lowest professional level until the
165
Burger Court arrived."'
Douglas appears to have first considered parameters to limit executive
claims of wartime authority in his dissent in Ludecke v. Watkins,' 66 a 1948
decision authored by Frankfurter. On December 8, 1941, the Attorney
General, acting in conformity with the Alien Enemy Act, arrested a former
Nazi immigrant to the U.S.' 67 After the German Army's surrender in 1945,
and his autobiography did not spend much time on it." Id. As an interesting
coincidence, A. Frank Reel represented Eisentrager on appeal. Eisentrager v.
Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
159. See DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS, supra note 39, at 288-92.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id.
Id. at 292.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 245.

165. Id. Justice Black shared Douglas's views on Truman's appointees. For
instance, Black advised Truman against nominating Burton. When Truman argued
that Burton was a "genuine liberal," Black had his doubts. NEWMAN, supra note
26, at 339.
166. 335 U.S. 160 (1948).
167. Id. at 162-63.
Had the U.S. deported Ludecke to Nazi Germany
immediately after the Nazi government declared war on the U.S., it is likely
Ludecke would have been imprisoned or killed by the Nazi government. He was
imprisoned in a concentration camp in 1933 for eight months and then offered an
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the Attorney General sought to have Ludecke deported to Germany. 168 The
Court determined that, as a matter of course, a decision for declaring when
and where a war terminated was an executive decision and not a judicial
one; therefore, Ludecke, as a designated
alien, was entitled to only those
69
Act.'
the
in
inherent
protections
In his dissent, Douglas did not overtly disagree with Frankfurter's view
on the parameters of armed conflict, but Douglas also joined in Black's
separate dissent in which Black severely criticized Frankfurter's view that
the Court could not delve into the question of whether the Nation remained
at war. 170 In one instance, Black, with Douglas's concurrence, argued,

opportunity to leave Germany. After his immigration to the U.S. in 1934, he
published works critical of Hitler. But because of a refusal to renounce Nazi tenets

or all affiliation with the party's ideals, he was denied naturalization in the U.S. Id.
at 162 n.3.
168. Id. at 163.

169. Id. at 167-69. The majority asserted,
War does not cease with a cease-fire order, and power to be
exercised by the President such as that conferred by the Act of 1798
is a process which begins when war is declared but is not exhausted

when the shooting stops. "The state of war" may be terminated by
treaty or legislation or Presidential proclamation. Whatever the
mode, its termination is a political act. Whether and when it would
be open to this Court to find that a war though merely formally kept
alive had in fact ended, is a question too fraught with gravity even to
be adequately formulated when not compelled. Only a few months
ago the Court rejected the contention that the state of war in relation
to which the President has exercised the authority now challenged
was terminated.
Id. (citations omitted).
170. Id. at 178 (Black, J., dissenting); see also id. at 184 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). Ludecke wrote to Douglas and Black after the case's publication. The
letter to Black still exists, though there is no evidence that either Black or Douglas

responded.

However, Ludecke not only thanked both justices, he argued, as

Douglas would later argue, that the case was an example of an expanding Executive
Branch. Additionally, he argued that the majority's opinion was at odds with the
"United Nations Charter of Human Rights." His letter, in part, reads,
Frankfurter's decision is a fateful decision which indeed may serve
as the decisive precedent for the detention and ruin of anyone of the
millions of "alien enemies" who may be deemed "dangerous" by
"arbitrary action" in case of war between the United States and
Russia with its satellites. . . . Here is a case which shockingly
illustrates the difference between what is preached and what is
practiced ....
Please argue for reconsideration so that Uncle Sam
stands for honesty and not hypocrisy.... Your attitudes encourage
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I do not reach the question of power to deport aliens of
countries with which we are at war while we are at war,
because I think the idea that we are still at war with
by the statute
Germany in the sense contemplated
71
controlling here is a pure fiction.
In another instance, Black reiterated his criticism of Frankfurter's
opinion, stating, "Of course it is nothing but a fiction to say that we are
now at war with Germany. Whatever else that fiction might support, I
refuse to agree that it affords a basis for today's holding ....,172 Douglas
of expansive authority in wartime as
considered Executive Branch claims
173
central to the issue in Ludecke.
However, as World War II receded, Douglas mainly considered the
military's legal construct in terms of its deficits in individual and civil
174
rights. In 1949, Douglas joined in Murphy's dissents in Wade v. Hunter,
a case determining the applicability of double-jeopardy prohibitions to
courts-martial, and Humphrey v. Smith, 175 a case involving due-process
requirements for pretrial investigations conducted under the Articles of
War. Wade originated in a court-martial conducted in the closing days of
the war. 176 The court-martial sought further German-witness testimony
after the presentation of evidence and closing arguments but before a
verdict was rendered. 77 Because of the Army's rapid advance through
of refugees, the sought-after witnesses
Germany and the large numbers
178
could not be timely found.
Consistent with the Articles of War, the commanding general withdrew
the charges against Wade but held the charges in abeyance until such time
as the witnesses were located. 179 The unique rules governing courts-martial
permitted the panel of officers sitting in judgment to call additional
me to write this letter, not for the sake of my insignificant self, but
for the greater principles involved.
Letter from Kurt Ludecke to Justice Hugo Black & Justice William 0. Douglas
(Nov. 16, 1949) [Black, Box 302]. While it is not possible to quantify the effect, if
any, of this, or any of the other letters to Douglas referenced throughout this Article,
on Douglas's jurisprudence, he maintained thousands of such letters and often
responded. However, there is no evidence Douglas responded to Ludeke.
171. Id.
at 175 (Black, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 178 (footnote omitted).
173. Id. at 186 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
174. 336 U.S. 684, 692-94 (1949).
175. 336 U.S. 695, 701 (1949).
176. Wade, 336 U.S. at 685.
177. Id. at 686-87.
178. Id.
at686.
179. Id.
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witnesses beyond what the prosecution or defense intended. 8 0 Once the
witnesses were located, a new court-martial, with a different panel of
officers, convened over Wade's objection on double-jeopardy grounds,
resulting in his rape conviction and lengthy imprisonment."'
The Court held that in the absence of prosecutorial malfeasance, and
despite the fact that under similar circumstances in a civil trial the Army's
action constituted double jeopardy, the second court-martial did not violate
the protection against double jeopardy. 8 2 In joining Murphy's dissent,
Douglas argued that double jeopardy was a fundamental right more
important than military exigency.8 3 Wade was not a case that struck at the
heart of executive authority more than it encompassed due-process rights
for individual soldiers, and Murphy's language was not aggressively
critical in comparison to Douglas's later cases. Douglas's correspondence
files are sparse in regards to this particular case, and there is no evidence
that he pushed for more critical language.
Humphrey presented an issue of an incomplete pretrial investigation
4
into charges referred to a court-martial that later resulted in a conviction.
The Articles of War codified investigation procedures akin to a grand jury

180. Id. at 686 n.2.
181. Id. at687.
182. Id. at 692. Black argued the importance of military necessity, perhaps
sarcastically, as a valid consideration to the dissenters, including Douglas: "[I]n the
absence of bad faith on the part of the commanding general, courts should not
attempt to review his actions in a fighting theatre to determine whether he should
have rearranged his invasion plans in order to have a court-martial continue its trial
of a simple case." Hugo Black, Un-typed Pencil Draft Decision, circulated
(undated) [Black, Box 302].
Black's argument evolved into a more subdued concluding statement in the
published opinion which read,
This case presents extraordinary reasons why the judgment of the
Commanding General should be accepted by the courts. At least in
the absence of charges of bad faith on the part of the Commanding
General, courts should not attempt to review his on-the-spot decision
that the tactical situation required transfer of the charges.
Wade, 336 U.S. at 692.
183. Id. at 694 (Murphy, J., dissenting). Douglas did not articulate in any
correspondence his reasons for dissenting. What remains is a cryptic note: "Justice
Douglas asked me to tell you that if the above case goes down Monday, please note
his dissent. If someone else writes a dissent, he may wish to join. But do not hold
the case for him." Letter from Edith Allen to Justice Hugo Black (Apr. 15, 1949)
[Black, Box 302].
184. Humphrey v. Smith, 336 U.S. 695, 695-97 (1949).
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but that significantly differed in operation. 1 5 Instead of a grand jury, the
Articles of War mandated, through Article 70, that a pretrial investigation
was conducted by a single officer. 186 That officer was required to be a
neutral advisor when recommending to the commanding
officer whether an
1 87
accused be brought to trial or the charges be dismissed.
Although the Court's majority recognized procedural shortcomings in
the pretrial investigation, they declined to overturn the court-martial
conviction, which they believed was conducted fully and fairly."'8 The
dissent argued that the majority's decision frustrated congressionally
mandated procedural safeguards in courts-martial, regardless of whether
the court-martial was conducted fully and fairly. 8 9 In a civilian trial, a
defective grand jury could divest a later trial of jurisdiction on due-process
grounds, and certainly prosecutorial misconduct in a grand jury would
divest a later court of jurisdiction. 90
That Douglas did not write a passionate dissent in Humphrey
further evidences that he did not fully embrace an anti-military
ideology in 1949 because the facts of Humphrey were tailor-made for
185. See id. at 690-97 n.3 (quoting Army Reorganization, Etc., Pub. L. No. 66242, 41 Stat. 759, 802 (1920), as amended; Articles of War, Courts Martial, Pub. L.
No. 75-325, 50 Stat. 724 (1937)).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 700-01. One undated Black memorandum to the Court is insightful as
to the majority's views. In it, he stated that the authority to determine whether a
pretrial investigation was defective rested solely in the Army's Judge Advocate
General, an instrument of the Executive Branch. However, the Court could grant
review of cases in which no pretrial investigation occurred. Memorandum from
Justice Hugo Black to the Court (undated) [Black, Box 300].
189. Id. at 702 (Murphy, J., dissenting). Douglas's sparse commentary in this
case is limited to a single correspondence through his secretary to Black, who wrote
the majority opinion. Drafted on the same day as the correspondence related to
Wade v. Hunter, his secretary notified Black, "Justice Douglas has asked me to tell
you that if your opinion in the above case goes down on Monday, will you kindly
note his dissent." Letter from Edith Allen to Justice Hugo Black (Apr. 15, 1949)
[Black, Box 300].
190. Humphrey 336 U.S. at 701; see, e.g., Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942);
Crowley v. United States, 194 U.S. 461 (1904); see also United States v. Claiborne,
77 F.2d 682 (8th Cir. 1935). In Claiborne,the appellate court articulated,
The purpose of an indictment is to apprise the accused of the crime
charged against him with such reasonable certainty that he can make
his defense and not be taken by surprise by the evidence offered at
the trial, and can be protected, after judgment, against another
prosecution for the same offense.
Id. at 689.
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the type of pointed criticism that marked Douglas's later decisions.
Nonetheless, Humphrey is an important case in delineating Douglas's
evolving ideology, which requires further explanation. Humphrey
came to the Court through the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit in a case with a different name, Smith v. Hiatt."'9 That court
reversed a district court's determination that the investigating
officer's misconduct, though egregious, did not create a reversible
192
unfairness in the subsequent court-martial.
Hiatt arose from an airman's court-martial conviction for rape in
Britain during World War 1. 193 The investigating officer, Lieutenant
Todd, had also served as a provost marshal charged with the duty of
194
maintaining order on the installation to which Hiatt was assigned.
Moreover, Todd commanded the military police who investigated the
case. 195 Two judges from the Third Circuit felt that Todd clearly
abandoned his role as an impartial investigator.' 96 After Todd
performed his duties as an investigator and recommended that Smith
be prosecuted in a general court-martial, the base commander
97
appointed him as an assistant judge advocate to prosecute the case.'
The appellate court recognized that it did not possess the authority
to review the alleged errors within the court-martial but concluded
191. 170 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1948).

192. Id. at 66, 67.
193. Id. at 62.
194. Id. at 64. Moreover, the appellate court noted that while Smith, the airman
accused of rape, was represented by an officer with no legal training, the judge
advocates prosecuting the case, and the investigating officer, Lieutenant Todd, were
trained lawyers. However, the court also noted that this fact was not a means for
granting relief under a habeas writ as it was not a matter ofjurisdiction. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. The appellate court noted:
But Lieutenant Todd's participation in the court-martial as assistant
trial judge advocate is a matter of further serious concern. Todd as
provost marshal had been in active charge of the investigation which
resulted in Smith's being held. Todd then -took over as the impartial
investigator. There was nothing of any consequence added to the
case against Smith during this period. Because of Todd's report and
recommendation as investigator a general court-martial was
convened, Smith tried before it for most serious offenses, and Todd,
a lawyer, was one of the two members of the prosecution staff in
court.
Id. at 63.
197. Id.
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that, as a due-process matter, it could find that the court-martial
198
lacked jurisdiction based on the defective pretrial investigation.
The Third Circuit also found that the Army's skirting of the
requirement for the investigating officer to remain impartial was
noxious to fairness. 199 And it surmised that Lieutenant Todd's
testimony before the district court was untruthful.2 °°
In reversing the district court, and in effect overturning the courtmartial, the appellate court concluded its decision with a statement
reflecting a growing consensus on the practice of courts-martial
during the war: "We recognize the enormous exigencies of the then
general conditions, but we cannot permit them to serve as an excuse
for the failure to give the soldier20involved
the express safeguards with
1
which Congress provided him.
Although, in joining the Court's dissent, Douglas agreed with the
Third Circuit's condemnation of the court-martial, he did not
articulate equally strong criticism against the military's legal
construct, which later marked his judicial tenure. 20 2 Indeed, Douglas
would not vociferously do so until after 1953, during a Republican
administration, with a politically powerful anti-Communism
movement dominating U.S. politics. In 1950, Douglas took no part in
Hiatt v. Brown,203 a case in which the U.S. Supreme Court reversed a
district court's determination that a court-martial lacked jurisdiction
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. Specifically, Todd had testified in district court that his role in
questioning witnesses as an investigator was very limited. The appellate court
noted:
These point to close cooperation between Todd, chief of the Military
Police, and the civilian constables.
The government's brief
emphasizes the latter promotion of Lieutenant Todd to captain,
which would merely confirm the impression that he was a zealous
policeman. Exhibit B is not explained by the government. Its
repetition of Todd's bald denial of seeing any witnesses until after
his appointment as investigating officer hardly overcomes the
implications in the photostat record.

Id.
201. Id.at 66.
202. Wade v.Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 693 (1949) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
203. 339 U.S. 103, 111 (1950), reh'gdenied, 339 U.S. 939 (1950). Douglas was
recovering from an injury at the time of the hearing, but he could have noted a
dissent in the case nonetheless.
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because no qualified law-member (an individual serving in a quasijudicial capacity charged with advising the court-martial panel) was
appointed to advise the court-martial in contravention of the Articles
of War.2°
In upholding the district court's decision, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit derided the qualifications and
performance of the law-member, concluding that "the arbitrary action
of organizing this court-martial in complete disregard of the plain
requirements of the 8th Article of War is manifestly reviewable, both
as an abuse of discretion, and as a fatal organizational defect which
effectually divests the court-martial of jurisdiction. ' ' 20 5 Douglas was,
in retrospect, strangely absent from the U.S. Supreme Court's
reversal of the lower courts' determination that the court-martial did
not lack jurisdiction because the appointed legal advisor possessed no
legal qualifications to serve in his appointed capacity. Indeed, that
the Court relied on common Army practices listed in a law text,
Digest of Opinions of the Judge Advocate General,206 would have
204. Brown v. Hiatt, 81 F. Supp. 647, 650 (N.D. Ga. 1948).
205. Hiatt v. Brown, 175 F.2d 273, 276 (5th Cir. 1949). In support of its
conclusion, the Fifth Circuit specifically noted that the Army appointed two judge
advocates to prosecute the case, but a colonel assigned to the field artillery to serve
as the court-martial's legal advisor. These facts caused the following commentary:
We are of opinion the 8th Article of War requires, in order to insure
the protection of fundamental and constitutional safeguards to
members of our armed forces, certainly in times of peace, that the
presence of a duly qualified law member from the Judge Advocate
General's Department be made a jurisdictional prerequisite to the
validity of such court-martial proceeding, except in the single
instance where such officer is actually, and in fact, "not available."
Id.
206. Hiatt,339 U.S. at 109. The Court articulated,
The 8th Article has also been consistently interpreted and applied by
the Army as vesting a discretion in the appointing authority, which
when exercised is conclusive in determining not only the
accessibility of personnel but also the suitability of the officer
detailed as the law member of a general court-martial. CM 231963,
Hatteberg, 18 B. R. 349, 366-369 (1943); CM ETO 804, Ogletree, 2
B. R. (ETO) 337, 346 (1943); CM 209988, Cromwell, 9 B. R. 169,
196 (1938); Digest of Opinions of The Judge Advocate General
(1912-1940) § 365 (9). This establishedinterpretationis entitled to
great weight in our determinationof the meaning of the article.
Id.(emphasis added).
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later provoked Douglas's wrath at his judicial peers upholding the
military legal construct makes his absence from Hiatt v. Brown
puzzling.
Douglas's decision to completely absent himself from Hiatt v.
Brown cannot fully be explained by his other judicial determinations
contemporaneous with that case. It is true that, in 1950, he authored
Whelchel v. McDonald,20 7 a decision upholding a court-martial
The Digest of Opinions of the Judge Advocate Generalwas first authored in
1864-1865 by Colonel William Winthrop, the author of Military Law and
Precedents, under the direction of General Joseph Holt, the Judge Advocate
General. It was intended to serve as legal guidance to provide consistency in
courts-martial practice. The Digest did not provide transcripts or texts of cases.
Instead, it compiled opinions based on judge advocate general reviews of courtsmartial determinations as well as other matters of military law. The Digest was
periodically updated and distributed to judge advocates from 1865 to 1950. See
DIGEST OF

OPINIONS OF

THE JUDGE

ADVOCATE

GENERAL OF THE

ARMY

(Government Printing Office, 1865); DIGEST OF OPINIONS OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE
GENERAL OF THE ARMY (Government Printing Office, 1866); DIGEST OF OPINIONS
OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE ARMY (Government Printing Office,
1880); DIGEST OF OPINIONS OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE ARMY
(Government Printing Office, 1917); DIGEST OF OPINIONS OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE
GENERAL OF THE

ARMY (Government Printing Office, 1919); DIGEST OF OPINIONS

(Government Printing Office,
1942). Its status as a persuasive legal text was cemented by the Court in Mechanics
& Traders Bank v. Union Bank, 89 U.S. 276 (1875). Justice Stephen Field noted,
"An excellent digest of these opinions was prepared by Major W. Winthrop, of the
United States Army, in 1868, and published by authority of the Secretary of War."
Id. at 302 (Field, J., dissenting). For the Digest's continuing use, see also United
States v. Landers, 92 U.S. 77, 79-80 (1876) and most recently, Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 605 (2006).
207. 340 U.S. 122, 123 (1950). Whelchel was convicted in a court-martial for
the rape of a minor girl and sentenced to death. The convening authority reduced
the sentence to life. Whelchel argued that his court-martial was defective on two
grounds-depriving the court-martial of jurisdiction. Tried under the pre-1948
Articles of War, his insanity defense was not as comprehensive as it would have
been under the 1948 Articles of War. However, the Judge Advocate General
reviewed the trial as well as a psychiatrist's evaluation and determined that
Whelchel was legally sane at the time of his offense. Douglas was satisfied with
this procedure, writing:
We put to one side the due process issue which respondent presses,
for we think it plain from the law governing court-martial procedure
that there must be afforded a defendant at some point of time an
opportunity to tender the issue of insanity. It is only a denial of that
opportunity which goes to the question of jurisdiction. That
OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE ARMY
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conviction in which Douglas noted his approval of modifications in
the Articles of War. Although Whelchel's primary attack on the
court-martial was centered on the military's interpretation of the
insanity defense under the pre-1948 Articles of War, secondarily he
argued that his court-martial, consisting of all officers, violated the
Constitution's guarantee of a trial by one's peers. 208 Unlike its
predecessor, which required courts-martial to be composed of officers
only, the 1948 Articles of War permitted an enlisted soldier or airman
20 9
to request a trial by court-martial consisting of enlisted members. 210
Welchel sought a new court-martial with enlisted members.
Surprisingly, in light of his later decisions, Douglas dismissed this
argument entirely, commenting as follows:
Under Article 4 of the revised Articles of War, an accused
may now request that enlisted men be included on the
court-martial that tries him. There was no such provision
of the law when petitioner was tried. But the fact that he
was tried by a court-martial composed wholly of officers
does not raise a question which goes to jurisdiction.
Petitioner can gain no support from the analogy of trial by
jury in the civil courts. The right to trial by jury
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment is not applicable to
trials by courts-martial or military commissions.21'
If anything, Douglas's decision in Whelchel evidenced some
amenability to the reforms then taking place in military law. But that
amenability shifted in two cases prior to Truman's departure from the
presidency in 1953. Both of these cases require some exposition to assess
Douglas's later ideological evolution against the military's legal construct.
The first of these cases, Gusik v. Schilder,212 arose in the context of a
capital-murder trial in a court-martial. Gusik had been convicted of luring
opportunity was afforded here. Any error that may be committed in
evaluating the evidence tendered is beyond the reach of review by
the civil courts.

Id. at 124.
208. Id. at 124. Under the Articles of War, courts-martial relied on the
McNaughten standard of insanity. The standard was basically whether an accused

could comprehend right from wrong. Id at 124 n. 1.
209. Id. at 126.
210. See id.
211. Id at 126-27. See also Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U.S. 1, 8 (1921); Exparte
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 40-41 (1942).
212. 340 U.S. 128 (1950).
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two Italian black-marketers onto a military base and then murdering
both.2 13 Commensurate with the Articles of War, the staff judge advocate
at the military base, as well as the Judge Advocate General of the Army,
reviewed the case after its conclusion and determined that there were no
legal errors within the record of trial.21 4 While in confinement, Gusik sued
for release through a writ of habeas corpus to the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio challenging the court-martial's jurisdiction on the
basis of a defective pretrial investigation. 211
The central issue raised by Gusik was whether the lack of retroactivity
216
of the review process in the new Articles of War denied him due process.
A new provision, Article 53, provided for a more complete appellate review
procedure by the Army's Judge Advocate General before finding the results
and sentences in courts-martial conclusive.2 17 This would have been the
point in which Gusik could claim a defective pretrial investigation, as well
as claim an exhaustion of remedies appeal to a federal court. The district
court subsequently ruled that the Army denied Gusik due process in failing
to conduct a full and impartial pretrial investigation in compliance with
Article 70 of the Articles of War.21 8
The appellate court reversed the district court, holding that Gusik was
entitled to review based on the law at the time of his court-martial review
and not a retroactive application of the new law. 21 9 Neither the district
court nor the appellate court provided any detailed analysis on the nature of
military law or the fairness of the Articles of War. Nor did Douglas, in
authoring the unanimous opinion, criticize the military's legal construct.
Instead, the majority upheld the appellate court's decision in denying
habeas but differed from it by ordering the appellate proceedings abated
until the Article 53 review was conducted. 220 Notably, Douglas's approach
213. Schilder v. Gusik, 180 F.2d 662, 663 (6th Cir. 1950), cert. granted, 339
U.S. 977 (1950). The facts of the case are found in the intermediate appellate
decision. Gusik was initially sentenced to life, but the sentence was reduced to
sixteen years. After review, Gusik was transferred to a federal penitentiary in Ohio.
Schilder was the warden of the penitentiary. Id.
214. Id. at 663.
215. Id.
216. Id.at 663,664.
217. See id. at 663-64.
218. Id. at 663. The Articles of War that were in effect at the time of Gusik's
court-martial were essentially the 1916 Articles of War. Gusik alleged he was
denied effective assistance of counsel in his pretrial investigation because his trial
counsel failed to call witnesses, which might have cast doubt on the charges in the
case. See Gusik v. Shilder, 340 U.S. 128, 130-31 (1950).
219. Gusik, 340 U.S. at 132.
220. Id.at 134.
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to courts-martial incorporated language that still evidenced trust in the
military's separate judicial system. 22' However, Douglas criticized the
Executive Branch's argument to the U.S. Supreme Court that the new
provision reduced the ability of aggrieved, convicted servicemen to petition
federal courts through habeas for redress.222 In response to the argument of
reducing habeas appeals, Douglas determined:
These tribunals have operated in a self-sufficient system,
save only as habeas corpus was available to test their
jurisdiction in specific cases .... If Congress had intended
to deprive the civil courts of their habeas corpus
jurisdiction, which has been exercised from the beginning,
the break with history would have been so marked that we
believe the purpose would have been made plain and
unmistakable. The finality language so adequately serves
the more restricted purpose that we would have to give a
strained construction in order to stir the constitutional issue
that is tendered.223
In light of his later opinions and correspondences, Douglas clearly intended
this language as a warning to the Executive Branch that he opposed the
diminution of the rights of servicemen.224
In spite of his warning, and the Court's unanimous agreement in Gusik,
Douglas was unable to convince his fellow justices to join a fundamental

221. See id.
222. Id. at 132. Douglas noted, "It is argued that this clause deprives the courts
of jurisdiction to review these military judgments and therefore amounts to a
suspension of the writ." Id. In a memorandum to the Court, Douglas cautioned, "If
this holding of the Sixth Circuit means that the decisions of the [Judge Advocate
General] cannot be collaterally attacked, there is serious constitutional difficulty
and courts-martial convictions will escape judicial scrutiny completely." See
Memorandum from Justice William 0. Douglas to the Court (1949) [WOD, Box
205].
223. Id. at 132-33. Douglas also detailed in a lengthy memorandum to the Court
that the appellate courts in Whelchel and in Gusik were at odds, and that the Court
had to make clear that Whelchel governed. "This view, while not the holding of the
case, is in conflict with the opposite view in Whelchel. This point buttresses my
feeling that cert should be granted." Memorandum from Justice William 0.
Douglas to the Court (1949) [WOD, Box 205].
224. See, e.g., Memorandum from Justice William 0. Douglas to the Court
(1949) [WOD, Box 205].
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criticism of executive reach in another case, Burns v. Wilson.225 Burns
arose from two capital-murder courts-martial held in Guam, a U.S.
226
protectorate administered at the time by the Department of the Navy.
Both petitioners alleged that civilian law enforcement officials in Guam
used torture and coercion to obtain confessions, as well as doctored
evidence to secure convictions.227 These allegations were reviewed by the
newly established military appellate courts to the majority's satisfaction,
who, in turn, upheld the convictions and sentences. 228 Within the
majority's opinion, as well as in Justice Sherman Minton's concurrence,
was a tacit acceptance that due-process standards differed for servicemen
than for citizens.229
225. 346 U.S. 137 (1953). Burns was argued on February 5, 1953, and decided
on June 15, 1953. Id. The arguments occurred prior to President Eisenhower's
inauguration. The decision was issued after the inauguration.
226. Id. at 138.
227. Id. at 143.
228. Id. at 144-45.
229. See, e.g., id. The majority held,
Congress has taken great care both to define the rights of those
subject to military law, and provide a complete system of review
within the military system to secure those rights. Only recently the
Articles of War were completely revised, and thereafter, in
conformity with its purpose to integrate the armed services,
Congress established a Uniform Code of Military Justice applicable
to all members of the military establishment. These enactments were
prompted by a desire to meet objections and criticisms lodged
against court-martial procedures in the aftermath of World War II.
Nor was this a patchwork effort to plug loopholes in the old system
of military justice. The revised Articles and the new Code are the
result of painstaking study; they reflect an effort to reform and
modernize the system-from top to bottom.
Id. at 140-41. Importantly, the Court relied on Professor Edmund Morgan in
arriving at this opinion. The majority specifically cited to Edmund Morgan, The
Backgroundof the Uniform Code of MilitaryJustice, 6

VAND.

L. REv. 169 (1953).

Id. at 137 n.7. A professor of law at both Vanderbilt's and Harvard's law schools,
Morgan served as a judge advocate in the Army during World War 1. Shortly after
the War, he became a leading critic of the Articles of War and was instrumental in
the transition of military law from those Articles to the UCMJ. See, e.g., Arthur E.
Sutherland, Edmund Morris Morgan: Lawyer-Professor and Citizen Soldier, 28
MIL L. REv. 3 (1965); Felix E. Larkin, Professor Edmund M Morgan and the
Drafting of the Uniform Code, 28 MIL. L. REv. 7 (1965); I JONATHAN LURIE,
ARMING MILITARY JUSTICE:

THE ORIGINS OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

1775-1950, at 62, 157-61 (1992).
Chief Justice Warren, Douglas's ally on the Court, did not view Burns in the
same manner as Douglas. In his speech to the New York University Law School
MILITARY APPEALS,
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Although Burns can be properly categorized as a decision primarily
impacting the individual due-process rights of uniformed servicemen,
Douglas viewed the case as both a matter of due-process deficits within the
military's justice system and an encroachment by the Executive Branch
into the judiciary. 23 Importantly, in Douglas's correspondence to Black,
he argued that military courts exceeded their jurisdiction when evidence

student body, he argued that Burns enabled a greater judicial role in the oversight of
courts-martial:
Thus it was hardly surprising to find that, in 1953, the Supreme
Court indicated in Burns v. Wilson that court martial proceedings
could be challenged through habeas corpus actions brought in civil
courts, if those proceedings had denied the defendant fundamental
rights. The various opinions of the members of the Court in Burns
are not, perhaps, as clear on this point as they might be.
Nevertheless, I believe they do constitute recognition of the
proposition that our citizens in uniform may not be stripped of basic
rights simply because they have doffed their civilian clothes.
Warren, supra note 5, at 4. Douglas did not agree with Warren's conclusions
because the Court had not granted the two petitioners relief. However, Douglas
particularly took exception to Justice Minton's concurring opinion, which
articulated a traditional view of military law:
I do not agree that the federal civil courts sit to protect the
constitutional rights of military defendants, except to the limited
extent indicated below.
Their rights are committed by the
Constitution and by Congress acting in pursuance thereof to the
protection of the military courts, with review in some instances by
the President. Nor do we sit to review errors of law committed by
military courts.
Burns, 346 U.S. at 146 (Minton, J., concurring).
230. Burns, 346 U.S. at 154 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Douglas articulated his
opposition to the military's legal construct as:
If the military agency has fairly and conscientiously applied the
standards of due process formulated by this Court, I would agree that
a rehash of the same facts by a federal court would not advance the
cause of justice. But where the military reviewing agency has not
done that, a court should entertain the petition for habeas corpus. In
the first place, the military tribunals in question are federal agencies
subject to no other judicial supervision except what is afforded by
the federal courts. In the second place, the rules of due process
which they apply are constitutional rules which we, not they,
formulate.
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was obtained by means that violate due process, and this enabled the
Executive Branch to ignore other checks and balances.2 3'
E. Torts: An Exception to Douglas'sAntipathy to the Military's
Legal Construct
While Douglas possessed a growing hostility to the military's legal
construct, it was not evident in all areas. In one notable instance, he
23 2
concurred with the Court's majority decision in Feres v. United States
that barred active-duty members from suing the U.S. government in tort on
the basis of negligence. Congress had recently enacted the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA), in part to provide an avenue for citizens to sue the
government for injuries caused by negligent acts and as a means for
reducing citizen petitions to Congress, the historical means of
compensation. 233
The issue of whether service members could sue the government was
not entirely novel. A year prior to Feres, in Brooks v. United States,234 the
Court determined that the decedents of a soldier could sue the government
under the FTCA for its negligent acts that were unrelated to actual military
service. 235 Douglas, along with Frankfurter, dissented in the case without
writing an opinion. 236 Instead, both justices adopted the lower court's
determination that Congress failed to make an express provision for
231. Letter from Justice William 0. Douglas to Justice Hugo Black (June 9,
1953) [WOD, Box 232]; Letter from Justice Hugo Black to Justice William 0.
Douglas (June 10, 1953) [WOD, Box 232]. This correspondence also indicates
Douglas's regret for joining the majority in In re Yamashita. Douglas feared that
Yamashita enabled the trammeling of due-process rights of servicemen facing
courts-martial. Black assured Douglas that In re Yamashita was a narrow ruling,
inapplicable to courts-martial:
I agree but do not think Yamashita is applicable here even as to
weight of evidence, hearsay... etc. His was a battle offence by the
enemy and it was solely for that reason I agreed to the opinion and
holding. I think the due process clause does have application to our
soldiers who are tried by courts-martial or commissions, except for
trial by jury.
Id.
232. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
233. Id.
at 138, 140.
234. 337 U.S. 49 (1949).
235. Id. at 51. In this case, a soldier on furlough was killed and another injured
when an Army vehicle collided with their car. In upholding the right to bring suit,
Justice Murphy, writing the majority opinion, concluded that "[w]e are not
persuaded that 'any claim' means 'any claim but that of servicemen."' Id. at 49-5 1.
236. Id. at 54.
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servicemen under the FTCA, and this omission had to be construed against
237
Interestingly, Douglas, without any objection in his
the serviceman.
correspondence, did not comment on the appellate court's statement in his
dissent:
The soldier, upon enlistment, acquires a special and unique
military status, quite different from any relation between
the Federal Government and civilians. The soldier is
subject to military discipline even while at play, and his
desertion is a serious crime, punishable at times by death.
Rarely, if ever, is a soldier referred to by Congress as a
"private individual. 238
Frankfurter's acceptance of this language is unsurprising in light of his
later opinions and past military associations. Douglas's joining with
Frankfurter, however, was odd. If, in 1949, he wholly embraced the intent
in the appellate court's verbiage, within a decade he departed from it.
Moreover, as Feres involved egregious conduct on the part of government
officers in several different instances (including wrongful death due to
deficient fire-safety measures, medical malpractice by leaving a surgical
towel in a patient's intestine, and wrongful death on the basis of another
instance of medical malpractice),2 39 Douglas's concurrence (without
237. Id.The appellate court noted, "This problem of statutory interpretation is
close and difficult, due primarily to the inept draftsmanship on the part of Congress
in failing to make clear and express provision as to soldiers in the United States
Army." United States v. Brooks, 169 F.2d 840, 842 (4th Cir. 1948). The appellate
court also noted,
Our attention is called to the fact that in an early draft of the Federal
Tort Claims Act (H. R. 181, introduced by Mr. Celler) there was an
express exception with reference to soldiers, and the Act was finally
enacted without this exception. The argument is made that when
Congress, with this exception brought to its attention, deliberately
omitted this exception from the final draft of the Act, it must fairly

be inferred that Congress clearly intended to include soldiers within
the scope of the Act.
Id. at 845.
238. Brooks, 169 F.2d at 842 (citations omitted).
239. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). For more detail on the nature
of the three individual negligence cases, see Feres v. United States, 177 F.2d 535
(2nd Cir. 1949) (stating that a widow of an officer sued the federal government
under the FTCA alleging a defective heating plant in a barracks caused the fire
which resulted in the officer's death); Jefferson v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 706
(D.C. M.D. 1948) (negligence based on Army surgeons leaving a sanitary towel
inside a soldier's intestine after surgery, which resulted in a necessary surgery
eighteen months after the first surgery); Griggs v. United States, 178 F.2d 1 (10th
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authoring an opinion) with the majority shows that he viewed the
individual soldier as almost completely confined to the will of Congress in
tort matters. 240 Douglas did not leave in his voluminous correspondence
the reasons for his Feres and Brooks decisions, but at the time of these
decisions the Korean Conflict did not appear to be abating, and it might
have concerned Douglas that individual soldiers could hamper the Nation's
war efforts through lawsuits. Douglas would later have no such
concerns
24 1
and even encouraged them to do so during the Vietnam Conflict.

I. FROM THE END OF THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION THROUGH
MCCARTHYISM: DOUGLAS'S ATTEMPTS TO REDUCE THE SCOPE OF
MILITARY JURISDICTION AND INDivIDUAL RIGHTS

National military policy following World War II was unlike that of any
other prior period in the Nation's history. After the termination of conflict
in both the Civil War and World War I, the Nation's military forces rapidly
demobilized. When the Civil War ended in 1865, the Union Army
numbered over I million soldiers and officers, but by 1875 the national
army numbered 25,000 soldiers.242 In 1918, the U.S. Army numbered
slightly over 4 million soldiers, but by 1921 its numbers decreased to
slightly over 120,000.243 This was not so after World War II. In 1945, the

Army numbered over 8 million soldiers. 244 Truman sought reductions to
slightly less than 4 million by 1946.245 As a result, the U.S. possessed a
peacetime military larger than at any time in history.246 Moreover, this

Cir. 1949) (officer's death resulting from "negligent, careless, and unskilled"
medical personnel).
240. Feres, 340 U.S. at 136-38.
241. See discussion infra Part III.
242. EDWARD M. COFFMAN, THE OLD ARMY:

A PORTRAIT OF THE AMERICAN

ARMY IN PEACETIME, 1784-1898, at 215 (Oxford University Press 1986).
generally ROBERT M. UTLEY, FRONTIER REGULARS:

See

THE UNITED STATES ARMY

AND THE INDIAN, 1866-1890 (Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc. 1973).
243. See RONALD H. SPECTOR, EAGLE AGAINST THE SUN 9-10 (The Free Press

1985); JOHN S. D. EISENHOWER, YANKS: THE EPIC STORY OF THE AMERICAN
ARMY INWORLD WAR 1288-89 (The Free Press 2001).
244. RUSSELL F. WEIGLEY, THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR: A HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES MILITARY STRATEGY AND POLICY 368 (Macmillian Publishing Co.,

Inc. 1973).
245. Id.

See generally THEODORE ROPP, WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD (Duke

University Press 1959).
246. National
Security Council
Report 68 (1950),
available at
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study-collections/korea/large/week2/nsc6
8_51.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2010) [hereinafter NSC-68].
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force would have been considerably larger but for the Nation's nucleardeterrence strategy.247 Douglas does not appear to have fully understood
the impetus for the buildup of large military forces in the sense that he was
not included in the top-secret, executive-level national security
deliberations; nothing indicates that Douglas knew of National Security
Council Report 68. But he accurately connected the government's fears of
its weaknesses in deterring Communism's expansion and the Executive
Branch's assertion of248
exclusive control over its enlarged military to a social
war on Communism.
A. MeCarthyism and the Rise of Douglas'sAntipathyfor the
Military s Legal Construct
While it is difficult to pinpoint the exact origin of Douglas's distrust of
the military, perhaps the best scholarly starting point for analyzing the
maturation of his ideology is in his seldom-cited 1952 Look Magazine

247. See, e.g., Lawrence Freedman, The First Two Generations of Nuclear
Strategists, MAKERS OF MODERN STRATEGY FROM MACHIAVELLI TO THE NUCLEAR

AGE 748 (Peter Paret ed., Princeton University Press 1986). This strategy was first
articulated in a classified document, NSC-68, dated April 7, 1950. NSC-68 noted
that the Soviet Union's goal was world domination. It further argued:
The capabilities of the Soviet world are being exploited to the full
because the Kremlin is inescapably militant. It is inescapably
militant because it possesses and is possessed by a world-wide
revolutionary movement, because it '[sic] is the inheritor of Russian
imperialism, and because it is a totalitarian dictatorship. Persistent
crisis, conflict, and expansion are the essence of the Kremlins
militancy. This dynamism serves to intensify all Soviet capabilities.
Id. at 22. NSC-68 reflected the reasons behind a nuclear deterrent strategy and the

maintenance of the Nation's large standing military forces:
It is true that the United States armed forces are now stronger than
ever before in other times of apparent peace; it is also true that there
exists a sharp disparity between our actual military strength and our
commitments. The relationship of our strength to our present

commitments, however, is not alone the governing factor. The world
situation, as well as commitments, should govern; hence, our
military strength more properly should be related to the world
situation confronting us. When our military strength is related to the
world situation and balanced against the likely exigencies of such a
situation, it is clear that our military strength is becoming
dangerously inadequate.

Id. at 51.
248. See discussion infra Part II.A.
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article entitled We Have Become Victims of the Military Mind.249 Published
during a stalemate, which characterized the later stages of the Korean War,
Douglas warned that the military's unitary and regimented mindset invaded
all levels of the government and would ultimately undermine confidence in
the democratic government.2 50 "The increasing influence of the military in
our thinking and in our affairs is the most ominous aspect of our modern
history," he argued.25 '
Douglas posited that because the military served only to fight wars, its
leaders looked not to the cultural, economic, or political reasons for
international conflict but simply to how to destroy an enemy by force of
arms. 2 52 In turn, he cautioned, this bred into the military leadership an
inherent conservatism that devalued minorities, devalued dissenting
opinions, and quashed meaningful debate.253 Without writing such, he
likened the military mindset to what contemporaneously became coined as
"McCarthyism.1 254 He caustically concluded that "[t]he military mind does
not know the give and take of public debate, the art of persuasion of people,
the value and importance of dissent and disagreement, the importance of
religious, political, [and] racial minorities in our midst. 255
Publishing the article carried risks, including confronting national
heroes, such as President Dwight Eisenhower, General Douglas
MacArthur, General Omar Bradley, and General George C. Marshall.
While Douglas overtly exempted these men from his otherwise pointed
criticisms, he mildly criticized Bradley without naming the General who, in
a companion article, challenged Douglas's fears as misplaced.256 Douglas
later articulated that he never believed Bradley was unintelligent or
dishonest, but he felt that Bradley's beliefs in the efficacy of retired, highranking military officers employed as corporate executives bidding for
contracts in the Pentagon horribly naive. 257 To Douglas, this naivety
permitted not only gross corruption, but it also undermined the Executive
Branch's duty to exist as a servant of the public good. 58
249. William 0. Douglas, We Have Become Victims of the Military Mind, LOOK,
Mar. 11, 1952, at 34 [hereinafter LOOK article].
250. Id.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See FRIED, supra note 20.
LOOK article, supra note 249.
Id. at 35.
257. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS, supra note 39, at 338 (writing that thenretired General Omar Bradley was an honest person who saw nothing wrong with
serving as a high corporate officer in a company making bids at the Pentagon).
258. Id.
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Douglas believed that Bradley's assertion that inherent protections
existed because the government was primarily staffed by civilians, with
civilians at the head of each agency, was a false check against the military's
encroachment into the federal government.2 59 He reasoned that career
military officers serving in the Pentagon unduly influenced defense and
foreign policy.2 60 However, he concluded the article with an understanding
that the Soviet Union and its support of Communism's spread were a
menace to freedom.26 1
Douglas kept a number of supportive correspondences resulting from
The editor of Dartmouth College's newspaper notified Douglas
article.
the
that the placement of Reserve Officers Training Corps units at his college
caused "the gradual disappearance of the free elective system, the
theoretical basis of [Dartmouth]. 262 A group of psychologists in New
Hampshire encouraged Douglas to seek the presidency based on his antimilitary position.263 Douglas also publicly received a "thank you" from the
National Council Against Conscription. 264 He thanked each of these
individuals and expressed his gratitude for their support. Oddly, he also
received a commendation from the editors of the ProtestantStatesman and
Nation, an anti-immigration-focused newsletter, which noted an irony,
arguing that "the Pentagon is going to give us a communist devised military
state in order to DEFEAT communism., 265 His record of correspondence
indicates that he did not respond to this organization.
As important as the contents of the published article and the responses
to it are in contextualizing Douglas's anti-military ideology in his
jurisprudence, his multiple handwritten and typed drafts of the article
convey stauncher views than the actual print. In his first unpublished draft
259. LOOK article, supra note 249.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. William 0. Douglas, We Have Become Victims of the Military Mind
(undated) (draft of article for LOOK magazine) [WOD, Box 855] [hereinafter LOOK
draft].
263. Letter from Kenneth Roman to Justice William 0. Douglas (Feb. 28, 1952)
[WOD, Box 602] Douglas's short response and "thank you" is located in the same
file.
264. Letter from James M. Swomley, Jr., President, National Council Against
Conscription to Justice William 0. Douglas (June 30, 1952) [WOD, Box 602]
265. See Letter from George M. Haslerud to Justice William 0. Douglas (1952)
[WOD, Box 602]; see also letter from Edward James Smythe to Justice William 0.
Douglas (Feb. 23, 1952) [WOD, Box 602]. Smythe was the ProtestantStatesman
and Nation editor, and he noted to Douglas, "[T]his organization is dedicated to
defending American Protestantism against the Un-American Activities of the
Highly Organized and well financed alien-minded, self-proclaimed minorities." Id.
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to Look, he aggressively criticized Bradley's statement that the civilian
oversight of the military was a shield against militarism. 266 Douglas argued
that because career military officers were viewed as experts, political
appointees fell captive to the officers' ideals.267 The drafts also contained
criticisms of the military's narrow approach to Communism, including the
statement that "communists fan the flames of the revolt against feudalism,
but the revolts are historic processes, accelerated by communist
lies in the wide
propaganda-but not communist in origin. Their origin
268
gulf between those at the top and those at the bottom.
While his articulation that Communism was an exaggerated evil was
absent from the final draft,2 69 this omission could not have been done out of
a fear of being labeled an appeaser. One year prior to the article, in Dennis
v. United States,270 Douglas effectively challenged the Court to take
judicial notice of Communism's weakness as a political force in the
Nation. 27' He did not use the same words that were present in his article
drafts, but in stating that "it should not be difficult to conclude that as a
politicalparty they are of little consequence, 2 72 Douglas made clear that
the internal threat from Communism was artificially conflated to the point
of the judiciary permitting the trammeling of the First Amendment.27 3
in another book, warned of Communism's
Ironically, however, Douglas,
274
growth in Southwest Asia.
To Douglas, McCarthy was "unscrupulous and fascist minded," and he
could not understand why neither Truman nor Eisenhower confronted the
anti-Communist craze then enveloping the Nation. 275 Douglas later wrote
266. LOOK draft, supra note 262.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. LOOK article, supra note 249.
270. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
271. Id. at 588.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 590 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also id. at 580 (Black, J.,
dissenting). Black dissented for similar reasons as Douglas; namely that the
prohibited speech violated the First Amendment. See generally NEWMAN, supra
note 26. Like Douglas, Black believed the Court's bow to McCarthyism was a
surrender of its independence. Id.
274. WiLLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, NORTH FROM MALAYA: ADVENTURE ON FIVE
FRONTS 9-10 (1953). Of Vietnam, Korea, Formosa, the Philippines, and Burma,
Douglas warned, "Each front is indeed an overt front of a communist conspiracy to
expand the Russian Empire." Id.
275. HOYT, supra note 24, at 181; see also DOUGLAS, Go EAST, YOUNG MAN,
supra note 37, at 383 Douglas had personal friends such as Owen Lattimore who
McCarthy targeted with disloyalty charges; see also Letter from Justice Felix
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that right-wing Republicans led by McCarthy engaged in parallelism.

276

He

recorded, "If one believed in free medical care, he was a communist
because Russia had that system. If one proposed disarmament, as Henry
2 77
Wallace often did, he was a communist because Russia proposed it too.
As a capstone indicator of Douglas's belief that the anti-Communist
movement had gone too far, he granted a publicly controversial stay of
execution for Ethel and Julius Rosenberg in 1953.278
Although Douglas's grant of a stay of execution generated controversy
within the Court, and the Court overrode Douglas's stay, Douglas
steadfastly believed that the Rosenbergs were denied due process. 279 To
Douglas, the issue was not per se part of the military's legal construct, but
it reflected pressures placed on the Executive Branch to deny due process
to people branded as Communists or traitors. 280 Douglas believed that
similar pressures affected the Executive Branch's control over military
policy. 281 And granting the Rosenbergs a stay of execution was not the last

time that Douglas would support granting stays against the government.282

Frankfurter to Justice William 0. Douglas (1948) [WOD, Box 33]. Even
Frankfurter, a conservative justice, was not immune from allegations of Communist
sympathies because he had worked alongside Alger Hiss. In 1948, Frankfurter
sought Douglas's support in combating charges of Communist sympathies from a
journalist named Westbrook Pegler. Frankfurter wrote, "Since Westbrook Pegler
evidently intends to bring his poisonous pen into action against me in connection
with the Alger Hiss affair, and since he will involve the Court, I should like you to
see the attached memorandum by way of background." Id.The memorandum
detailed Frankfurter's past association with Hiss, as well as Pegler's attempts to
interview Frankfurter's secretary and law clerk in hopes of uncovering damaging
information on the Court. To Douglas, this was further evidence on the corruption
of government by McCarthyism.
276. DOUGLAS, Go EAST, YOUNG MAN, supra note 37, at 382.
277. Id.
278. See Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273, 283 (1953); see also JAMES
F. SIMON, INDEPENDENT JOURNEY: THE LIFE OF WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 301-03
(1980). For a summation of criticism regarding Douglas's stay of execution, see
William Cohen, Justice Douglas and the Rosenberg Case: Setting the Record
Straight, 40 CORNELL L. REv. 211 (1985).
279. SIMON, supra note 278, at 307-10. This did not mean that Douglas believed
that the Rosenbergs were innocent victims of a witch hunt. To Douglas, the fact
that both might have been treasonous was different from the denial of a fair trial.
280. See id.
at 311.
281. See id.
282. See infra Part III.A. During the Vietnam conflict, Douglas granted stays
against the government in cases of reservists called to active duty.
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B. Ending the Military's Jurisdictionover United States Citizens
In 1952, Madsen v. Kinsella, a quasi-military-jurisdictional case came
before the Court.283 In a pattern that became familiar to the Court during
the decade, Madsen, the civilian wife of an Air Force lieutenant, murdered
her husband. 284 As a result of an international agreement, Germany lacked
jurisdiction to prosecute U.S. citizens employed by the victorious allied
governments or their spouses. 285 The U.S. military governor convened a
trial before the Fourth District of the U.S. Court of the Allied High
Commission for Germany, a tribunal established by the U.S. government
after the German surrender in 1945.286 That court convicted Madsen and
sentenced her to fifteen years imprisonment.2 87
On appeal, the Court of Appeals of the U.S. Court of the Allied High
Commission for Germany, another tribunal established by the U.S.,
affirmed the conviction and remanded Madsen to the Attorney General's
custody.2 88 Each court consisted of civilian judges, and there were no
servicemen sitting in judgment of Madsen.28 9
Black dissented in the case arguing that because the two courts were
not created by Congress, the courts could not possess jurisdiction to try a
civilian. 290 Douglas did not join in Black's dissent, and, as in the Feres and
Yamashita cases, his correspondence regarding the case is sparse, leaving
little insight into his thoughts. The fact that the two lower courts
adjudicating Madsen's case were staffed by civilians, largely free from
military command influences, was likely the reason for Douglas's quiet
acquiescence to the majority. Had Madsen come to the Court in 1969, it is
probable, for reasons later discussed, that Douglas would have joined in
Black's dissent. But in 1952, Douglas had not yet fully viewed the military
as enabling the creation of a unitary executive. However, even in 1952, the
same year as Madsen and the Look Magazine article, Douglas attempted to
283. 343 U.S. 341 (1952).
284. Id. at 343.
285. Id. at 345. The specific delineation of the authorities of the occupation
courts is found in Allied High Commission Documents, 15 Fed. Reg. 2086 (Apr.
13, 1950). For a general history and discussion of the functions and purposes of the
commission, see, for example,

ELMER PLISCHKE, HISTORY OF THE ALLIED HIGH

COMMISSION FOR GERMANY: ITS ESTABLISHMENT, STRUCTURE AND PROCEDURES 1

(1951). See also, Eli E. Nobleman, Military Government Courts: Law and Justice
in the American Zone of Germany, 33 A.B.A. J. 777, 778-79 (1947).
286. Madsen, 343 U.S. at 344.
287. Id. at 344-45.
288. Id. at 345.
289. Id. at 344-45.
290. See id. at 371-72 (Black, J., dissenting).
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curb the expansion of executive authority in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer, which, while not directly part of the military's legal construct,
had a significant relation to it to require brief inclusion into an analysis of
the evolution of Douglas's intent toward the military's legal construct.2 9'
In 1952, President Truman ordered a number of the Nation's steel mills
seized during a labor strike that occurred after the management of the mills
and the steelworkers' unions failed to agree on wage increases.292 Truman
believed that the strike threatened the Nation's ability to supply its armed
forces with the equipment and armaments necessary to continue its war
effort.293 The steel mill corporations sued in federal court challenging the
seizure, and the issue swiftly came before the Supreme Court.294 While the
Court deliberated after hearing oral arguments, Truman answered questions
during a news conference, which unnerved Douglas. 95 In particular, to
Douglas, Truman advocated a position of extreme executive authority in
matters of national defense.296

291. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
292. Exec. Order No. 10,340, 17 Fed. Reg. 3, 139 (Apr. 10, 1952).
293. Id.; see also BALL, supra note 5, at 178 (noting that Truman's belief in the
constitutional efficacy of his authority to seize the steel mills stemmed in part from

ex parte advice given to him by Chief Justice Frederick Vinson).
294. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 579.
295. Special Message to the Congress on the Steel Strike, 8 PUB. PAPERS 161
(June 10, 1952). Truman's explanation to the U.S. press, given after the Court
decided against his actions, was as follows:

When I took the extraordinary step of seizure in the absence of
specific statutory authority, I pointed out that with American Troops

facing the enemy on the field of battle, I would not be living up to
my oath of office if I failed to do whatever is necessary to provide
them with the weapons and ammunition for their survival. Now a
majority of the Supreme Court have declared that I cannot take the
action I believe necessary. But they have clearly said Congress can

do it.
Id.
296. The President's News Conference, 8 PUB. PAPERS 136 (May 22, 1952). The

pertinent part of Truman's news conference held on May 22, 1952, is as follows:
Question [Q] from reporter: Mr. President, as I understood you to
say that the President has the power, that is, of seizure.
Answer [A] from Truman: That's correct.
Q: And they can't take it away?
A: That's correct.
Q: Who did you mean sir, Congress?
A: Yes.
Q: The courts, who?
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It is now almost universally accepted that Youngstown constitutes a
decision that defines executive authority in domestic affairs during the
crisis of an armed conflict. 297 Although Black authored the majority
opinion, Jackson's concurring opinion has ultimately been more influential
than any of the other opinions rendered in Youngstown.298 That Douglas
concurred with the majority in overruling Truman's assertion of authority
to seize control of steel mills during a strike is unsurprising when
juxtaposed against his other decisions, but, again, his language in the case
was largely subdued in its criticism toward Truman.
In his concurring opinion, Douglas conceded that Truman acted in what
he believed were the Nation's critical interests in seizing the steel mills, but
he worried over the precedent that Truman set.299 Douglas argued, "The
President with the armed services at his disposal can move with force as
well as with speed. All executive power-from the reign of ancient kings
to the rule of modem dictators-has the outward appearance of
efficiency. ' ' 3 0 Just as Douglas publicly omitted President Eisenhower and
Generals MacArthur, Bradley, and Marshall from his anti-military rubric,
he did so with Truman in writing,
Today a kindly President uses the seizure power to effect a
wage increase and to keep the steel furnaces in production.
Yet tomorrow another President might use the same power
to prevent a wage increase, to curb trade-unionists, to
regiment labor as oppressively as industry thinks it has
been regimented by this seizure.3 0

A: Nobody can take it away from the President because he is the
chief executive of the nation and he has to be in a position to see that
the welfare of the people is met ....
Q: It appears that you have said the [Supreme] Court can't take the
power away.
A: Nobody can take it away from the President because it is inherent
in the Constitution.
Id.
297. See, e.g., KERMIT L. HALL & JOHN J. PATRICK, THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE:
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS THAT SHAPED AMERICA 118 (2006).

298. Jay S. Bybee & Tuan N. Samahon, William Rehnquist, the Separation of
Powers, and the Riddle of the Sphinx, 58 STAN. L. REv. 1735, 1738 (2006).

299. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 629-32 (Douglas, J., concurring).
300. Id.
at 629.
301. Id. at 634.
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Douglas later considered Youngstown as "probably the most important in
our history concerning the separation of powers between the President
and
30 2
the Congress and the role of the Court in enforcing the separation."
It is important to recognize the level and source of public support that
the Court and, for the purpose of this Article, Black and Douglas received
as a result of their Youngstown opinions. While traditionally liberal and
Democratic Party organizations lauded Douglas's concurring opinion, he
also received letters of thanks from such conservative groups as the
Frontier Club of Republican Women and the Independent Livestock
Marketing Association. °3 Most surprising to Douglas and Black was an
endorsement from the conservative Chicago Tribune.30 4 Displaying humor,
30 5
Douglas quipped to Black that they "might wish to rethink their logic."
In 1955, the Court in United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, an opinion
authored by Black, decided that once an enlisted member of the armed
forces was discharged, the military no longer possessed jurisdiction to
prosecute an offense in a court-martial, even when that offense occurred
while the former enlisted member was on active duty and subject to the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). 3 06 Importantly, Congress
expressly permitted prosecutions of this sort when it legislated the UCMJ
in 1950 without making a distinction between military discharges secured
by fraud and those occurring within operation of the law. 30 7 In preparing
the decision, Douglas noted to Black that as of October 27, 1955, there
were 22.61 million veterans living in the U.S. and almost 3 million active

302. DOUGLAS, ALMANAC OF LIBERTY, supra note 14, at 293.

303. See Letter from James Lynde to Justice William 0. Douglas (1952) [WOD,
Box 221]. The letter stated, "I am happy to note that Justice Black and yourself
were not swayed by any short-time political considerations." Id.
304. See John Fisher, Truman's Seizure of Industry Voided by Supreme Court;
Ruling Blasts His UsurpationofAuthority, CHI. TRIB., June 3, 1952, § 1, at 1.

305. Letter from Justice William 0. Douglas to Justice Hugo Black (undated)
[WOD, Box 221]. On reading the Tribune's editorial, Douglas penned to Black,
"Dear Hugo, are we sure you were right?" Id.
306. 350 U.S. 11, 14-15, 23 (1955). Douglas's role in the case is evidenced in a
letter to Black dated November 1, 1955, in which he wrote:
Dear Hugo, I like your Toth case and reach your result. I am
troubled by the paragraph on pages 9-10 saying that ex-soldiers may
be tried or could be tried in the federal district courts .... The
trouble in the case of ex-soldiers who committed a crime overseas or
sailors who did so while at sea will escape court-martial, while those
who committed a crime in the United States will not.
Letter from Justice William 0. Douglas to Justice Hugo Black (Nov. 1, 1955)
[WOD, Box 309].
307. Toth, 350 U.S. at 19.
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duty military personnel, totaling over 25 million citizens subject to military
jurisdiction. 30 8
Douglas also joined with Black and contributed to
language critical of the military's justice system.309
Significantly, the majority viewed the UCMJ's expanded jurisdiction
as a matter of the Executive Branch encroaching into the Judicial Branch,
thereby causing a diminution of civil rights. 310 The Court noted, "[A]ny
expansion of court-martial jurisdiction like that in the 1950 Act necessarily
encroaches on the jurisdiction of federal courts set up under Article I of
the Constitution where persons on trial are surrounded with more
constitutional safeguards than in military tribunals. 31' Notably, it was
Douglas who pushed for the following language in the decision: "Strides
have been made toward making courts-martial less subject to the will of the
executive department which appoints, supervises and ultimately controls
them. But from the very nature of things, courts have more independence
in passing on the life and liberty of people than do military tribunals. 3 12
In a pretrial memorandum, Douglas was also critical of the justices'
continuing reliance on military-law treatises and, in particular, Colonel
William Winthrop's 1895 treatise, Military Law and Precedents.313 First
published in 1885, Winthrop's treatise had supplanted older texts and come
into common judicial usage the same year as its citation in Smith v.
Whitney.31 4 In 1953, the Court complimented Winthrop as "the Blackstone

308. Letter from Justice William 0. Douglas to Justice Hugo Black (undated)
[Black, Box 327]. Douglas's commentary was in response to Justice Sherman
Minton's arguments for an expansive military jurisdiction. Id.
309. Id.
310. Toth, 350 U.S. at 14, 21-22.
311. Id.
at 15.
312. Id.at 17; see also Letter from Justice William 0. Douglas to Justice Hugo
Black (Nov. 1, 1955) [WOD, Box 309].
313. Memorandum from Justice William 0. Douglas to the Court (Nov. 1, 1955)
[WOD, Box 309].
314. 116 U.S. 167, 185 (1885). Winthrop was born in 1831 and died in 1899.
Educated at Yale and Harvard, he assisted in drafting the Minnesota State
Constitution in 1858. Prior to the Civil War, he also defended fugitive slaves in
Boston and joined in other abolitionist causes, including campaigning for William
H. Seward's presidential bid in 1860. He enlisted in a New York militia unit after
the South Carolina militia fired on Fort Sumter in 1861. After a brief service in this
unit, he was commissioned as an officer in the First United States Sharpshooters
and fought in the battles of Malvem Hill, Second Manassas, Antietam, and
Fredericksburg. Following a severe injury at Fredericksburg, Winthrop was
commissioned in the Judge Advocate General's Corps where he remained until
retirement in 1895. His duties included investigating Mary Surratt and the other
Lincoln assassination conspirators, as well as authoring arguments to the Supreme
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of Military Law."3 '
Apparently, by 1954, Douglas believed that
Winthrop's work, among others, stood in the way of meaningful reform.
Douglas's most significant role in this decision was his contribution to
Black's historic analysis, particularly the statement, "We find nothing in
the history or constitutional treatment of military tribunals which entitles
them to rank along with Article 1II
courts as adjudicators of the guilt or
innocence of people charged with offenses for which they can be deprived
of their life, liberty or property. 31 6 Another important aspect of the
decision was Douglas's insistence on including language that juries
composed of laypersons were far superior to courts-martial composed of
officers. 317 This additional language was unnecessary to the separation-ofCourt in cases such as Ex parte Vallandigham. See JOSHUA E.
BLACKSTONE OF MILITARY LAW:

KASTENBERG, THE
COLONEL WILLIAM WINTHROP (2009); William

Winthrop, Acting Judge Advocate General; 1881, 28 MIL.L. REV. v,v, vi (1965)

(biography of William Winthrop).
315. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 19 n.38 (1957) (plurality opinion).
Frankfurter's insistence on the continuing viability of Winthrop's work resulted in
an angry exchange in conference with Douglas. Douglas interrogated Frankfurter
on his continued reliance on Winthrop, and Frankfurter refused to acknowledge
Douglas in return. Letter from Justice William 0. Douglas to Justice Felix
Frankfurter (June 1, 1956) [WOD, Box 330]. It was clear by this time that the
relationship between Douglas and Frankfurter was strained. Douglas, in a private
letter, scolded Frankfurter for his perceived rudeness while in conference discussing
Winthrop. Frankfurter distributed the letter to the other justices. The letter read,
Today at conference I asked you a question concerning your
memorandum. The question was not answered. An answer was
refused, rather insolently. This was, so far as I recall, the first time
one member of the conference refused to answer another member on
a matter of Court business. We all know what a great burden your
long discourses are. So I am not complaining. But I do register a
protest at your degradation of the Conference and its deliberations.
Id.
316. Letter from Justice William 0. Douglas to Justice Felix Frankfurter (June 1,
1956) [WOD, Box 330].
317. Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Justices Warren, Black, and Douglas
(Oct. 26, 1955) (Located in Papers of Earl Warren, Box 432, Library of Congress)
[hereinafter Warren, Box 1. Frankfurter argued, "I do not want to write
separately in Toth and I do want to join your opinion. There will be no difficulty if
you forgo a few references pertaining to trial by jury, the implications of which I do
not think the Court should sponsor." Id. In addition to his disagreement with
Douglas's belief in the superiority of civil lay juries over court-martial panels, he
strongly opposed the Court adopting language from Justice Horace Gray's dissent
in Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895). In Sparf Gray argued that due
process required judges to fully inform juries of their responsibility to adjudge facts
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powers issue, though it reflected Douglas's views on individual rights and
his belief that the military's ignorance of due process rendered courtsmartial unfair. That Douglas believed this to be uniformly the case
arguably belied a focused irrationality on his part, and Frankfurter
attempted to dislodge this language from the decision.3 '8 Even in 1956, the
notion that lay juries, with the infectious prejudices of the time, were in any
way superior to a panel of college-educated officers was doubtful.
Nonetheless, long into his judicial tenure, Douglas believed Toth was a
victory for individual
rights as well as a protection against arbitrary
31 9
executive authority.

In 1957, Douglas took a leading role in the Court's reconsideration of
two earlier cases determining the reach of military jurisdiction. The prior
year, in the last days of the Court's term, Douglas dissented in Reid v.
Covert (Reid /) 320 and Kinsella v. Krueger,32 1 two decisions authored by

Justice Tom C. Clark. A Truman appointee and loyalist, Clark seldom
opposed Truman's policies.32 2 Douglas believed that Clark was one of the
Court's weakest minds-even to the point of considering Justice James C.
McReynolds a superior judge to Clark.32 3 Given Douglas's loyalty to
Roosevelt and McReynolds's antipathy toward the New Deal, Douglas's

and, on occasion, the law. Id. at 183 (Gray, J., dissenting). Frankfurter considered
Gray, the author of Plessy v. Ferguson, an "unredeemable bigot" and did not want
to give any judicial weight to his dissent. [Warren, Box 432].
318. This irrationality is borne out by the fact that Douglas was involved in
several decisions critical of the jury selection processes. See, e.g., Swain v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 232 (1965) (Goldberg, J., dissenting); Williams v. Georgia,
349 U.S. 375 (1955); Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953). Douglas joined
Golberg's dissent from the Court's affirmation of the exclusion of blacks from petit
juries where purposeful discrimination was unproven. Swain, 380 U.S. at 232.
319. WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE 194 (1954).
320. Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 487, 488, 492 (1956). ReidI was argued on May
3, 1956, and decided on June 11, 1956. Reargument was heard on February 27,
1957, and the Reid H decision was published on June 10, 1957. Reid v. Covert,
354 U.S. 1 (1957).
321. 351 U.S. 470 (1956). Krueger was argued and decided on the same dates as
Reid I. The case was consolidated with Reid I and reargued on the same dates.
ReidlI, 354 U.S. 1.

322. BELKNAP, supra note 1, at 81.
323. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS, supra note 39, at 245. For Douglas's views
on McReynolds see id. at 13. Truman shared Douglas's view of Tom Clark.
Truman once referred to Clark as his biggest mistake and called Clark "a dumb son
of a bitch." SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 256. Schwartz himself is not particularly
complimentary toward Clark, though he placed Clark's abilities above Justice
Sherman Minton, another Truman appointee. See id.
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placement of Clark below McReynolds clearly marked Douglas's belief
that Clark was encumbered by a deficit in intellect and reasoning.
In both Reid I and Krueger, the Court's majority upheld a UCMJ
provision extending courts-martial jurisdiction over civilians accompanying
the Nation's armed forces overseas. 324 Billed within the Court's
memorandum as "the murdering wives cases," Clark's pragmatic reasoning
for upholding the provision rested less on constitutional principles than on
the probability that foreign courts afforded a citizen less due process than a
military trial.325 In both the published decisions and in his correspondences
to his fellow justices, Clark argued that because U.S. servicemen were
located in sixty-three foreign countries and that their dependents could be
subjected to trials by local courts, there was reason enough to uphold the
UCMJ provision.326 Clark's personal correspondence to his fellow judges
was more direct than the actual decision. He argued,
V.P. Nixon is on his present mission to secure or break
ground for more bases and agreements in other lands,
including Africa . . . . The only remaining alternative
would be to let prosecutions proceed in the local courts of
the foreign sovereign and while England 327
might be okay,
but in Spain, the Middle East and Far East?
But, to Douglas, Warren, and Black, Clark's pragmatism overlooked
what they believed were inherent dangers in an expansive military
jurisdiction. After the publication of Reid I and Krueger, Warren, with
Douglas endorsing him, circulated a memorandum to the Court expressing
his reservations with Clark's decision.328 The memorandum began,

324. Reid 1, 351 U.S. at 492; Krueger, 351 U.S. at 474. In Krueger, Clark
determined that courts-martial conducted under the UCMJ possessed enough
guarantee of due process not to render it unconstitutional to try civilians
accompanying the armed forces. Id. Clark also relied on Ross v. McIntyre, 140
U.S. 453 (1891), a nineteenth-century decision upholding the authority of consular
courts to prosecute U.S. citizens oversees in nations permitting such courts through
treaties. Douglas and Frankfurter found the concept of consular courts noxious to
twentieth-century principles of comity and equality.
325. Letter from Justice Thomas Clark to Justice William Brennan (undated)
(Located in Papers of William Brennan, Box 2, Library of Congress [hereinafter
Brennan, Boxj).
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Memorandum from Chief Justice Earl Warren to the Court (Sept. 22, 1956)
[Warren, Box 575].
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The opinions of the majority in these cases concern me
because they gravely threaten one of the fundamental
relationships upon which our government is built-the
supremacy of the civil over the military branch, and
because they violate a personal right guaranteed to every
American citizen in unequivocal language by the
Constitution-the
right to a trial by a jury after indicted by
32 9
a grand jury.

Douglas joined Warren and Black in a brief dissent, with the promise
of expanding on it during the 1957 term.33 ° In a judicial conference held
immediately after the two decisions, Black and Douglas sought
reconsideration of the two cases. Black and Douglas gained Warren's
support for reconsideration along with Justices John M. Harlan and
William Brennan. 3

329. Id.
330. Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470, 485 (Warren, C.J., dissenting). The
dissent argued,
The decisions just announced have far-reaching importance. They
subject to military court-martial, even in time of peace, the wives,
mothers and children of members of the Armed Forces serving
abroad even though these dependents have no connection whatever
with the Armed Forces except their kinship to military personnel and
their presence abroad. The questions raised are complex, the remedy
drastic, and the consequences far-reaching upon the lives of
civilians. The military is given new powers not hitherto thought
consistent with our scheme of government.
For these reasons, we need more time than is available in these
closing days of the Term in which to write our dissenting views. We
will file our dissents during the next Term of Court.
Id.

331. Letter from Justice William 0. Douglas to Justice Hugo Black (undated)
[Black, Box 327]. However, Brennan remained concerned that the Court not inhibit
the military from enforcing lesser violations, such as traffic offenses or the ability to
conduct negotiations. In writing to Douglas and Black, he expressed this concern
as:
I note that nothing is said about lesser offenses, for example, simple
breach of the peace, traffic violations, disorderly conduct .

.

. etc.

Do you think dispositions of such offenses (which I suppose are
technically not "crimes" within Art. 3 sec. 2 and the Fifth and Sixth
Amend) are within the holding of your opinion? And what of the
power of the military to arrest for crimes, and if nothing said, in the
opinion inhibits that power, what of arraignments, interrogations,
etc?
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Frankfurter only tepidly supported reconsideration because he feared
that a reversal in Reid I and Krueger would lead to an endorsement of the
Bricker Amendment, a controversial political movement seeking to limit
presidential treaty-making power.332
Named for Congressman John
Bricker, a Republican isolationist and opponent of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO), Republican adherents to the Amendment
wanted a new constitutional construct to require that the President obtain
either the consent of both congressional branches or a popular vote through
state legislatures before entering into a treaty.33 3 Douglas argued that
Frankfurter's concerns were unfounded.334 Bricker was opposed by
President Eisenhower as well as the Democratic Senate Majority Leader,
Lyndon B. Johnson, and the Amendment ultimately receded into
oblivion.335

Letter from Justice William Brennan to Justices Douglas and Black (undated)
[Brennan, Box 2].
332. Memorandum from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Justices Earl Warren, Hugo
Black, and William 0. Douglas (Sept. 19, 1956) [Black, Box 327]. Frankfurter
wrote to Warren, Douglas, and Black a secret memorandum concerning the Bricker
Amendment, calling it a "contentious controversy in the Senate."

Clearly,

Frankfurter, Black, Douglas, and Warren did not want to endorse, or unintentionally
endorse, Bricker. Frankfurter did not want Clark or the other justices to know of
his concerns. On May 20, 1957, Frankfurter wrote,
Now that Clark's dissenting opinion has made explicit how wholly
uncalled for is the injection of the Bricker Amendment problem, for

the disposition of these cases, I would feel derelict in my duty to the
Court to suppress within the Court expression of my deep concern
that injection of that controversy is a great disservice to the Court
and the country.
Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Justices Earl Warren, William 0. Douglas,
and Hugo Black (May 20, 1957) [Black, Box 327].
For an analytical discussion of the Bricker Amendment, see ROBERT A.
CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON: MASTER OF THE SENATE 527-41 (2003).
See generally RICHARD 0. DAVIES, DEFENDER OF THE OLD GUARD: JOHN BRICKER
AND AMERICAN POLmCS (1993).
333. CARO, supra note 332, at 527-41; see generally DuANE TANANBAuM, THE
BRICKER AMENDMENT CONTROVERSY: A TEST OF EISENHOWER'S POLITICAL
LEADERSHIP (1988).

334. Letter from Justice William 0. Douglas to Justice Felix Frankfurter (June 1,
1957) [WOD, Box 330].
335. CARO, supra note 332, at 527-41.
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On reconsideration, the Court consolidated and, in a decision authored
by Black, reversed the two cases. 336

The majority, joined by Douglas,

declared that the full protection of the Bill of Rights extended to citizens
accompanying the military oversees.33 7 Therefore, civilians could not be
subject to courts-martial jurisdiction simply because they resided on a
military installation.338 Reid II incorporated an extensive use of British and
U.S. legal history, applying the distrust of standing armies to the issue of
military jurisdiction over civilians. Despite Black's authorship, Douglas
339
was largely responsible for these historic arguments in the decision.
340
Between Reid I and Reid II, the Court issued Jackson v. Taylor,
another decision impacting the military's justice system, which Douglas
336. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (Reid II). While Reid II was not a
unanimous decision, the dissenting Justices, Clark and Burton, did not cite to
Dynes, though Frankfurter did in a concurring opinion.
337. Id.
338. The Court, in relying on Toth, held:

There are no supportable grounds upon which to distinguish the Toth
case from the present cases. Toth, Mrs. Covert, and Mrs. Smith
were all civilians. All three were American citizens. All three were
tried for murder. All three alleged crimes were committed in a

foreign country. The only differences were: (1) Toth was an exserviceman while they were wives of soldiers; (2) Toth was arrested
in the United States while they were seized in foreign countries. If
anything, Toth had closer connection with the military than the two
women for his crime was committed while he was actually serving in

the Air Force. Mrs. Covert and Mrs. Smith had never been members
of the army, had never been employed by the army, had never served
in the army in any capacity.
ReidII, 354 U.S. at 32.
339. Douglas wrote to Black disparaging Solicitor General John Rankin's
arguments:
We have been listening to the arguments in Covert and Kruger, and I
am surprised that the Court is not subjecting Rankin to more
penetrating questioning.
Here are some items from my
memorandum which he undoubtedly cannot satisfactorily explain.
Why not hit him with Winthrop, with Toth, with English precedent
before 1789 and with early American law.
Letter from Justice Justice William 0. Douglas to Justice Hugo Black (undated)
[Black, Box 327]. Perhaps because Winthrop had argued for limited jurisdiction,
Douglas found his work usable for this particular argument. Douglas also urged
Black to incorporate his unused legal historic analysis from Yamashita.
340. 353 U.S. 569 (1957). Jackson was decided on June 3, 1957. See also
Fowler v. Wilkinson, 358 U.S. 583 (1957), a companion case in which the
petitioner was tried for the same offenses as Jackson. The Court, in a decision
again authored by Clark, held substantially similar to Jackson. Id.
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found offensive and had a relationship to the ultimate outcome in Reid II.
In a decision authored by Clark, the Court upheld a court-martial
conviction and sentence, as well as the holdings of the military's appellate
courts. 4 Jackson, the petitioner, had been convicted of both premeditated
murder and attempted rape and was sentenced to life imprisonment.342
Both the Army's Board of Review and the intermediate-level appellate
court overturned the murder conviction and reassessed the sentence to
twenty years. 343 This action was permissible under the UCMJ, except that
it had not yet been tested by the federal appellate courts. 3 "
The maximum sentence of imprisonment that a court-martial could
adjudge for attempted rape was twenty years. Jackson argued that
notwithstanding the UCMJ, as a matter of due process, the appellate court
was required to return his case for a rehearing on sentencing, rather than
reassessing the sentence itself.34 5 The majority found two reasons to deny
this argument. First, the Court essentially held that the law on aggregate
sentences reflected military necessity and custom. 346

Second, and most

appalling to Douglas, was the majority's deference to the UCMJ as
constructed.347 The majority noted, "Congress must have known of the
problems inherent in rehearing and review proceedings for the procedures
were adopted largely from prior law. It is not for us to question the
judgment of the Congress in selecting the process it chose.' 348

341. Jackson, 353 U.S. at 570-71.
342. Id. Under the UCMJ, courts-martial sentenced convicted servicemen by
aggregating the offenses without delineating imprisonment lengths. As a result,
both servicemen convicted of multiple offenses, as well as the appellate courts,
were unaware of whether a court-martial imposed specific segments of time for
individual offenses. At that time, this was codified as Article 66 of the UCMJ, 64
Stat. 128, 50 U.S.C. § 653 (1950).
343. Jackson, 353 U.S. at 571.
344. Id. at 572.
345. Id.at 578-79. Douglas found the majority's language offensive in this
matter, specifically,
Military law provides that one aggregate sentence must be imposed
and the board of review may modify that sentence in the manner it
finds appropriate. To say in this case that a gross sentence was not
imposed is to shut one's eyes to the realities of military law and
custom.
Id.
346. Id.
at 578-79.
347. See id.
at 580-82.
348. Id.
at 580.
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349
Douglas, along with Black and Warren, joined Brennan's dissent.
These four Justices had become a core influence in military-justice cases,
With the
incorporating due-process standards into courts-martial.
Brennan
nor
Black
neither
however,
of
Warren,
exception
occasional
the
Executive
in
attempted to expand the Judicial Branch's influence
Branch's control of military matters. However, Jackson had a relationship
to the Reid I and Krueger rehearings in that Douglas influenced Brennan to
not subject civilians to a criminal-justice construct that he found offensive
to soldiers.350
If, today, Reid II is an anachronism, it had an immediate effect on the
reach of military jurisdiction over civilians. On January 18, 1960, the
Court issued three decisions, authored by Clark, giving further definition to
the military's jurisdiction. In Grisham v. Hagan, a capital case of an Army
civilian employee, the Court retroactively applied Reid II and determined
that the lower courts erred in denying a civilian habeas review, challenging
the military's jurisdiction.3 51 Without criticizing Reid I, Clark and the
majority determined that Reid II solely controlled the issue. 352 In McElroy
v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, the Court applied Reid II to civilian
defense contractors in non-capital cases.353
In Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, the lengthiest decision of
the three, the Court also extended Reid II to non-capital cases of civilian
dependents.354 With Douglas's full approval, Clark noted that "we are not
convinced that a critical impact upon discipline will result, as claimed by
the Government (even if anyone deemed this a relevant consideration), if
noncapital offenses are given the same treatment as capital ones by virtue

349. Id.at 581.
350. Memorandum from Justice William 0. Douglas to Justice William Brennan
(undated) [Brennan, Box I: 2].
351. 361 U.S. 278 (1960). Frederick Bemays Weiner represented Grisham in
arguments before the Court. Id.In his court-martial, Grisham was charged with
premeditated murder but found guilty of unpremeditated murder and sentenced to
life. His sentence was later reduced to thirty-five years. Id.
at 280.
352. Id.
353. 361 U.S. 281 (1960). This case consolidated two petitioners. McElroy was
a prison warden. The criminal defendant named Guagliardo was charged with
larceny and conspiracy to commit larceny. The court-martial adjudged him guilty
and sentenced him to ten years. The second case, Wilson v. Bohlender, involved a
civilian charged in a court-martial with sodomy, found guilty, and sentenced to five
years. Both Guagliardo and Wilson were defense contractors accompanying the
Army. They were not dependents such as in Reid I. Id. at 281-83. Frederick
at 281.
Bemays Weiner represented Guagliardo in arguments before the Court. Id.
354. 361 U.S. 234 (1960). Frederick Bemays Weiner represented Singleton in
arguments before the Court. Id. at 235.
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of the second Covert case.,, 355 Not one to abandon pragmatism, Clark also
noted, again with Douglas's approval, that the threat of a civilian
35 6
prosecution in a foreign court would, in and of itself, serve as a deterrent.
Reid H also served as a basis for due-process rights in civil cases. In
Gideon v. Wainright, a non-military case, Clark viewed Reid II as
guaranteeing the right to defense counsel in capital and non-capital cases
alike.357 Whatever offense Clark may have taken from the Court's reversal
of his original decision, Clark found the majority's logic compelling
enough to adopt.

C. Military Justice,Due Process,and Administrative Rights of
Servicemen: Douglas's JurisprudenceConstrainsthe Executive
Branch
One year after Youngstown, Douglas dissented in Orloffv. Willoughby,
a case involving one of the more unique challenges to the Executive
Branch's control over the military. 358 The majority opinion held that the

355. Id. at 243.
356. Id. at 245-46. Clark pointed out here,
We have no information as to the impact of that trial on civilian
dependents. Strangely, this itself might prove to be quite an
effective deterrent. Moreover, the immediate return to the United
States permanently of such civilian dependents, or their subsequent
prosecution in the United States for the more serious offenses when
authorized by the Congress, might well be the answer to the
disciplinary problem. Certainly such trials would not involve as
much expense nor be as difficult of successful prosecution as capital
offenses.
Id. Harlan and Frankfurter dissented to the removal of military jurisdiction in noncapital cases, Id. at 249-50 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
357. 372 U.S. 335, 348-49 (1963) (Clark, J., concurring). Clark penned,
Having previously held that civilian dependents could not
constitutionally be deprived of the protections of Article III and the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments in capital cases, Reid v. Covert, 354
U.S. 1 (1957), we held that the same result must follow in noncapital
cases. Indeed, our opinion there foreshadowed the decision today, as
we noted that:
Obviously Fourteenth Amendment cases dealing with state action
have no application here, but if they did, we believe that to deprive
civilian dependents of the safeguards of a jury trial here ... would

be as invalid under those cases as it would be in cases of a capital
nature.
Id. at 348-49 (citation omitted).
358. 345 U.S. 83, 95 (1953).
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President's authority to determine fitness for holding a military commission
was not within the Court's discretion to review. 359 Relying on a
constitutional privilege, Dr. Orloff refused to take a loyalty oath or disclose
to the government whether he had ever been a member of the Communist
Party. 360 As a licensed physician, Dr. Orloff was conscripted into the Army
under a set of rules that should have resulted in his commission as a
medical doctor.36 ' Instead, the Army placed Dr. Orloff in an enlisted
position and refused to discharge him upon his request. 362 The Court's
majority conceded that while Dr. Orloff had a constitutional right to join a
political organization as well as a right to refuse to answer questions, that
particular right did not trump the Executive Branch's authority to exclude
individuals from trusted national-security positions.363
Along with Black, Douglas joined in Frankfurter's dissent.3 64 The
dissent did not disagree with the majority regarding the President's
365
But the dissent argued that
authority to withhold a military commission.
the case was more complex than the majority admitted.366 Dr. Orloff's
claim was two-fold: first, that he possessed a right to the commission based
on a statutory construction of the draft laws under which he was
conscripted, regardless of his exercise of a constitutional privilege; and
second, failing the Executive's conferring of a commission, that he was
entitled to a discharge from the military.367 The dissent reasoned that if
Congress intended the particular draft laws and commissioning rules for
doctors (dating to 1847) to result in either a commission or a discharge,
then the Executive Branch could not keep Dr. Orloff in military service.368
Branch's authority beyond the
To do so strengthened the Executive
369
Constitution's constraints on it.

Although Douglas did not author the dissent, there are two notable
features to his role in the case. The first was that he clearly approved of
Frankfurter's criticism of the Executive Branch's conduct throughout the
case, and nothing in the correspondence between the two justices evidences
a desire to curb this criticism. Both the majority and dissents recognized
that the Executive Branch had shifted its legal arguments from the initial
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.

Id. at 91-92.
Id. at 89-90.
Id. at 84.
Id. at 85.
Id. at 91-92.
Id. at 95 (Black, J., dissenting).
Id. at 97 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).

366. See id. at 99.
367. See id. at 97-99.

368. Id. at 97-99.
369. See id. at 97-98.
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hearing before the district court to the arguments before the Supreme
Court.370 The Court's majority found the shift commendable, while the
to keep this man in the Army
dissent critically stated, "Only in its purpose
371
has the Government been undeviating."
The second was Douglas's unpublished objection to the statement
made in the majority's opinion:
We know that from top to bottom of the Army the
complaint is often made, and sometimes with justification,
that there is discrimination, favoritism or other
objectionable handling of men. But judges are not given
the task of running the Army. . . . Orderly government
requires that the judiciary be as scrupulous not to interfere
with legitimate Army matters as the Army must be
scrupulous not to intervene in judicial matters.3 72
Douglas saw the majority's logic as antiquated, and he feared its use by the
government in the Nation's postwar political climate.3 73 In a proposed,
penciled draft, Douglas concluded that even though Dr. Orloff might not
merit a commission as a matter of national security, the Executive Branch's
assertion of authority to retain the doctor as an enlisted man was symbolic
of an "authoritarianism alien to the country's principles. 374 Douglas did
not insist that Frankfurter place this language in the dissent, and, as a result,
his draft only gives insight into Douglas's mindset on the case.
In 1959, in Lee v. Madigan, Douglas authored the majority opinion
limiting the military's jurisdiction to prosecute the capital crimes of rape
and murder to periods of actual war. 37 5 Equal to any of Douglas's prior
decisions, the facts and rulings in Madigan are instructive to his evolving
belief that a dangerous nexus existed between the reach of the Executive
370. Id. at 87 (majority opinion); id. at 95 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 99
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
371. Id. at 87 (majority opinion) ("We think, however, that the Government is
well advised in confessing error and that candid reversal of its position is
commendable."); id. at 99 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
372. Id. at 93-94 (majority opinion). Douglas's disgust with this quote is found
in the Hugo Black correspondence files. Memorandum from Justice William 0.
Douglas to Justice Hugo Black, copied to Justice Felix Frankfurter (1952) [Black,
Box 315].
373. Memorandum from Justice William 0. Douglas to Justice Hugo Black,
copied to Justice Felix Frankfurter (1952) [Black, Box 315].
374. Justice William 0. Douglas, draft dissent in Orloff (undated) [WOD, Box
221]. This dissent was incorporated into Black's dissent. See Orloff, 345 U.S. at
96-97 (Black, J., dissenting).
375. 358 U.S. 228 (1959).
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Branch's exertion of its authority and the military's legal construct.
Madigan was sentenced to twenty years after being court-martialed for a
rape and murder that occurred in France during World War 11.376 While
serving his sentence in a military prison in California in 1949, he conspired
to murder another inmate; the Army court-martialed Madigan a second
time, resulting in a second conviction.377
While the actual conflict concluded in August 1945 with the Japanese
surrender, the Legislative and Executive Branches did not declare an end to
hostilities with Germany until 1951 and Japan in 1952.378 Under Article 92
of the Articles of War, the military did not have subject matter jurisdiction
to prosecute murder during peacetime. 379 Although Congress had already
rescinded a number of individual Articles of War by the time of Lee's
second court-martial, Article 92 remained in effect because Congress
considered the Nation still at war while U.S. forces occupied Germany and
Japan and the allied political apparatus governed much of the
administration of both countries.
Douglas's approach to the jurisdictional issue minimized the
importance of the 1950 Congress's intent and focused on the historic
opposition against expanded military jurisdiction. Douglas argued, "We do
not write on a clean slate. The attitude of a free society toward the
jurisdiction of military tribunals-our reluctance to give them authority to
try people for nonmilitary offenses-has a long history. 380 Relying on the
Court's reasoning in Duncan v. Kahanamoku,381 a case involving martial
law and the extent of its jurisdiction over civilians, the Court determined
376. Id. at 229.
377. Id.
378. Id.at 230. ("The war with Germany terminated October 19, 1951, by a
Joint Resolution of Congress and a [corresponding] Presidential Proclamation. And
on April 28, 1952, the formal declaration of peace and termination of war with
Japan was proclaimed by the President ..... )
379. Id.
at 229. Article 92 read,
Any person subject to military law found guilty of murder shall
suffer death or imprisonment for life, as a court-martial may direct;
but if found guilty of murder not premeditated, he shall be punished
as a court-martial may direct. Any person subject to military law
who is found guilty of rape shall suffer death or such other
punishment as a court-martial may direct: Provided, That no person
shall be tried by court-martial for murder or rape committed within
the geographical limits of the States of the Union and the District of
Columbia in time of peace.
Id.
at 229 n.2.
380. Id.
at 232.
381. 327 U.S. 304 (1946).

236
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the term "in time of peace" to mean an enemy state's surrender, truce, or
armistice rather than a congressional or executive declaration of when a
conflict actually terminated.3 82
While Douglas noted few facts to strengthen his view of legislative
intent, he opined that the original congressional intent underlying Article
92 was consistent with the majority's opinion.383 But the original
congressional intent dated to 1916 when the relevant Articles of War were
enacted and the law was far from settled over the question of which
legislature's decision governed-the 1916 Congress or the 1950 Congress.
Most telling, however, was Douglas's narrowing of the Executive Branch's
authority to declare when a conflict terminated. It is true that a sizeable
body of international law held that the law of war ceased when a belligerent
surrendered or a truce existed. 384 But Douglas did not turn to international
law in writing the majority's opinion and fashioned his own answer.
In a memorandum circulated to the Court detailing his jurisprudential
approach to the case, he noted four points.385 First, his willingness to have
the Court define "in time of peace" was contrary to the Executive Branch's
definition.38 6 Second, Douglas professed a continued belief that civilian
juries were superior to courts-martial.3 87 Third, he argued that Congress's
failure to repeal or amend the extension of Article 92 past the Japanese
surrender had no bearing on the original purpose of the Article; therefore,
the Court, consistent with the Articles of War's intent to curb Executive
Branch control over military members in peacetime, restored Article 92 to
its original purpose.388 Important to this point is that the original purpose
of the Article was its jurisdictional limitations. Finally,
Douglas expressed
389
anger at Frankfurter's absence from the decision.

382. Lee, 358 U.S. at 235-36.
383. See id. at 236.
384. See, e.g., HENRY WAGER HALLECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW; OR, RULES
REGULATING THE INTERCOURSE OF STATES IN PEACE AND WAR 340-54 (1861); L.
OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 300, 333-35 (7th ed. 1952); Jost Delbrueck, A
European Peace Order and the German Question: Legal andPoliticalAspects, 11
MICH. J. INT'L L. 897 (1990) (explaining post-World War II discussions to unify
Europe through treaties).
385. William 0. Douglas, draft opinion in Lee v. Madigan (undated) [WOD, Box
1205].
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Id. Douglas argued, "The failure to repeal, alter, or amend this law leaves
the problem where it was at the time the law was enacted, but the failure has no
bearing on the original purpose of the law's jurisdiction." Id.
389. Id.
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In 1958, the Court, per curiam in Harmon v. Bruker, determined that
the judiciary possessed jurisdiction to review the Secretary of the Army's
administrative-discharge decisions on the basis of a claim that the Secretary
exceeded his authority.390 In 1952, Harmon was inducted into the Army,
and for two years the Army described his service as excellent.39 ' However,
in 1954, the FBI provided the Army with information that Harmon's preservice conduct was subversive, and the Army discharged Harmon with a
"less than honorable" discharge. 392 After exhausting all administrative
appeals, Harmon appealed the Army's decision to the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia.393 The trial judge sympathized with Harmon
but concluded that the court lacked jurisdiction to review the Army's
decision.3 94 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, partly
390. 355 U.S. 579, 581-82 (1958). Harmon originated in a consolidated case
from two petitioners. For a full recitation of the facts underlying this case, see
Harmon v. Bruker, 243 F.2d 613 (D.C. Cir. 1957). From the appellate record, it
appears that Harmon exhausted his administrative remedies prior to seeking redress
in federal court. Initially, Chief Justice Warren assigned the case to Justice Charles
Whittaker. However, Whittaker's per curiam decision was unsatisfactory to
Douglas and Black, and Douglas expanded on it. See Letter from Charles E.
Whittaker to Chief Justice Earl Warren (Feb. 11, 1958) [Warren, Box 634].
391. Harmon v. Brucker, 243 F.2d 613, 617 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
392. See id. at 616. At the time of Harmon v. Bruker (as in the present),
administrative discharges fell into three categories: honorable; general, but under
honorable conditions; and other than honorable. A number of veterans' benefits
available under law and regulation were affected by the classification of the
discharge. State veterans programs generally distinguished between the three types
of administrative discharges to the benefit of those with honorable discharges.
Moreover, then, as now, society placed a higher standing on honorable discharges
than the lesser two. See, e.g., Ives v. Franke, 271 F.2d 469, 471 (D.C. Cir. 1959)
(Bazelon, J., dissenting); Schustack v. Herren, 234 F.2d 134, 135 (2d Cir. 1956).
Prior to Harmon, the Court unanimously-including Douglas--determined that it
would not review the Secretary of the Army's policy on administrative discharges.
Patterson v. Lamb, 329 U.S. 539 (1947).
393. Harmon v. Brucker, 137 F. Supp. 475, 476 (D.D.C. 1956). The district
court noted that the Army's basis for Harmon's administrative discharge was that
prior to his service, as a youth, his parents were associated with the Detroit Urban
League and the American Labor Party. The Court caustically noted, "Save for
plaintiffs continuing association with his parents and for writing one letter
requesting contributions for the legal defense of two persons indicted under the
Smith Act, all charges against plaintiff were based on conduct antedating his
induction into the Army." Id. at 476.
394. Id. at 477-78. The district court noted,
In his complaint, plaintiff states that he is not now and never has
been a member of the Communist Party or any of its front
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relying on Orloff v. Willoughby, likewise denied its jurisdiction to review
Harmon's claim.395
Douglas did not view the case as a matter of constitutional rights but
whether the Secretary of the Army exceeded the authority legislated by
Congress. Douglas reasoned that a harmonious reading of the various
provisions in the statute required a finding that the Secretary of the Army
exceeded the authority enumerated by the laws on discharges.396 Namely,
the law required that discharges reflect the service of an individual rather
than any pre-service affiliations. 397 Additionally, Douglas made it clear to
the judicial conference that he believed that the petitioner in the case had
suffered a legal harm.3 98 One of the unique features of this case involved a
dispute between the Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense, in
organizations, or of any organization which has engaged in
subversive activities of any kind. Plaintiff asserts that he has always
been unswervingly loyal to the Government of the United States. To
this the government responds that for lack of knowledge and
information sufficient to form a belief, it denies plaintiffs assertion,
but in its argument it concedes that it has never found plaintiff either
disloyal or loyal.
Although it may be true that the immediate case presents questions
of law, it likewise involves a review of the findings upon which the
separation was based, for while the vast majority of facts upon which
the government relies occurred prior to induction, at least one
such fact occurred during the term of military service. We feel
constrained to hold, therefore, that under the present state of the law
we lack requisite authority to review, control or compel the granting
of particular types of discharge certificates. We would, nevertheless,
be remiss if we failed to point out the inequities which may result, as
in this case, from the lack of adequate Congressional circumscription
of military action regarding discharges-action which is isolated
from judicial review.
Id.
395. 243 F.2d at 618. The appellate court additionally took notice of what is
considered the widespread dangers of the Communist Party infiltrating the national
defense, stating that "[a]ctivity in the Communist movement now involves a
possible conspiratorial participation dangerous to the security of this country. The
efforts of this movement to infiltrate all parts of the Government pose new
problems, which must be met with new rules and regulations." Id. at 621-22. As
noted previously in the body of this Article, by the time of Harmon v. Brucker,
Douglas had derided this view.
396. Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579, 582-83 (1958).
397. Id. at 583.
398. See Letter from Charles E. Whittaker to Chief Justice Earl Warren (Feb. 11,
1958) [Warren, Box 634] (providing a synopsis of the case).
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which the Justice Department concluded that if the Army had overstepped
its authority in including pre-service conduct as a deciding element in the
characterizations of discharges, then the Supreme Court should rule against
the Army.3 99 The Court seized on this dispute in reaching its conclusion.l4
In his dissent, Clark noted that the majority's decision was based on
non-constitutional matters and criticized what he perceived as the Court's
encroachment into the arena of executive exclusivity. 401 Moreover, to
Clark, the majority's decision overturned Orloff and potentially enabled
individuals to cripple national security. 4°2 While Clark's criticism of the
Court's weakening of national security was a factor for congressional
consideration, rather than judicial determination, his criticism reflected a
later avenue of attack against Douglas. And while Clark exaggerated his
accusation that the majority overturned Orloff, Harmon certainly narrowed
the reach of Orloff.
Despite the Court's holdings that narrowed the military's legal
construct in the 1950s, Douglas was not satisfied that he had curbed either
the Executive Branch's authority over the military or the military's political
influence. In 1958, he published The Right of the People, which, among
40 3
other points, was highly critical of the military and its legal construct.
Reflecting his now-entrenched anti-military ideology, Douglas's attack on
the U.S. military was two-fold. First, he argued that the military's
disciplinary system lacked constitutional safeguards guaranteed to the
Nation's citizens 4°4 and, second, that the military had grown into a
powerful political force of its own making.4 5
399. Id.
400. Harmon, 355 U.S. at 582. The Court noted:
The Solicitor General conceded that if the District Court had
jurisdiction to review respondent's determinations as to the
discharges he issued these petitioners and if petitioners had standing
to bring these suits, the action of respondent is not sustainable. On
the basis of that concession and our consideration of the law and this
record we conclude that the actions of the Secretary of the Army
cannot be sustained in law.
Id.
401. Id. at 584 (Clark, J., dissenting). Clark argued, "Throughout our history the
function of granting discharge certificates has been entrusted by the Congress to the
President and, through him, to the respective Secretaries of the Armed Forces. At
no time until today have the courts interfered in the exercise of this military
function." Id.
402. See id. at 585-86.
403. DOUGLAS, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE, supra note 319.
404. Id. at 181-97.
405. Id.
at 181-216.
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In The Right of the People, Douglas conceded that the UCMJ contained
safeguards against arbitrary and oppressive actions that existed under the
Articles of War.40 6 Nonetheless, he argued that military trials lacked
fundamental due-process guarantees found in civil courts, which rendered
military trials inherently opposed to standards of due process: "Military
trials are trials where swift and severe action is often necessary for
discipline. The sentences in the past have been notorious for their
harshness. They are often rendered by men who have no foundation in law
or in the democratic tradition of law administration.'4°7 These arguments
were not new. Douglas, Warren, and Black had incorporated them into the
case law of the 1950s. But Douglas's antipathy to the growth of the
military, and consequently its legal construct, had become increasingly
more open and placed him on a unique jurisprudential trajectory.4 ° 8
He argued that a general, albeit nascent, democratic aversion to
military law existed in Britain as early as 1628 and continued into modem
U.S. political culture. 40 9 To Douglas, this aversion was manifested in such
events as the passing of Pennsylvania's Constitution of 1776, which
prohibited standing armies within the state, as well as the constitutional
debates, in which the standing army issue was contentious among its
members. 41 0 Lending later credibility for his judicial criticism of the
Johnson and Nixon Administrations' conduct in Vietnam, Douglas warned
that the military leadership in regard to Southeast Asia was unwittingly
drawing the U.S. into armed conflict in that region. He wrote,
In 1955 our military [men] were so bold as to try to depose
the progressive Ngo Dinh Diem as president of Vietnam
.... But it indicates the manner in which well-meaning
406. Id. at 182.
407. Id. at 183.
408. See discussion supra Part II.B.
409. DOUGLAS, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE, supranote 319, at 170-72.

410. Id. at 172-74. Douglas was correct in Pennsylvania's early aversion to
standing armies. Article XIII of the 1776 Pennsylvania Constitution read,
That the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of
themselves, and the state; and as standing armies in time of peace,
are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be kept up: and that the
military should be kept under strict subordination to, and governed
by the civil power.
PA. CONST. of 1776, art. XIII. Douglas's use of this document to reinforce his

arguments for limiting standing armies is arguably flawed. Settled by Quakers,
Pennsylvania also possessed a religious-based aversion to standing armies. This
made Pennsylvania unique. No such aversion existed in its neighbors, New Jersey,
Massachusetts, or New York. See, e.g., DANIEL J.BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS:
THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 48-54 (1958).
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military men, without understanding of political forces,
assigned by our
surreptitiously intrude in affairs
411
Constitution to the civil authority.
From 1958 on, Douglas's two-tiered criticism was cemented in his
literary efforts. In 1963, he published The Anatomy of Liberty: The Rights
of Man Without Force.4 12 While he once more conceded that the UCMJ
was an improvement over the older Articles of War,4 13 he cautioned that
"[t]he growing influence of the Pentagon in American thinking is
illustrative of how basic alterations in a constitutional scheme can be
effected without a rewriting of the document. ' 4 14 In retirement, Douglas
reflected on the military's strength in the context of President John F.
Kennedy's role in the assassination of Ngo Dinh Diem, the South
Vietnamese President, in 1963:
Diem was not sufficiently servile to the Pentagon demands;
he was committed to rejection of any foreign expeditionary
force. So he had to go. Jack's acquiescence was a tragic
dereliction. Diem was the one barrier protecting America
against the designs of the Pentagon. In reflecting on Jack's
relation to the generals, I slowly realized that the military
were so strong in our society that probably no President
could stand against them. 5
Although Douglas's statement on the military's influence over
Kennedy and its role in the escalation of the Vietnam Conflict was an
oversimplification of the reasons underlying the Conflict's escalation, his
belief of Kennedy's acquiescence is clearly revealing to his later cases.
After Kennedy's assassination, Lyndon Johnson assumed the presidency,
411. DOUGLAS, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE, supra note 319, at 212-13. Douglas
first met Diem in 1952 at Yale University's club in New York City. Diem
impressed Douglas, and he introduced the future Vietnamese President to other
government officials. See SETH JACOBS, COLD WAR MANDARIN: NGO DINH DIEM
AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICA'S WAR IN VIETNAM, 1950-1963, 31 (2006).
412. WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, THE ANATOMY OF LIBERTY: THE RIGHTS OF MAN
WITHOUT FORCE (1963).
413. See id.at 63-66.
414. Id. at 72. It is noteworthy that Douglas also penned, "The military, though
still subordinate to the civilian authority, has increased its influence since World
War II. Its influence has mounted as its budget has increased." Id. at 70. In
conceding the improvement of the UCMJ over the Articles of War, Douglas wrote
that the UCMJ, "enacted in 1950, a court composed of civilians and designated as a
Court of Military Appeal, was made the agency of final review of questions of law

arising in cases of courts-martial." Id.
at 63.
415. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS, supranote 39, at 304-05.
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and while the two men knew each other and were friendly dating back to
Franklin Roosevelt's administration, Douglas grew to distrust Johnson
because of his "Machiavellian character." 4 6 Johnson's escalation of the
Vietnam Conflict emboldened Douglas to attempt to eviscerate the
military's legal construct to the point where the Executive Branch could not
commit the military to conflict unless it had the express declaration from
Congress to do so.
II.VIETNAM AND DOUGLAS: THE "NOT So HIDDEN" INTENT
UNDERLYING O 'CALLAHAN

In 1974, Vern Countryman observed,
In recent years William 0. Douglas has consistently
dissented from the refusal of the Court to consider cases
challenging the validity of our military operations in
Vietnam and the validity of the use of the Selective Service
Act to support those operations ...

because Congress has

not declared a state of war to exist .. .,417

In essence, what Countryman had correctly articulated was that
Douglas had migrated from narrowing the jurisdictional reach of military
law to reducing executive authority and seeking to terminate what he
considered an unjust and illegal war through the judiciary's power. But, by
416. Id. at 317. For a thorough exposition of Douglas's views on Johnson, see
id.at 310-19. Douglas acknowledged that Johnson accomplished the passage of
important civil-rights legislation and had worked for the betterment of impoverished
U.S. citizens. Id.at 336. But he also believed that Johnson possessed a personality
defect of a need to be liked, as well as a need to convince his opponents to agree
with him. Id.at 333. When either need failed to materialize, Douglas believed that
Johnson became destructive. Id. at 336. Notably, Douglas penned, "LBJ-like
Nixon after him-always spoke of peace and emphasized how peaceful the
intentions of Americans in Vietnam were. That of course, was fraudulent talk.
Almost every day of the Johnson term brought an escalation of the war effort." Id.
at 324.
417. VERN COUNTRYMAN, THE JUDICIAL RECORD OF WILLiAM 0. DOUGLAS 15
(1974). A veteran of World War II, Countryman was Douglas's law clerk and,
later, Royall Professor of Law at Harvard Law. Nick Ravo, Obituary, Vern
Countryman, 81, Professor and Commercial Law Expert, N.Y. TIMES, May 17,
1999. He later taught at Yale University but was denied a full professorship in
1954. Id. He had publicly criticized McCarthy and loyalty oaths, and he claimed
that congressional investigations of suspected Communists were politicized witchhunts, and he linked his anti-McCarthy stance to the denial of a full professorship.
Id. Countryman was later appointed law school dean at the University of New
Mexico and then hired as a full professor at Harvard Law School. Id.
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1974, the Vietnam Conflict was, for practical purposes, at an end, and,
although neither Douglas nor Countryman likely knew it at the time,
Douglas had passed the apex of his influence. That apex had occurred five
years earlier in O'Callahanv. Parker,a case that, at least symbolically, had
the possibility to accomplish the very constitutional realignment that
Douglas sought.4 18
Following Kennedy's death, the escalation of U.S. involvement in
Vietnam was not universally popular.41 9 By 1966, public protests against
the war had emerged from university campuses and spilled into mainstream
society. 420 Citizens not only avoided conscription, some even attempted to
disrupt the military's ability to engage in the Conflict. 421 It has been aptly
observed that during the Vietnam Conflict, the Court largely confined itself
to determining cases on individual rights rather than addressing the
constitutionality of presidential actions during the Conflict. 422 But this
observation does not hold true for Douglas, who judicially attacked the
Conflict. 423 He criticized his colleagues for refusing to decide on issues
involving reservist call-ups, troop movements, and war-protester cases.424
A. Conscriptionand MilitaryReservists: Douglas Breaksfrom
IndividualRights and His Brethren
No analysis of Douglas's intent in O'Callahan is complete without
examining his now little-noted dissents in Morse v. Boswel 25 and other
cases involving reservists challenging the government's decision to order
them to active duty.426 Nor can O'Callahan be fully analyzed without
418. 395 U.S. 259 (1969), overruled by Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435
(1987).
419. See NOAM CHOMsKY, RETHINKING CAMELOT: JFK, THE VIETNAM WAR,
AND U.S. POLITICAL CULTURE 1-5 (South End Press 1993).
420. See

MELVIN SMALL, ANTIWARRIORS: THE VIETNAM WAR AND THE BATTLE

FOR AMERICA'S HEARTS AND MINDS

34-36 (2002).

421. See generally BALL, supra note 5, at 206. Two excellent histories detailing
both the progress of the conflict and the national response are STANLEY KARNOW,
VIETNAM: A HISTORY (Penguin Group 1997) (1983) and GEORGE C. HERRING,
AMERICA'S LONGEST WAR: THE UNITED STATES AND VIETNAM, 1950-1975 (2d ed.

1986).
422. See generally Michal R. Belknap, The Warren Court and the Vietnam War.The Limits of Legal Liberalism, 33 GA. L. REV. 65 (1998); see also Russell W.
Galloway, Jr., The Third Periodof the Warren Court: Liberal Dominance (19621969), 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 773 (1980).
423. See Belknap, supra note 422.
424. See id.
425. 393 U.S. 802, 802 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
426. See, e.g., Winters v. United States, 390 U.S. 993 (1968).
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Douglas's positions on selective-service cases that arose during the
Vietnam Conflict, such as Sellers v. Laird,427 which was decided almost
contemporaneously with O'Callahan. It is essential to note that, in each of
these cases, when Douglas dissented from the Court's refusal to examine
the merits of petitioners' claims by not granting stays against the Executive

427. 395 U.S. 950 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Another example of
Douglas's attempt to narrow the Executive's ability to commit forces to Vietnam
without a formal declaration of war was in his dissent from the Court's denial of
certiorari in Holmes v. United States, 391 U.S. 936 (1968). Douglas argued,
correctly, that the Court had never fully tested the Executive's authority to oversee
conscription during peacetime. Id. at 938 (Douglas, J., dissenting). He pointed out
that during the Civil War, four justices, in 1863, dissented in the Prize Cases
because they felt that the "President alone had no power to place an embargo under
which a British Ship was seized while in Hampton Roads." Id. at 946-47. The
Prize Cases, however, did not involve the question of conscription at all but
whether the maritime decisions of the President during the Civil War were
constitutional. Id. at 947.
To Douglas, the issue required a broad review to include conscription for
domestic needs as well as for oversees conflicts. But within his reasoning, he
clearly enunciated a belief in the validity of the argument that the conflict in
Vietnam was an illegal war, specifically,
Putting down an internal insurrection, like defending our shores
against an aggressor, is certainly quite different from launching
hostilities against a nation or a people overseas. I express no
opinion on the merits. But there is a weighty view that what has
transpired respecting Vietnam is unconstitutional, absent a
declaration of war; that the Tonkin Gulf Resolution is no
constitutional substitute for a declaration of war; that the making of
appropriations was not an adequate substitute; and that "executive
war-making is illegal."
As I said, the question whether there can be conscription when
there has not been a declaration of war, has never been decided by
this Court. It is an important question. It is a recurring question. It
is coming to us in various forms in many cases as a result of the
conflict in Vietnam. I think we owe to those who are being marched
off to jail for maintaining that a declaration of war is essential for
conscription an answer to this important undecided constitutional
question.
Id. at 947-49. Although Douglas dissented alone in this case, Justice Potter Stewart
commented separately that he would join Douglas if the issue were narrowed to
whether the Executive Branch had the authority to compel conscription for an
international armed conflict without a declaration of war. Id. at 936 (mem.).
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Branch's conduct 42 8 or by refusing to grant review under a writ of
certiorari, 429 he was not dissenting from the Court's opinion as to the actual
issues of law raised by the affected parties. When Douglas acted on these
cases, he often did so in his capacity as a circuit justice rather than as a
Supreme Court justice. Ironically, his conduct occurred in a similar
manner as a justice that he detested from a previous era, Chief Justice
Roger B. Taney, in Ex parte Merryman.4 3 °
The roots of Morse originated in a presidential call-up of reservists to
active duty.4 3' On April 10, 1968, President Lyndon Johnson delegated
authority to the Secretary of Defense to activate units from the Army's
Ready Reserve, and, the following day, the Defense Secretary delegated
this authority to the Secretary of the Army who, in turn, activated a number
of reserve units to active duty.4 32 The Army's purpose in this activation
was both to counter allegations that the Ready Reserve had become a
refuge for persons seeking to avoid service in Vietnam and to assume
duties within the Continental U.S., which had primarily been the role of
active forces.433
After a number of challenges from affected reservists, the lower federal
courts issued contrary rulings.43 4 Douglas granted a stay against the call to
active duty for each reservist but centered on Morse, and the Court
eventually overrode Douglas's stay.435 In his dissent, Douglas noted that
the call-up was inequitably enforced and, in some conditions, reservists
were called up for twenty-four months beyond time already served.4 36
Moreover, the enlistment contracts of some of the affected reservists noted
that call-ups for active duty would occur only during periods of national

428. See Winters, 390 U.S. at 993 (denying the application for a stay presented
by Justice Harlan).
429. See Holmes, 391 U.S. at 949 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
430. 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487) (holding that President
Lincoln lacked the constitutional authority to suspend the writ of habeas corpus).
Note, however, that despite Douglas's antipathy for Taney, he viewed Taney's
conduct in Merryman as courageous. See DOUGLAS, ALMANAC OF LIBERTY, supra
note 14, at 345. Douglas wrote, "Taney had no army to compel [the executive to
his decision]. The authority of the Court was flouted; and its prestige suffered
greatly." Id.
431. Morse v. Boswell, 393 U.S. 802 (1968).
432. Id. at 804 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
433. Id. at 806.
434. Id. at 803.
435. Id. at 802.
436. Id. at 806.
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emergency. 437 Citing to a public statement opposing a call-up by Senator
Russell Long, Douglas opined that no such national emergency existed. 438
Douglas then turned to Burns v. Wilson,439 Orloff v. Willoughby,440 Reid
v. Covert (Reid I1),441 and Harmon v. Bruker"2 for the proposition that the
Court possessed jurisdiction to review Executive Branch determinations
made under the Constitution's enumerated war powers, including the
employment conditions of reservists." 3 In retrospect, it could have been
the case that, as early as 1949, Douglas intended the judiciary to have a
supervisory role over the military during armed conflict, and he spent two
decades building case law to that effect. 444 As noted later, his opponents

437. Id. at 807.
438. Id. at 808. In 1966, Senator Russell Long, a Louisiana Democrat, stated in
the Senate,
Mr. President, I cannot see how any realistic answer can be raised
against this amendment [calling up the reserves]. They say, "You
can call up the units." In the first place, it cannot be done, because
the President of the United States has to declare a national
emergency, and very naturally he does not want to declare a national
emergency at this time after we have gone this far without it.... [A]
declaration of a national emergency would make us look ridiculous
in the eyes of the world-to declare a state of emergency in regard to
a third-rate power like North Vietnam.
Id. (citing 112 CONG. REC. 19726 (1966) (statement of Sen. Russell)).
439. 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
440. 345 U.S. 83 (1953).
441. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
442. 355 U.S. 579 (1958).
443. Wilson, 393 U.S. at 809-10 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
444. In Winters v. United States, 390 U.S. 993 (1968), Douglas, in his dissent,
claimed that he did not seek to have the Judiciary govern the conduct of military
operations. He argued:
Historically, one of the most important roles of civil courts has been
to protect people from military discipline or punishment who have
been placed beyond its reach by the Constitution and the laws
enacted by Congress. If Winters is right, he is in one of those
categories. There are those who in tumultuous times turn theirfaces
the other way saying that it is not the function of the courts to tell
the Armed Forces how to run a war. Of course that is true. But it is
the function of the courts to make sure, in cases properly coming
before them, that the men and women constituting our Armed Forces
are treated as honored members of society whose rights do not turn
on the charity of a military commander.
Winters v. United States, 89 S.Ct. 57, 59-60 (1968) (emphasis added) (citations
omitted). However, Douglas's assurance of the judiciary's non-intervention is not
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accused him of doing so; though, given Douglas's concurrence with
Yamashita, Quirin, and other World War 11-era cases, this accusation
proves hollow. However, the most compelling part of Douglas's dissent
was in his defacto attempt to negatively define the legal character of U.S.
participation in armed conflict in Vietnam. Douglas conceded that
Congress had the power to alter laws without the interference of public
estoppel. 445
Morse was not the only reservist case in which Douglas dissented, and,
indeed, he knew that his arguments to grant a full hearing would be
defeated. A more complex and, for Douglas, fruitless case, Winters v.
United States,4 6 showed how isolated he had become in curbing the
Vietnam Conflict through judicial intervention. The case involved the
broad question of whether, by an enactment of law, Congress could
unilaterally modify the terms of an enlistment contract; but the heart of the
case, as fashioned by the district court Judge, John Francis Dooling, was
whether the judiciary could intervene in the orders of commanders to
military personnel serving under their command where the law underlying
those orders was otherwise valid. 44 7 Judge Dooling answered the question
in the negative and concluded that the reservist's contention-that his

supported by his other opinions, draft dissents, or memoranda described throughout
this Article.
445. Morse v. Boswell, 393 U.S. 802, 807 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
446. 390 U.S. 993 (1968). The case arose from a New York Federal District
Court ruling captioned, Winters v. United States, 281 F. Supp. 289 (E.D.N.Y.
1968). On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit refused to
grant a stay in the government's orders for Winters to report to duty. See Winters v.
United States, 390 F.2d 879 (2nd Cir. 1968).
447. Winters, 281 F. Supp. at 299. Important to Douglas's arguments for
granting certiorari was the following statement issued by District Court Judge
Francis Dooling:
At the troublesome interface between the civil order and the sealedoff military sub-order with its own code of laws, system of justice
and hierarchy of tribunals the task of the civil court is limited to
determining whether or not the military has acted within the
jurisdiction conferred on it by valid law; that includes the duty to
determine, where an act of discretion is the bridge over which must
lead the path of determining whether or not a quasi-civilian will be
transferred from civilian to full military status, that the discretion has
been exercised; the civil court would exceed its duty if it reviewed
the exercise of discretion to see whether it was well or ill-founded by
any substantial evidence rule.
Id. That Dooling was generally thought of as a liberal judge who sided with
women's-rights issues and labor unions did not appear to salve Douglas.
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contract shielded him from congressional alterationsoriginal enlistment448
was without merit.
On March 22, 1968, Justice Harlan refused to grant a stay in
proceedings against a marine reservist who had challenged the
government's orders to be called into active duty; Douglas disagreed with
Harlan's determination. 449 On May 20 of the same year, the marine
reservist sought a second stay, which Harlan denied once more.45 ° In
response, the reservist sought certiorari to the Court, which was denied on
October 14, 1968.4 1' Douglas dissented from the denial of certiorari but
was the sole justice to do so. Harlan, along with seven other justices,
believed, as Judge Dooling did, that the particular issues raised were
beyond the Court's jurisdiction. In a memorandum to his law clerk, a
puzzled Douglas noted,
In Justice Harlan's opinion in the Winters case, there is a
suggestion that the judiciary has no business passing on
questions concerning the relationship of members of the
armed forces to the Pentagon. Would you prepare for me
and leave on my desk for Saturday an addition to the
Morse opinion showing this type of problem is within the
traditional type of judiciary competence.452
Douglas's arguments to Black did not influence his support for Douglas's
positions. Indeed, apparently by not joining in the dissent, Justice
Thurgood Marshall, who staunchly allied with Douglas in O 'Callahan,was
not swayed by Douglas's position that the Court could review an individual
military order for an individual amenable to military service to muster.
As a further sign of Douglas's isolation from his judicial peers, in
Johnson v. Powell he criticized Black's refusal to grant a stay against the
Army's shipment of reserves to Vietnam.453 Douglas excoriated the
Executive Branch's assertion that reservists were in a different category
than the Constitution's aegis of militia and, therefore, were not entitled to
the Constitution's view that the federal government was only empowered to
call into federal service militia units "to execute the laws of the Union,
suppress insurrections, and repel invasions .... ,,44 However, based on

448. Id. at 300.
449. Winters, 390 U.S. 993.
450. Winters v. United States, 391 U.S. 910 (1968).
451. Winters v. United States, 393 U.S. 896 (1968).
452. Memorandum from Justice William 0. Douglas to the Law Clerk (Oct. 2,
1968) [WOD, Box 1451].
453. 393 U.S. 920 (1968).
454. Id.
at 920 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8).
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Black's denial of a stay against the transfer of reservists, Douglas admitted
that he55had no choice but to treat the issues raised by the petitioners as
4
moot.
Outside of the Court, institutions that had at least nominally sided with
Douglas began to criticize his attempts to curb U.S. involvement in
Vietnam through judicial fiat. On September 16, 1968, the Washington
Post, in an editorial on the reservist cases, accused Douglas of a "shop
around" on an issue of "slender legal merit. '456 In a pattern that was to
become more common during the conflict, Douglas responded to the Post:
"It is amazing just how little the press knows about Supreme Court
procedures. A County paper that we read at Goose Prarie can be excused,
but not the Washington Post whose editors could find someone to give
them a seminar on judicial procedure any time they chose. ' 7
Other issues that troubled Douglas and empowered his view of
Vietnam as an unlawful war included social inequities within the military.
In Sellers v. Laird, Douglas not only attempted, in concert with Warren
and Marshall, to enable the judiciary to take a more active supervisory role
in the Nation's conscription program, he also sought to correct a
demographic imbalance within it. 458 As in the case of both World Wars, in
the Vietnam-era conscription program local draft boards determined
eligibility for military service. 459 Sellers, an African-American inductee
from South Carolina, challenged his eligibility based on discrimination
inherent in his board's decision-making process because the board was
composed entirely of Caucasian citizens.46 ° Sellers's arguments were not
unique. In 1967, heavyweight boxing champion Muhammad Ali sought
relief from military induction on similar grounds. 46'
455. Id. at 921.
456. WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 16, 1968, at A20.
457. Douglas, Editorial Response (Sept. 27, 1968) [WOD, Box 1451].
458. 395 U.S. 950 (1969).
459. Id. at 950-51.
460. Id.
461. See Clay v. United States, 397 F.2d 901, 910 (5th Cir. 1968). In 1971, the
Court reversed Ali's conviction based on the selective-service board's improper
denial of Ali's conscientious-objector status. Douglas provided a synopsis as to
Ali's Islamic views of a just war. He concurred in the per curium decision, writing,
That is a matter of belief, of conscience, of religious principle. Both
Clay and Negre were "by reason of religious training and belief'
conscientiously opposed to participation in war of the character
proscribed by their respective religions. That belief is a matter of
conscience protected by the First Amendment which Congress has
no power to qualify or dilute as it did in § 60) of the Military
Selective Service Act of 1967, when it restricted the exemption to
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Douglas noted that in South Carolina 34.8% of the state's population
was African-American, but of its selective-service board members, only
one was of that race. 4 2 He also recognized that in Georgia, the state in
which Sellers filed his appeal of the South Carolina board's decision, less
than 0.2% of the 509 selective-service board members were AfricanAmerican, despite 28.5% of the state's population being AfricanAmerican. 4 3
Although not included in the final decision, Douglas's initial draft
contained a brief history of African-American military experience.
Drawing an analogy with the Indian caste system, Douglas noted that in the
Nation's first experience with national conscription in World War I,
"blacks were treated as untouchables." 464 Backing this observation,
Douglas pointed out that in both World Wars "the Navy allowed [blacks] to
serve in servile capacities, blacks were placed in separate units in the
Army" while "the Marine Corps excluded them altogether. ' 465 He also
noted, correctly, that the African-American experience in World War II
was little different.46 6 Turning to Vietnam, he excoriated the Nation's
conscription program, writing,
While blacks constitute about one tenth of our country's
population, they account for over one fifth of our combat
fatalities in Vietnam. Their burden is great and yet their
participation in imposing it is slight; of the fifty states
polled in 1966, twenty-three maintained local boards
those "conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form."
For the reasons I stated in Negre and in Gillette v. United States, that
construction puts Clay in a class honored by the First Amendment,
even though those schooled in a different conception of "just" wars
may find it quite irrational.
Clay v. United States, 403 U.S. 698, 709-10 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(citations omitted). For a more complete exposition of Ali's fight against
conscription, see Andres Quintana, Muhammad Ali: The Greatest in Court, 18
MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 171 (2007).
462. Sellers, 395 U.S. at 950-51. Douglas also noted that twenty-three states
maintained local boards "without a single Negro member." Id. at 951 n.2 (citing
REPORT, NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON THE SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT

(1967)).
463. Id.
464. Douglas, draft dissent memorandum (undated) [WOD, Box 1451]. The
memorandum began, "The story of Negroes in the military is no happier than others
of our racial heritage." Id.
465. Id.
466. Id. Douglas added, "Twenty years later, in WWII, the situation had hardly
changed. Again, blacks were forced to serve in separate units." Id.
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without a single Negro member and among those states
were some in which Negroes constitute 20%, 30%, and
even 40% of the general population.4 67
The memorandum circulated, but it was not incorporated into the dissent
for reasons not apparent in the correspondences between Marshall, Warren,
and Douglas. Nonetheless, the memorandum clearly evidenced Douglas's
view that societal inequities were inherent in the national conscription
program, and this fact was enough to warrant judicial oversight, if not
another means of the judiciary forcing an end to the war.
B. Points of Rebellion and Douglas's Grantof Bailfor CaptainLevy
In 1969, Douglas published Points of Rebellion,468 perhaps the most
controversial book of his career. 469 The book was a damning account of
U.S. political leadership, which linked the expansion of the military, the
Executive Branch's assertions of exclusive control over the military, and
the diminution of civil rights. In essence, it was a treatise that linked
McCarthyism to an imperial--or unitary-presidency willing to forgo
checks and balances against it, as well as popular opinion, in committing
the armed forces into conflict.
Douglas argued that the U.S. had existed under a military state since
Truman's administration. 470 To Douglas, the President was backed by the
Pentagon or, perhaps, as Douglas conceded, a prisoner to its designs. As a
result, he argued, President Johnson "avoided all constitutional procedures"

467. Id. Prior to this quote, the memorandum also stated,
The situation now is, of course, different. For while the Armed
Services, in the past, have often denied blacks their fair share of
responsibility, they now appear to be giving them more than a fair
burden. Of the young men in this country who for example are
"qualified for service," those who are black are twice as likely to be
drafted as their white counterparts.
Id.
468. WILIAM 0. DOUGLAS, POINTS OF REBELLION (1969). Portions of this book
were published in Playboy Magazine prior to the book's publication. The
controversy surrounding this book is discussed in Part D, infra.
469. JAMES E. SIMON, THE CENTER HOLDS: THE POWER STRUGGLE INSIDE THE
REHNQUIST COURT 101-02 (1995); HOYT, supra note 24, at 149-50; BELKNAP,

supra note 1, at 62. For specific, right-wing literature calling for Douglas's
removal from the Court, see, for example, JULIAN E. WILLIAMS, THE CASE AGAINST
JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 3-6 (1970); H.E. MCBRIDE, IMPEACH JUSTICE
DOUGLAS 26 (1971).
470. DOUGLAS, POINTS OF REBELLION, supra note 468, at 43.

THOMASM COOLEYLA WREVIEW

[Vol. 26:2

and "slyly maneuvered [the U.S.] into an Asian war.",4 7 1 In addition to the
Vietnam Conflict, Douglas argued that the Executive Branch had subjected
over 20 million people to loyalty tests since the end of World War II, which
resulted in the improper use of data.472 To this end, Douglas wondered,
"[W]here is the force that will restrain the Pentagon? Would a President
dare face it down?"' 4 73 These two questions were answered by Douglas the
year that Points of Rebellion was published. He believed that the Nation
could not rely on the President to face the Pentagon, and that the force to
stop the military's growth rested within himself and, as he hoped, a
majority of the Court. This force manifested itself in O'Callahan.
On August 2, 1969, Douglas took the unusual step of ordering that bail
be made for a military inmate named Captain Howard B. Levy.474 Douglas
admitted that his grant of bail was unusual, though mainly because the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit, and Justice Brennan had all previously
denied bail.475 As noted earlier, Douglas had once before granted a stay of
execution in the Rosenberg case, contrary to the determination of another
justice. But in this case, Levy had yet to argue the merits of his case before
the district court.476
The grant of bail occurred one month after the Supreme Court issued
O'Callahan, but because Douglas referenced Levy's case in the
o 'Callahandecision, the grant of bail merits discussion prior to analyzing
477
O'Callahan.
Levy was convicted of conduct unbecoming an officer and
gentleman, among other offenses, and sought bail pending a lengthy
appellate process. 478 Unlike O'Callahan, Levy was a well-reported,
contentious case.479
Douglas's reasons for granting bail to Levy have to be viewed in a
holistic light of not only O'Callahanbut also the judicial contentiousness
of Levy's case. In 1965, Captain Levy, a doctor assigned to Fort Jackson,
471. Id. at 39.
472. Id at 17.
473. Id at 43-44.
474. Levy v. Parker, 396 U.S. 1204, 1205 (1969). Although Parker v. Levy is
analyzed in the third article in this series (The Rehnquist Court and the National
Defense: Establishing a Reasonable Balance in the Practice of Military Law), an
excellent history of the case can be found in Robert N. Strassfield, The Vietnam
War on Trial: The Court Martial of Dr. Howard B. Levy, 1994 Wis. L. REv. 839

(1994). See also Levy v. Parker, 487 F.2d 772 (3rd Cir. 1973).
475. Levy, 396 U.S. at 1204.
476. Id.
477. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 266 (1969).
478. Strassfield, supra note 474, at 841.
479. Id. at 839-41.
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engaged in activities designed to provoke enlisted personnel to refuse to
obey orders or train for combat service in Vietnam.480 The Army charged
Levy with violating UCMJ Article 90 (failure to obey a lawful order),
UCMJ Article 133 (conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman), and
UCMJ Article 134 (uttering various statements "with design to promote
disloyalty and disaffection among the troops ... to the prejudice of good
order and discipline in the armed forces"). 481 He was court-martialed for
this conduct, found guilty, and sentenced to three years confinement and a
dismissal on June 3, 1967.482
Prior to his court-martial, Levy
unsuccessfully sought relief in the federal courts to stay any military
proceedings against him. 483 After his court-martial, while incarcerated at

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Levy unsuccessfully sought relief in an effort to
better his confinement conditions in the U.S. District Court for the District
of Kansas. 48
To Douglas, the central issue in Levy's case was not court-martial
jurisdiction as there was an obvious nexus between Levy's conduct and
military service. Rather, Levy's case presented an issue of charging, as a
non-enumerated, common-law crime, conduct otherwise constituting free
speech.485 While it would be five years before the Supreme Court
480. United States v. Levy, 39 C.M.R. 672, 673 (A.C.M.R. 1968); see Levy v.
Resor, 37 C.M.R. 399 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 1967).
481. Levy, 39 C.M.R. at 674-75.

482. Id. at 672-73.
483. See Levy v. Corcoran, 389 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1967), stay denied, 387 U.S.
915 (1967) (where Chief Justice Earl Warren, Douglas's judicial ally, denied the
stay of proceedings), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 960 (1967); see also Levy v. Resor,
384 F.2d 689 (4th Cir. 1967), cert denied, 389 U.S. 1049 (1968) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).

484. See Levy v. Dillon, 286 F. Supp. 593 (D. Kan. 1968), af'd, 415 F.2d 1263
(10th Cir. 1969).
485. Levy v. Parker, 396 U.S. 1204 (1969). Douglas argued:
Some of the problems tendered seem substantial to me. One charge
on which applicant stands convicted rests on Article 134 which
makes a crime "all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good
order and discipline in the armed forces." In O'Callahan v. Parker,
395 U.S. 258, ... which the lower courts did not have before them
when they denied bail, we reserved decision on whether Article 134
satisfies the standards of vagueness required by due process. Apart
from the question of vagueness is the question of First Amendment
rights. While in the Armed Services, applicant spoke out against the
war in Vietnam. The extent to which First Amendment rights
available to civilians are not available to servicemen is a new and
pressing problem.
Id. at 1205.
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ultimately decided Levy's case, it is clear that Douglas envisioned further
reducing the military's jurisdiction over service members by eliminating
non-enumerated, common-law offenses.48 6 A jurisdictional reduction of
this sort, if successful, would diminish the military's legal construct as well
as reduce the Executive Branch's authority over it.
C. O'Callahan v. Parker: Douglas's Short-Lived Triumph in
Limiting Military Jurisdiction
Although O'Callahan is of little legal authority because the Court has
since overturned it, 487 it was, for a brief moment, Douglas's triumph from
the bench. Unlike both Ex rel. Toth v. Quarles (where the serviceman was
no longer on active duty) 48 8 and Reid v. Covert (Reid I) (where the accused
individual was a civilian),48 9 the facts arising in O'Callahan merely
reflected the common 4jurisdictional
reach of courts-martial since the
90
UCMJ.
the
of
enactment
While on an evening pass away from Fort Shafter, a military
installation on Hawaii where he was stationed, Sergeant O'Callahan was
arrested on suspicion of breaking into a hotel room and attempting to rape a
teenage girl. 491 The civilian police arrested and interrogated O'Callahan,
and, in turn, he confessed to committing the offenses.4 92 O'Callahan was
not in uniform during either the time of the charged offenses or the police
interrogation.4 93
Ultimately, the Army charged O'Callahan with
housebreaking, assault with intent to commit rape, and attempted rape.4 94
The ensuing court-martial sentenced O'Callahan to ten years in
confinement and a dishonorable discharge. 495 O'Callahan's court-martial
486. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 766 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
487. Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 436 (1987).
488. 350 U.S. 11, 13 (1955).
489. 351 U.S. 487, 488 (1956).
490. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 273 (1969).
491. Id. at 259-60.
492. Id. at 260.
493. Id. at 259-60.
494. Id. at 260.
495. Id. at 260-61. Although six witnesses in addition to the victim testified
against O'Callahan, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit later noted that
the most damning testimony came from O'Callahan's peer, another soldier named
Charles Redden. O'Callahan v. Parker, 390 F.2d. 360, 361-63 (3rd Cir. 1968). The

appellate court noted:
Charles Redden, a soldier who had been a friend and companion of
the petitioner, testified that on the evening in question, after they had
drunk several beers, he and the petitioner made their way to the
balcony outside of the fourth story hotel room where the intrusion
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was not controversial when it occurred, and, perhaps reflecting the
mundane aspect of the court-martial, it was not reported in the national
media. The offenses occurred in July 1956, and the court-martial occurred
four months later, during a time of national peace.49 6
O'Callahan appealed by way of a writ of coram nobis to the Court of
Military Appeals in 1967. 497 His principal argument was not that the
military lacked jurisdiction to prosecute him in a court-martial, but, rather,
that the admission of deposition testimony over his objection had deprived
him of due process. 498 Three years after O'Callahan's court-martial, the
Court of Military Appeals ruled, in another case, that deposition testimony
in lieu of actual witness presence deprived an accused of the Sixth
Amendment's guarantee of the right of confrontation. 499 At issue, then,
was whether the later decision could be retroactively applied to
O'Callahan's case.
After the Court of Military Appeals denied relief, O'Callahan
petitioned by way of a writ of habeas corpus to the U.S. District Court for
the District of Massachusetts. 500 There, for the first time, he argued that the
court-martial did not possess jurisdiction to prosecute him.5 °1 The district
court denied relief.50 2 The following year, O'Callahan appealed to the U.S.
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, arguing that he was
denied a fair trial because the prosecution introduced depositions into

and assault allegedly occurred. Looking in they saw a girl in bed.
The defendant suggested that they enter the room and that one of
them should have intercourse with the girl while the other held her.
Redden rejected the suggestion, warned the defendant that such
conduct would be rape and left the scene.
Id. at 362.
496. O'Callahan,395 U.S. at 259, 273.
497. United States v. O'Callahan, 37 C.M.R. 188 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 1967).
498. Id. at 188.
499. Id. The particular case on which O'Callahan sought relief was United States
v. Jacoby, 29 C.M.R. 244 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1960). Id. In Jacoby, the Court of
Military Appeals determined that the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation
applied to courts-martial. 29 C.M.R. at 249.
500. O'Callahan v. Chief U.S. Marshal, 293 F. Supp. 441 (D. Mass. 1966).
501. Id. at 441-42.
502. Id, at 442.

256

THOMAS M COOLEYLA WREVIEW

[Vol. 26:2

evidence. 50 3 Both that court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit denied relief.5 4
The Supreme Court granted review of the case in the waning days of
the Johnson Presidency.5 05
It heard arguments prior to Nixon's
inauguration. The Court published O'Callahan on June 2, 1969.506
Between the grant of certiorari and the published decision, the composition
of the Court changed. As a result of a threatened impeachment based on
his scandalous conduct, Justice Abe Fortas departed from the Court and
was replaced by Justice Harry Blackmun.50 7 However, Blackmun took no
part in the decision, resulting in only eight justices deciding the issue.50 8
Ultimately, Douglas authored the majority opinion with Warren, Black,
Marshall, and Brennan in agreement.509 Justices Harlan, Byron White, and
Potter Stewart dissented. 510
Douglas began the majority opinion by enunciating the basic
constitutional precept that while the Constitution conferred the power "to
make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval
forces," the Fifth and Sixth Amendments provided basic rights that existed
in those rules. 51 ' The two fundamental rights Douglas focused on were the

503. United States ex rel. O'Callahan v. Parker, 256 F. Supp. 679, 681-82 (M.D.
Pa. 1966). The district court denied release without ruling on the merits of the case.
See id.
504. Id. at 682; United States ex rel. O'Callahan v. Parker, 390 F.2d 360, 364
(3rd Cir. 1968). O'Callahan raised additional issues for the first time before the
appellate court which commented,
The petitioner also makes belated claims that he did not have
effective assistance of counsel and that Constitutional requirements
were not met in the obtaining of his confession. These contentions
have not been urged before the Military Court of Appeals or any
other military tribunal. Without suggesting that they have merit, we
decide merely that they are not ripe for consideration by way of
collateral attack in a civil court.
Id. at 363.
505. O'Callahan v. Parker, 393 U.S. 822 (1968).
506. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
507. See LAURA KALMAN,

ABE FORTAS

(1990).

508. O'Callahan,395 U.S. 258.
509. Id.at 259, 274.
510. Id. at 274 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Byron White was appointed by John F.
Kennedy to replace Charles Whittaker. HENRY JULIAN ABRAHAM, JUSTICES,
PRESIDENTS,

AND

SENATORS;

A

HISTORY

OF

THE

U.S.

SUPREME

APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH II 46 (5th ed. 2008).

Dwight Eisenhower appointed Potter Stewart to replace Burton. Id.
511. O'Callahan,395 U.S. at 261-62.
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right to a grand jury and the right to trial by jury before a civilian court.5 12
This latter right is also found, as Douglas noted, in the second section of
Article Il.5 13
It is not surprising that Douglas centered on individual rights from the
start because the other justices focused their support for his position solely
on the issue of individual rights. It also provided Douglas with ample
opportunity to criticize the practice of courts-martial in comparison to
civilian trials. 5 14 Douglas pointed out that a court-martial panel was
"empowered to act by a two-thirds vote," while a jury could only find guilt
with unanimity. 5 5 He also degraded the military's appointment of a
presiding officer to oversee courts-martial instead of an objective and
independent judge, protected by tenure and "nurtured by the judicial
evidentiary rules
tradition., 516 Douglas also opined that the UCMJ's
5 17
handicapped an accused seeking a full and fair trial.
Douglas conceded in the necessity of courts-martial to the effective
functioning of the military, but in citing Toth he noted that the Court had
already held that the military's jurisdiction was limited "to 'the least
possible power adequate to the end proposed.' 51 8 To Douglas, this meant
that the military's jurisdictional reach was limited to offenses committed in
wartime, overseas, or enumerated as purely military offenses, such as
desertion. 5 '9 Although O'Callahan's conduct did not implicate the nonenumerated, common-law offenses under Article 134, Douglas,
nonetheless, focused on these two offenses as proof that courts-martial
lacked the due-process guarantees found in civil trials. 520 And he turned to
another case to prove the injustice of the military's legal construct, which
would, in four-years time, come before the Court. Citing to the case of
Captain Howard B. Levy, discussed infra, Douglas quoted from a
Columbia Law School journal: "None of the travesties of justice
perpetrated under the UCMJ is really very surprising, for military law has
always been and continues to be primarily an instrument of discipline, not
justice. 52 1
at262.
512. Id.
513. Id.
at 263-65.
514. Id.
at263.
515. Id.
at264.
516. Id.
517. Id. at 262-64.
518. Id.at 265 (quoting United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 22-23
(1955)).
at 266-67.
519. See id.
at 265-66.
520. See id.
at 266 (quoting Ira Glasser, Justice and Captain Levy, 12 COLuM. F. 46,
521. Id.
49(1969)).
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Although the issue of military jurisdiction over civilians was settled
earlier, Douglas argued that courts-martial did not possess unlimited
jurisdiction over soldiers, and he criticized the government's arguments on
this point. 2 2 His use of British and early U.S. history buttressed his basic
tenet that most offenses committed by soldiers were traditionally
prosecuted in civil courts instead of courts-martial because both
governments feared the authority of their nations' executive.523 To Douglas
and the Court's majority, it was only nominally relevant that in both 1916,
with the establishment of a new Articles of War, and in 1950, with the
enactment of the UCMJ, Congress had legislated a vast expansion of
military jurisdiction over servicemen. 24 This was because, as the Court
held, Congress's authority to legislate military law had to be conducted in

522. O'Callahan,395 U.S. at 267. Douglas explained:
These cases decide that courts-martial have no jurisdiction to try
those who are not members of the Armed Forces, no matter how
intimate the connection between their offense and the concerns of
military discipline. From these cases, the Government invites us to
draw the conclusion that once it is established that the accused is a
member of the Armed Forces, lack of relationship between the
offense and identifiable military interests is irrelevant to the
jurisdiction of a court-martial.
The fact that courts-martial have no jurisdiction over nonsoldiers,
whatever their offense, does not necessarily imply that they have
unlimited jurisdiction over soldiers, regardless of the nature of the
offenses charged. Nor do the cases of this Court suggest any such
interpretation. The Government emphasizes that these decisionsespecially Kinsella v. Singleton---establish that liability to trial by
court-martial is a question of "status"....
Id.
523. Id. at 269. Of British precedent, Douglas argued:
The jurisdiction of British courts-martial over military offenses
which were also common-law felonies was from time to time
extended, but, with the exception of one year, there was never any
general military jurisdiction to try soldiers for ordinary crimes
committed in the British Isles. It was, therefore, the rule in Britain at
the time of the American Revolution that a soldier could not be tried
by court-martial for a civilian offense committed in Britain ....
Id. Douglas argued further that post-Revolutionary U.S. followed the British
precedent through to the Civil War, expanding courts-martial jurisdiction for the
duration of the war, but then returning to a limited jurisdiction thereafter. Id.at
270-71.
524. Id.
at 271-72.
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harmony with the Bill of Rights.525 As noted throughout this Article,
Douglas believed that such a harmony could seldom be achieved.
Douglas concluded the majority's opinion with a new enunciation of
the "service connected" test, and, without noting Ex parte Milligan, he
virtually quoted from it in arguing that O'Callahan was charged with
peacetime offenses that were committed in a state with fully functioning
civil courts rather than "a far-flung outpost., 526 In essence, the Court
created a new jurisdictional test for courts-martial. O 'Callahanmeant that
for the military to charge a serviceman with an offense, it had to prove that
the criminal conduct occurred on an installation and that the criminal
conduct in some manner directly affected the discipline of the military, that
the victim of the offense was also in the service, or that the offense
occurred overseas. There is one other important aspect of O'Callahan:the
majority opinion did not, at any time, publish its cognizance of the
dissent's arguments.52 7
D. O'Callahan: The Arguments, the Court'sInternalDebates, and
the Response
An analysis of the published opinion, without further noting the
surrounding circumstances of the case, falls short of fully illustrating
Douglas's intents behind O'Callahanfor two reasons. First, the opinion
does not completely evidence Douglas's intentions because, as in the case
525. Id.
at 273. The Court specifically held:
The power of Congress to make "[r]ules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forces," Art. I, § 8, cl. 14, need not
be sparingly read in order to preserve those two important
constitutional guarantees. For it is assumed that an express grant of
general power to Congress is to be exercised in harmony with
express guarantees of the Bill of Rights. We were advised on oral
argument that Art. 134 is construed by the military to give it power
to try a member of the armed services for income tax evasion. This
article has been called "a catch-all" that "incorporates almost every
Federal penal statute into the Uniform Code." The catalogue of
cases put within reach of the military is indeed long; and we see no
way of saving to servicemen and servicewomen in any case the
benefits of indictment and of trial by jury, if we conclude that this
petitioner was properly tried by court-martial.
Id.
(citation omitted).
526. Id. at 273-74 (referring to Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866)).
527. Id. at 274 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The dissent is not analyzed in this Article
because it is the subject of the third article in this set. It was a short opinion, and
the dissent correctly noted that in creating a new service-connected jurisdiction, the
majority failed to explain its scope. Id.
at 283.
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of many opinions, it was the product of a compromise. As discussed
further below, Douglas expected to be in the minority. He authored a
stinging dissent against not only the military's jurisdictional claims but also
against the Pentagon and, by incorporation, a nexus between the Vietnam
Conflict and the Executive Branch's growth in political power through the
military's expansion. Second, the majority opinion incorporated some of
the exact language from O'Callahan's counsel, Mr. Victor Rabinowitz.
This feature of decisions is not unheard of, but Rabinowitz was considered
by many as a radical.
1. Douglas's Reaction to Petitioner's and Government's Arguments
An admitted Socialist, Rabinowitz had made a legal career of
defending people accused of subversive un-American activity as well as
labor unions. In 1948, he represented labor unions before the Court and
later memorialized his admiration for both Douglas and Black.5 28 He
defended Alger Hiss, and his reputation was such that, in 1950, Julius
Rosenberg sought his counsel. 29 In 1964, Rabinowitz was a named
petitioner in a Court decision. 530 He unsuccessfully challenged the
government's requirement of having to list himself under the Foreign
Agents Registration Act as a result of representing the Cuban Government
in U.S. courts. 531 However, O'Callahan did not seek Rabinowitz's counsel
on his own: Rabinowitz's well-known client, Teamsters Union President
James R. Hoffa, introduced O'Callahan
to Rabinowitz during a visit to
32
Hoffa in a federal penitentiary.
Douglas wholeheartedly agreed with Rabinowitz's argument that "if
the government is right [in arguing for expansive jurisdiction], it could try a
member of the armed forces for any crime at all, including securities
violations, violations of the anti-trust laws, or anything else. 5 33 Furthering
his arguments, and gaining Douglas's angry approval, Rabinowitz noted
that the Air Force had gone so far as to court-martial an airman for tax

528. VICTOR RABINOwITZ, UNREPENTANT LEFrIST: A LAWYER'S MEMOIR 50,
52,242-43,293 (1996).
529. RONALD RADOSH & JOYCE MILTON, THE ROSENBERG FILE

89-90 (spec. ed.,

The Notable Trials Library 1999) (1983).
530. Rabinowitz v. Kennedy, 376 U.S. 605 (1964).
531. Id.
at610.
532. RABINOWITZ, supra note

528, at 291-92.

533. For the complete transcript, see Victor Rabinowitz, Oral Argument
(Alderson Printing Co. Jan. 27, 1969) [Brennan, Box 197].
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fraud.534 Shortly after oral argument, Douglas35 personally commended
Rabinowitz for defending individual servicemen.
At the same time Douglas complimented Rabinowitz, he scathed the
Solicitor General. For instance, in response to the Solicitor General's
argument, "I am suggesting that there may be some cases where in fact the
military man does benefit from a military trial as distinguished from a civil
trial," Douglas cut him off with a curt, "[H]ave you ever been to an Army
court-martial? ' 536 Douglas did, in fact, know that the Solicitor General had
never attended a court-martial, and when the Solicitor General responded
that he had not witnessed a military proceeding, Douglas responded in a
manner designed to showcase the Solicitor General's ignorance. 5 "
2. Douglas and the O'CallahanConference Compromise
More than Douglas's compliment to Rabinowitz or the incorporation of
Rabinowitz's arguments into Douglas's decision, Douglas's conduct during
conference sessions is insightful. Admittedly, the conference memoranda
and personal correspondences regarding the case are few in number.
However, Douglas did in fact expect to lose in O'Callahanand prepared a
scathing dissent to a draft opinion authored by Justice Harlan. 538 Harlan
included in his draft opinion a comment that-Douglas argued-lacked any
efficacy, concluding, "[W]hatever may have been the infirmities of the
seventeenth century English martial law, military personnel today are not
summarily or arbitrarily
treated, but enjoy a fair and enlightened system of
5 39
criminal justice.

534. Id.
535. Id. It could not have escaped Douglas's attention that Rabinowitz had made
a career of defending persons, such as Alger Hiss, who were accused of Communist
ties, as well as foreign government officials, such as the Chilean President Salvador
Allende, who were marked as unfriendly by the U.S. Government. See, e.g.,
Douglas Martin, Victor Rabinowitz, 96, Leftist Lawyer Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20,
2007, at B. Moreover, Rabinowitz was the lead counsel for the appellant in
Harmon v. Bruker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958).
536. For the complete transcript, see Victor Rabinowitz, Oral Argument
(Alderson Printing Co. Jan. 27, 1969) [Brennan, Box 197].
537. Id. (responding, "Now I can see why you say it.").
538. Justice John M. Harlan, Draft Dissenting Opinion (Apr. 1, 1969) [Warren,
Box 563] ("[I]t should be made clear that, although trial by court-martial does lack
some of the traditional safeguards of civilian courts, it is attended by many
others.").
539. Id.
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Initially, it appeared that only Warren, White, and Stewart would join
Douglas.5 40 Douglas circulated his dissent on April 8, 1969. "The Court's
opinion leaves me aghast," Douglas began, "The sweep of power of the
Pentagon over members of the armed forces is now broad and seemingly
limitless, save and unless the Pentagon exercises its discretion to let a
civilian authority take over the prosecution. 54' It also included the
statement, "[C]ourts-martial are singularly inept in dealing with the
subtleties of constitutional law., 542 Finally, his draft dissent contained his
belief that the judiciary had to establish the tightest control over the
military legal construct in the Nation's history:
We have at stake the civil liberties of the citizen, not the
image of the Pentagon which is made, or re-made, by the
financial adventurers of the military industrial complex. I
say that the image of the Pentagon is not tarnished by the
luckless sergeant charged with rape in Honolulu.54 3
Expecting to lose, he also argued for a chance to have the case reheard
and for the Court to designate Frederick B. Wiener to present an amicus
brief to the Court. 544 One month after Douglas circulated his dissent,
Fortas and Brennan rethought their initial vote for the early majority; so too
did Black. Fortas had argued that the Court should order a remand to the
lower court to determine whether O'Callahan's offenses fell under military
jurisdiction, even under the rubric of an expansive jurisdiction. 45 On April
11, 1969, Fortas notified Harlan that he opted to join Douglas's opinion
because the initial majority opposed a remand, and Harlan's draft opinion
concluded that the military possessed almost unlimited jurisdiction over its
members. 546 Three days later, Harlan replied to Fortas arguing that "little
540. Chief Justice Earl Warren, Tally Sheet of O'Callahan[Warren, Box 565].
541. Justice William 0. Douglas, Draft Dissenting Opinion (Apr. 8, 1969)
[WOD, Folder 2, Box 1446].
542. Id.The sentence following stated, "A civilian trial, in other words, is held
in an atmosphere conducive to the protection of individual rights, while the military
trial is marked by the age-old manifest destiny of retributive justice." Id.
543. Id.
544. Id.
545. Letter from Justice Abe Fortas to Justice John Harlan (Apr. 11, 1969)
[Brennan, Box 197].
546. Id.Fortas's letter to Harlan, disagreeing with Harlan's view of overarching
military jurisdiction, is instructive to the overall debate:
I am sorry to say that I cannot go along with your draft. I cannot
agree that every person on active duty in the Armed Forces can be
tried by military courts for every offense whatever, wherever
committed, merely because he is in the military. At the conference, I
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would be gained by a remand," and that he considered Douglas's restrictive
test far too narrow.547 Both Fortas's change of heart and his resignation
from the Court prevented Douglas's dissent from being published, thereby
depriving him of a judicial platform
to use such terms as "military
5 48
war.
"illegal
and
complex"
industrial
On May 1, 1969, Warren assigned Douglas to write the majority
opinion. After a brief correspondence between Douglas, Warren, Black,
Brennan, White, and Marshall, Douglas's draft decision was accepted.5 49
The sole circulated draft is almost identical to the published decision with
only grammatical changes and case-cite corrections contained. But because
neither Black nor Marshall appeared willing to accept Douglas's scathing
language, as evidenced in a conference memorandum, the dissent adopted a
significantly different decision, lacking the poignant criticisms of the
military's criminal justice system that was found in Douglas's draft
dissent.550
3. Correspondence, Reaction, and Douglas's Response
Douglas gladly accepted letters criticizing the military justice system
from a number of military personnel as evidence of the system's unjust
character. For instance, he agreed with Captain Maureen Murphy at
Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana, that the Air Force's attempts to find
and discharge homosexuals intruded on the fundamental privacy rights of
airmen. 551 An Army Private and intended Vanderbilt law student stationed
in Vietnam, in thanking Douglas for O'Callahan,wrote,

voted to affirm, but only on narrow grounds. That although the point
is debatable, we could conclude that petitioner's offense had a
sufficiently direct and immediate impact upon the performance of
the Armed Force's military mission to justify bringing this trial
within the constitutional and statutory authority of courts-martial.
Id. Fortas had been one of Douglas's law students while Douglas taught at Yale
Law School. HOYT, supra note 24, at 43.
547. Letter from Justice John Harlan to Justice Abe Fortas (Apr. 14, 1969)
[Brennan, Box 197].
548. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969); Justice William 0. Douglas,
Draft Dissenting Opinion (Apr. 8, 1969) [WOD, Folder 2, Box 1446].
549. Chief Justice Earl Warren, Tally Sheet of O'Callahan[Warren, Box 565].
550. Supreme Court Conference Memorandum on O'Callahan [Warren, Box
565].
551. Letter from Captain Maureen Murphy to Justice William 0. Douglas (June
16, 1969) [WOD, Box 1449]. Captain Murphy was the WAF commander at
Barksdale Air Force Base when the letter was written. Id. Douglas penned a brief
response concluding his total agreement with Murphy, but indicated that the
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[A]bsolute control such as the army has over the enlisted
men is, admittedly, in the interests of efficiency, but
freedom sacrificed to expediency doesn't reflect the ideals
of the Constitution. The position of the enlisted man, or in
my case of involuntary servitude, is one of complete
vulnerability,
subject to the whims of the commanding
2
55

officer.

Douglas wholeheartedly endorsed the private's views and wished him
success in his legal career.553
While many legal commentators lauded O'Callahan,a critical minority
argued that the case was inconsistent with the disciplinary needs of the
military.55 4 Not surprisingly, criticism of O'Callahanappeared within the
military legal community. One author noted, "A repudiation by the
O'Callahanmajority of the principle of law developed in ...[the Quirin
and Kinsella] cases would have been more admirable than the insistence

O'Callahandecision did not address privacy rights. Letter from Justice William 0.
Douglas to Captain Maureen Murphy (1969) [WOD, Box 1449].
552. Letter from Private Ross Hassig to Justice William 0. Douglas (June 16,
1969) [WOD, Box 1449]. Hassig never attended Vanderbilt Law. Instead, he
earned a Doctorate in Anthropology and is today one of the world's leading
scholars in Mesoamerican history and culture.
553. Letter from Justice William 0. Douglas to Private Ross Hassig (June 16,
1969) [WOD, Box 1449].
554. See, e.g., MCBRIDE, supra note 469, at 58-59. On the subject of
O'Callahan, McBride wrote, "[T]he Court's largely one sided discussion of the

competing individual and governmental interests at stake, and its reliance upon
what are at best wholly inconclusive historical data, fall far short of supporting the
contrary conclusion which the majority has reached." Id.
See also G. Nelson & J. Westbrook, Court-Martial Jurisdiction Over
Servicemen for "Civilian" Offenses: An Analysis of O'Callahan v. Parker, 54

MINN. L. REV. 1 (1969); James B. St. John, Jr., Note, MilitaryLaw-Constitutional
Law-Court-MartialJurisdiction Limited to "Service-Connected" Cases, 44 TUL.

L. REV. 417 (1970). St. John argued:
Although certain aspects of the decision will benefit the serviceman,
it seems likely that this aspect will have unfavorable results.
Moreover, the decision will almost certainly force the military to
abdicate a portion of its in loco parentis role. Absent any service
connection, the activities of armed forces personnel will no longer be
subjected to the restraining influence of military discipline. Given
the youth and inexperience of many young servicemen, this forced
abdication of the military's in locoparentis role may be undesirable.
Id.at 425.
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that O'Callahanis consistent with ...[these] cases. 555 Frederick Bernays
Wiener, an attorney that Douglas admired and sought guidance from, and
who had represented the petitioners in Toth, Reid, and Kinsella, argued:
The Court's opinion made no mention of the circumstance
that the specific terms of the fifth amendment plainly made
indictment by grand jury inapplicable to members of the
armed forces, nor that such members had never since the
beginning had the slightest claims to trial by petit jury.
Indeed, with characteristic inconsistency, Justice Douglas
failed even to cite his own unanimous opinion in Whelchel
v. McDonald.... 556
Just as Douglas received correspondences after the publication of his
Look Magazine article, a large amount of mail came to him after both the
O'Callahan decision and Captain Levy's release on bail. Douglas's
responses to the mail show an increasingly entrenched anti-military
position. For instance, in August 1969, Captain Frank E. Brown, the staff
judge advocate at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, in a three-page, single-spaced,
typed letter, systematically challenged Douglas's belief that courts-martial
were bereft of due-process protections.55 7 Brown's letter to Douglas and
Douglas's response are not only indicative that Douglas believed that the
part of the military's legal construct responsible for discipline and criminal
justice was inherently antiquated, if not corrupted by the Executive Branch,
they are also evidence of Douglas's belief that the officers charged with the
internal oversight of the military's legal construct were either
untrustworthy or ignorant.558
After assuring Douglas that he "was a far cry from a career military
apologist who rationalizes each situation with the end in mind of showing
the military can do no wrong," Brown conceded that Douglas's view had
merit prior to the enactment of the UCMJ in 1950.159 He also accepted the
fact that courts-martial practices were imperfect and required

555. Paul Jackson Rice, O'Callahan v. Parker: Court-Martial Jurisdiction,
"Service Connection," Confusion, and the Serviceman, 51 MiL. L. REv. 41, 56
(1971).
556. Weiner, supra note 23, at 57 (concluding that O'Cahallan embodied an
"anti-military shriek," later found in the dissent in Solorio).
557. Letter from Captain Frank E. Brown to Justice William 0. Douglas (Aug.
11, 1969) [WOD, Box 1449].
558. Id.; Letter from Justice William 0. Douglas to Captain Frank E. Brown
(Sept. 4, 1969) [WOD, Box 1449].
559. Letter from Captain Frank E. Brown to Justice William 0. Douglas (Aug.
11, 1969) [WOD, Box 1449].
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improvements, but so too did civil trials.5 60 Brown pointedly challenged
Douglas's assertion that laymen in civil trials were less biased toward
defendants than college-educated officers assigned to courts-martial and
that the legal officers charged with the duty of overseeing courts-martial
were mere instrumentalities for a commander's view of discipline.5 6'
Instead of engaging Brown in a philosophical dialogue, and ignoring
Brown's respectful recognition that Douglas had a "distinguished career in
the service of the United States," Douglas tersely replied,
Your views reflect one school of thought. But you
overlook two things:
You err in referring to the
O'Callahanopinion as my opinion when it was written not
for me but for the consensus. Secondly, you overlook the
Sixth Amendment and Art. III of the Constitution; a habit
more common among officers from Captain on up, than
among those from lieutenant on down.562
As in the case of much of Douglas's writing, he prepared his own draft
responses to Brown that were never sent but were kept in Douglas's files.
One of these, dated August 27, 1969, caustically noted that most of the
justices who concurred in O'Callahanhad "extensive military service.' 563
The insulting implication in Douglas's deleted comment was clear: Brown
was a legal neophyte whose unwelcome beliefs on the efficacy of the
modem military justice system were a nuisance rather than a bona fide
intellectual defense. 564
560. Id.
561. Id.Brown noted,
The Judge Advocates of the military services are, for the most part,
conscientious and dedicated individuals who are striving to make the
military justice system the finest possible. The day is long past when
military justice was administered as an adjunct of command
prerogative ....
Comments such as made in the O'Callahan case, many of which
were, in my opinion unnecessary to the final decision, only serve to
make our job more difficult and hamper, rather than help, the
administration of a fair an impartial system of justice. I might point
out that your indictment of the military failed to mention that the law
under which we operate is framed by one of the most elite groups of
civilians in the world-the Congress of the United States.
Id.
562. Letter from Justice William 0. Douglas to Captain Frank E. Brown (Sept. 4,
1969) [WOD, Box 1449].
563. Draft Letter from Justice William 0. Douglas to Captain Frank E. Brown
(Aug. 27, 1969) [WOD, Box 1449].
564. Id.
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O'Callahan also resulted in intense criticism from congressional
conservatives. Congressman F. Edward Hebert complained to Chief Justice
Douglas Burger, "I cannot understand how Justice William 0. Douglas is
allowed to hamstring the military. 5 65 Hebert was a longtime critic of
Douglas, and earlier that year, prior to the publication of O'Callahan,the
congressman threatened Chief Justice Warren that if the Court did not stop
Douglas's anti-military holdings, then he would sponsor legislation to curb
the Court's jurisdiction.566 It was a hollow threat, but it put the Court on
notice that it had become a political cause. Indeed, Nixon had campaigned
for the Presidency in 1968 with a promise
to appoint justices who would
5 67
undo the Warren Court's judicial activism.
Of greater concern was a conservative congressional alliance, led by
House Minority Leader Gerald Ford, formed specifically to force Douglas's
removal.568 But Douglas was not intimidated by critics such as Ford and
Hebert. Indeed, Hebert was the type of reactionary politician whom
Douglas did not shy from, and Douglas recognized that Ford was working
as an agent of Nixon.569 In 1948, Hebert served alongside Nixon in a
subcommittee of the House Un-American Affairs Committee investigating
Alger Hiss. 570 As previously noted, Hiss was one of Douglas's friends. In
one of the modem era's more egregious displays of racism and sexism,
Hebert, while serving as the House of Representative's Armed Services
Committee Majority Chairman, refused to allocate two seats for Ronald
Dellums, an African-American congressman, and Patricia Schroeder, a
565. Letter from Congressman F. Edward Hebert to Chief Justice Warren E.
Burger (Aug. 8, 1969) [WOD, Box 1468]. See also BALL & COOPER, supra note
140, at 306.
566. Letter from F. Edward Hebert to Chief Justice Earl Warren (Jan. 24, 1969)
[WOD, Box 1648].
567. See LAMB & HALPERN, supra note 29, at 433; EARL M. MALTZ, THE CHIEF
JUSTICESHIP OF WARREN BURGER, 1969-1986, at 11 (2000). Nixon considered
Herbert Brownell, the Attorney General during Eisenhower's presidency, or
Thomas Dewey, a former Republican New York Governor, to replace Earl Warren
as Chief Justice, but decided on Warren Burger. In a press conference regarding
Burger's nomination, Nixon stated his admiration for Felix Frankfurter, and his
belief that Burger would be a strict constructionist. Press Conference of Richard
Nixon 1 PuB. PAPERS 1003 (May 22, 1969). Douglas's opinion of Frankfurter by
this time was very low and, as previously noted, he derided Burger.
568. See DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, GERALD FORD 37-40 (2007). Brinkley notes that
the idea behind impeachment was Nixon's, and "in the end Ford's effort to impeach
Douglas failed miserably." Id.
569. See DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS, supra note 39, at 359-64.
570. CLARENCE L. MOHR, TULANE, THE EMERGENCE OF A MODERN UNIVERSITY,
1945-1980, at 71 (2001).
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72
congresswoman. 5 7' Hebert claimed that each only merited half of a seat.1
However, even if Douglas viewed Ford and Hebert as members of a
political fringe, the fact that Fortas's resignation occurred after an
impeachment threat could not have left him unaffected. 73

IV. CONCLUSION
From the end of World War II through 1969, the Court influenced
Congress and the Executive Branch to reform the military's justice system
by incorporating due-process standards into courts-martial. Douglas's role
in this process cannot be disputed. He was the leader of a judicial alliance
that reduced the reach of the military's jurisdiction and forced standards of
fairness that had never before existed in courts-martial. He also reduced
the Executive Branch's almost unlimited control of the part of the
military's legal construct that came into conflict with individual rights. But
his efforts to reduce the Executive Branch's authority over the employment
of the armed forces did not succeed, principally because his fellow justices
and former peers did not join him and also because political currents began
to work against him.
O'Callahan was a short-lived decision, through not visibly because
Congress or the Court saw Douglas's intents in authoring it, but, rather, for
reasons analyzed in the third article in this series: its jurisdictional
requirements proved unworkable. However, as Douglas's assault on the
military's legal construct resulted in little support in any of the three
branches of government, O'Callahan'sshort life is not merely explainable
simply because it narrowed the jurisdictional reach of courts-martial to the
point where courts-martial became an irrelevancy. 574 In 1973, in Holtzman
75
v. Schlesinger,1
Douglas unsuccessfully attempted to convince the Court
571. See ROBERT REMINI, THE HOUSE:
REPRESENTATIVES 444-46 (2006).

THE HISTORY OF THE HOUSE OF

572. Id. at 445.
573. KALMAN, supranote 507, at 373.
574. However, Congress legislated the

War Powers Act, which has yet to be

tested in the Court. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. 1541-48 (1988); Ange v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509 (D.D.C.
1990); John Hart Ely, Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act that Worked,

88 COLUM. L. REV. 1379 (1988); Eugene v. Rostow, Great Cases Make Bad Law:
The War Powers Act, 50 TEX. L. REV. 833 (1972); and John C. Cruden, The WarMaking Process, 69 MIL. L. REV. 35 (1975).

575. 361 F. Supp 553 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), rev'd 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973).
Douglas's stay against U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit's holding was
overturned by the Supreme Court. See Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1304
(1973).
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to determine whether the President could be enjoined from conducting
military activities in a neutral country. 76 In this case, a congresswoman
challenged Nixon's authority to order the Air Force to bomb targets in
Cambodia, but the Court denied certiorari of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit's determination that it lacked jurisdiction to review the
issue.577
Douglas was unable to significantly alter the military's legal construct
in terms of the authority over the armed forces possessed by the Executive
Branch. Indeed, the Executive Branch, on more than one occasion, has
directed the military to engage in publicly unpopular military operations. A
newer political ideology seeking the establishment of a unitary executive
claims that the Executive Branch enjoys its greatest control over the
military during periods in which the Executive Branch determines a
national emergency exists or commits its military forces into conflict,
apparently regardless of whether Congress legislatively approved of the
action.
Unlike during the early McCarthy era, however, the Legislative Branch
has increasingly resisted the Executive Branch's encroachment, and the
new ideology, if not discredited, has at least seen its key adherents
subjected to public opprobrium. Finally, it might very well have surprised
Douglas that John Yoo, one of the well-known advocates of that ideology,
recently criticized the Judge Advocate General for testifying in Congress
that certain legal positions of the military's civilian leaders, such as the
permissibility of torture and trials of insurgents without full disclosure of
evidence, were contrary to standards of due process. 578 Their testimony
576. Holtzman, 414 U.S. at 1305-06.
577. Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973).

The appellate

court introduced the case with the following language:
At the outset, as the parties agreed below and on the argument on
appeal, we should emphasize that we are not deciding the wisdom,
the propriety or the morality of the war in Indo-China and
particularly the on-going bombing in Cambodia. This is the
responsibility of the Executive and the Legislative branches of the
government.
Id. at 1308. Whether Douglas agreed or not is unknown, but his grant of a stay
clearly evidenced a desire for the Court to determine whether a member of the
legislature had standing to enjoin the President through the Judiciary.
578. See Glenn Sulmasy & John Yoo, Challenges to Civilian Control of the
Military: A Rational Choice Approach to the War on Terror, 54 UCLA L. REV.

1815, 1833-37 (2007). Sulmasy and Yoo believe that military attorneys defending
enemy aliens in military tribunals could be lawfully prohibited from seeking redress
in Congress or the media, or through habeas appeals. They also argue that appeals
to customary international law as defenses could result in disciplining the attorneys.
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exposed that politically appointed counsel, employed in the Defense
Department and at the White House, departed from traditional
interpretations regarding national obligations to uphold the laws of war and
basic rights enumerated in treaties. Douglas's belief that the military's
leadership and its law
officers were a monolithic entity, uninterested in due
579
process, was wrong.
Douglas also narrowed O'Callahan's reach, voting to deny its
retroactivity, in 1970, in Relford v. Commandant. s° In 1974, Douglas
dissented in Parker v. Levy, 58 in which the Court upheld the military's
authority to regulate conduct and speech through non-enumerated,
common-law offenses, and with the holding it upheld Captain Levy's
conviction.58 2 Although Parker is analyzed in another article, it is worth
noting Douglas's criticism of the majority's decision in which he wrote:
The power to draft an army includes, of course, the power
to curtail considerably the "liberty" of the people who
make it up. But Congress in these articles has not
undertaken to cross the forbidden First Amendment line.
Making a speech or comment on one of the most important
and controversial public issues of the past two decades
cannot by any stretch of dictionary meaning be included in
"disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and
discipline in the armed forces." Nor can what Captain
Levy said possibly be "conduct of a nature to bring
discredit upon the armed forces." He was uttering his own
belief-an article of faith that he sincerely held. This was
no mere ploy to perform a "subversive" act. Many others
who loved their country shared his views. They were not
saboteurs. Uttering one's beliefs is sacrosanct under the

Additionally, they claim that the Judge Advocates General, when testifying before
Congress as to deficiencies in the Executive Branch's construct of military trials,
created a dangerous precedent to the concept of civilian control over the military.
Id.
It is this author's contention that Sulmasy & Yoo's article, in particular its
use of military history, is either characterized by historic illiteracy or intentional
malfeasance. Nonetheless, the complaints listed in this Article would surely have
surprised Douglas.
579. Id.
580. 401 U.S. 355 (1971).
581. 417 U.S. 733, 766 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
582. Id. at 769-70.
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is an
Punishing the utterances
First Amendment.
583
"abridgment" of speech in the constitutional sense.
Having narrowed the in personam reach of courts-martial, Douglas had
tried, but failed, to reduce the military's subject matter jurisdiction. Had
Douglas fully succeeded, the military's disciplinary enforcement would
largely exist under the control of civilian courts, unaccustomed to the needs
of military discipline. As a result, civilian juries would be asked to
determine, for instance, whether a soldier had a right to kill a civilian in a
zone of conflict without understanding the environment of that zone. Such
a scenario could either work to the benefit or the detriment of the soldier,
but the decision would not be arrived at by a jury of the soldier's peers.
While historically there have been a number of legal scholars who believe
this is appropriate, Congress has thus far resisted calls to limit jurisdiction
based on Douglas's model. There is good reason for this resistance. The
evidence of the overall conduct of uniformed U.S. forces in the current
conflicts in Iraq and in Afghanistan, including courts-martial prosecutions
and administrative determinations stemming from assignment to those
theatres, clearly indicates that Douglas was wrong in deriding the need for
a fully-jurisdictional-military discipline system, even in peacetime. The
U.S. today fields the most disciplined fighting force in its history, and the
military's legal construct has not resulted in blindly monolithic
commanders or uniformed lawyers.

583. Id. at 772. Douglas also included:
I cannot imagine, however, that Congress would think it had the
power to authorize the military to curtail the reading list of books,
plays, poems, periodicals, papers, and the like which a person in the
Armed Services may read. Nor can I believe Congress would
assume authority to empower the military to suppress conversations
at a bar, ban discussions of public affairs, prevent enlisted men or
women or draftees from meeting in discussion groups at times and
places and for such periods of time that do not interfere with the
performance of military duties.
Congress has taken no such step here. By Art. 133 it has allowed
punishment for "conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman."
In our society where diversities are supposed to flourish it never
could be "unbecoming" to express one's views, even on the most
controversial public issue.
Article 134 covers only "all disorders and neglects to the prejudice
of good order and discipline in the armed forces, all conduct of a
nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces."
Id. at 769.

